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1Preface
The Nordic Energy Perspectives project has clarified several economically sig-
nificant opportunities and challenges for Nordic energy actors. With an interdis-
ciplinary approach, involving research groups from four Nordic countries and 
different traditions, the opportunities of EU policy and market integration have 
been explored. The aim of the project is to provide a better basis for decisions on 
energy and environmental policy at both national and international levels. It is 
intended to contribute to constructive dialogue between researchers, politicians, 
authorities and actors in the energy markets.
A second phase of the project has been carried out during 2007-2010. This book 
summarises important results.
More than 20 organisations financed the second phase of the project. Many of 
them were represented on the board of directors. The board holds the overall 
responsibility for the project. The research leaders have led the scientific work. 
The project managers have been responsible for co-ordination of the project. 
Together we have striven actively for rapid and extensive dissemination of re-
sults. The board can happily note that the researchers have delivered interesting 
results, meeting expectations as well as time schedules.
The research issues of the second phase are related to targets and measures of 
the EU’s energy and climate policy package. Examples of areas that have been 
analysed are the function and development of the energy markets and infrastruc-
ture, effective measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions – renewable energy 
and other energy with low CO
2
 emissions, together with energy efficiency and 
resource management – as well as security of supply issues.
Core research activities have been the synthesis work of different perspectives, 
results and models of the research-groups from different countries and scientific 
disciplines.
Results produced by the project’s researchers have been examined and quality-
assured.  They are not only reviewed by the project directors from a scientific 
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perspective, but also challenged at several conferences and workshops with par-
ticipating, external experts from relevant fields. 
The board has not interfered with the scientific freedom of researchers. Thus, the 
researchers, not the project as such, are accountable for the contents of this book.
An objective of Nordic Energy Perspectives has been to create a forum for fact-
based discussion between politicians, civil servants, industrialists and other en-
ergy actors from different disciplines and countries. This forum is active. We are 
eager that these discussions shall continue on the themes dealt with by Nordic 
Energy Perspectives. Hence, for each of the result sections below, we identify 
the researchers whom the reader can contact for further dialogue. Another means 
of contact is the project’s web site: www.nordicenergyperspectives.org.
We extend warm thanks to the project management as well as to all the resear-
chers who have contributed to the project’s second phase. As this is written we 
look forward to the final seminar and the enlightening discussions we hope will 
follow!
For the project board in April 2010
Tomas Kåberger
Chairman
3How to read this book
Nordic Energy Perspectives (NEP) is an interdisciplinary Nordic energy research 
project which, from a holistic perspective, has analysed and created new insights 
into the consequences for energy markets and energy systems of the goals and 
instruments of energy policy in the light of new environmental conditions. 
The project’s aim has been to provide better bases for decisions on energy and 
environmental policy at both national and international levels. 
This book is one part of the documentation of the project. It is truly a challenge 
to present the results from such a large project in the compact form of a book. We 
have chosen an approach where we highlight certain aspects in the form of short 
chapters that presents conclusions and syntheses based on the project’s results 
and analyses. We call them “20 perspectives on Nordic energy”. In addition 
to these chapters we present ten sections, which are a translation of these 
perspectives into “opportunities and challenges” for the Nordic energy systems.
20 perspectives on Nordic energy
This book presents the following 20 perspectives on Nordic energy:
• Significant impact of meeting the EU energy and climate package on Nordic 
energy markets
• Future options for large-scale stationary energy production with low CO
2
 
emissions in the Nordic countries – nuclear in the near future, CCS a new 
long term option
• The EU renewable target is the main driver for reducing Nordic emissions of 
CO
2
 by 20 %
• Large renewable energy resources in the Nordic region - but the extent to 
which the use of these resources can be increased varies significantly from 
country to country
• Energy efficiency measures in the entire energy system leads to synergies
• Large, profitable efficiency improvement potential in end-use - existing pro-
grammes and simple measures give significant improvements in efficiency
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• The development of the Nordic electricity system: Towards zero CO
2
 emis-
sions?
• Can we expect electricity demand to grow?
• Millions of electric vehicles will have manageable impacts on the Nordic 
power system
• Huge opportunities for Nordic electricity export in a widened European elec-
tricity market
• Scenarios for the Baltic Sea Region
• District heating – an important part of a sustainable Nordic energy system
• District heating price model – important for future competitiveness
• Proactive strategies for environmental sustainability of municipal energy 
companies – pathways of sustainable development in the stationary energy 
system
• Leading indicators in successful facilitation schemes for Clean Tech compa-
nies with an extensive operating history – the case of increasing growth and 
export volumes in the Swedish biomass combustion manufacturing industry
• International climate policy participation critical for Nordic industry compe-
titiveness
• The forest industry in the Nordic region – a temporary dip or the beginning 
of a structurally driven decline?
• Broader participation required for successful emissions reduction as global 
energy demand increases
• Global climate challenge – a stimulant for a new Nordic business?
• Perspectives on security of supply issues in the Nordic countries?
• Is nuclear power a threat to security of supply?
• Potential effects on the Nordic region of a gas shortage in Europe - increased 
demand of gas in EU and decreased production gives increased dependence 
of imports
Ten opportunities and challenges
This book also includes ten sections concentrating on related challenges and 
opportunities:
• The challenge of implementing the EU climate and energy package in the 
Nordic countries
- Identifying synergies is the key to cost-efficient solutions, and opens for 
opportunities
- New technology gives new opportunities
- A large share of the CO
2
 reductions are taken by the trading sector
5• Utilize CO
2
 lean electricity and district heating as measu-
res in the transformation of the energy system 
- Measures that transfer the responsibility from the 
non-trading sector to the trading-sector are important
- Measures that reduce more than one greenhouse gas 
at the same time
• The Nordic renewable energy resources provide opportu-
nities, but also challenges
- Opportunities for Nordic cooperation in order to ef-
fectively utilize the renewable resources – within the Nordic region
- Effective use of the Nordic renewable energy resource – the EU perspec-
tive
- A proper balance between different demands for the biomass resource
• Three energy efficiency challenges
- Choose a policy that gives equivalent incentives to improve efficiency in 
the whole energy system
- The choice of policy instruments – finding a good balance
- Large incentives might be required to reach the 20% efficiency target
 
• The challenge of making Nordic electricity (almost) CO
2
 free
- A strict marginal perspective
- Intermittent electricity production, e.g. wind power, is a challenge for the 
Nordic electricity market
- Electricity disclosure and trade in guarantees of origin (GO)
• Finding the balance between politics and markets - a recurring theme in the 
Nordic Energy Perspectives 
- The Nordic electricity market is increasingly policy-driven
- Successful deregulation requires adequate reregulation
- The market cannot always be blamed
• Important issues to consider in a further integration of the electricity markets 
in Northern Europe
- The Nordic renewable energy resources are valuable in an European 
perspective
- A further integration is likely to further expose differences in national 
policy measures
- Electricity-price volatility is likely to rise as the share of intermittent 
production is increased
• The district heating challenge – how to remain competitive and contribute to 
a sustainable development if/when energy demand starts to decline
- Increased efforts towards a more efficient use of energy in buildings 
tends to reduce heating demand
The sections 
presenting the 
”Opportunities 
and Challenges” 
in this book are 
marked with 
green bars.
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- Increased competition from increasingly efficient heat pumps may also 
decrease total district heating demand in the Nordic countries
- Climate and energy policies influence district heating demand and produc-
tion, both positive and negative
• Industrial and export development for Nordic industry – opportunities and 
challenges
- Macro economic changes
- Can energy also in the future support the global competitiveness of 
Nordic industry?
- Case study: Time consuming physical presence in local markets is often 
necessary
• The challenge to use energy systems modelling in a “wise and appropriate” 
manner in large multidisciplinary research projects
- Success factors, based on lessons learned in NEP
It has also been a challenge for the project to reach its 
overall goal of “demonstrating means for stronger and 
sustainable growth and development in the Nordic 
countries”. By showing all these opportunities we are 
convinced that the project’s results and conclusions can 
– if they are taken into consideration – contribute to 
strengthening the development in the Nordic countries and 
Nordic cooperation.
Other NEP reports
In addition to this book the results from the NEP project are presented through a 
number of additional channels:
A book describing experiences from the extensive use of energy-system models: 
Coordinated use of energy-system models in energy and climate-policy analysis 
– lessons learned from the NEP project.
A booklet concentrating on the opportunities and challenges that has been 
identified for the Nordic energy systems: Ten opportunities and challenges for 
Nordic Energy – towards a sustainable Nordic energy system.
A number of research reports and presentations from workshops and conferences 
that can be found on the project’s web site: www.nordicenergyperspectives.org. 
These reports provide more comprehensive and detailed descriptions of the 
project’s results and analyses within different areas.
It has also been a 
challenge for the 
project to reach its 
overall goal”
”
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1. Introduction 
Nordic Energy Perspectives (NEP) is an interdisciplinary energy research pro-
ject with the overall goal of demonstrating means for sustainable growth and 
development in the Nordic countries. The Nordic energy system is the point of 
departure, seen from a European and a global perspective.
The second phase of the project has been carried out during 2007-2010. This 
book summarises the most important results and conclusions. 
NEP analyses the national and international political goals, directives, and po-
licy instruments within the energy area, as well as their influence on the Nord-
ic energy sector. The analysis includes the impact on energy markets, energy 
systems, infrastructures and institutional structures. NEP aims at clarifying to 
decision-makers the consequences for politicians, energy actors and the public 
of political and strategic decisions. The project is intended to promote a con-
structive dialogue among researchers, politicians, authorities and other actors on 
the energy markets. 
This second phase is characterized by:
- The most important market actors have participated
- Experienced researchers involved
- Cross scientific cooperation and process of synthesis
- Professional energy models
- Intense dissemination of results.
The aim is to make better and more well-balanced decisions between competing 
ends possible. The project also presents ways for the Nordic countries and their 
energy actors to meet the demands from the rest of the world regarding environ-
mental adjustments and security of supply in a cost efficient manner. 
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THE EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE PACKAGE
On January 23 2008 the EU Commission presented its 
energy and climate package and in December 2008 an 
agreement with the EU Parliament was reached. The 
goal for the policy package is to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases by at least 20 % compared to 1990 and 
to increase the renewable share in the EU energy mix 
from 8.5 to 20 % until the year 2020.
The target for CO
2
 emissions reduction of 20 % compared to the 1990 level 
corresponds to a reduction of 14 % compared to the 2005 level. The reduc-
tion should be reached partly within the system for emission trading and partly 
through measures in other sectors. The trading system will be expanded and 
the number of emission allowances will gradually be reduced in a way that the 
emissions covered by the system decreases by 21 % until 2020, compared to the 
2005 level.
Within the sectors not included in the emission trading system the emissions 
should, as an average, be reduced by 10 % compared to the 2005 level. For 
these sectors a burden sharing has been applied, taking each country’s specific 
prerequisites into account.
In order to reach the 20 % target for increased use of renewable energy until 
2020 the EU Commission has assigned individual and mandatory targets for all 
EU countries. The policy package also includes the target that at least 10 % of 
all fuels in the EU´s transport sector should be biofuels. 
The EU’s energy and climate package also includes a requirement for energy 
efficiency improvements of 9 % by 2016, and a proposal for 20 % energy ef-
ficiency improvements by 2020.
The EU Commission has also issued new guidelines for governmental support 
to environmental protection which should help the member states to develop a 
sustainable European energy and climate policy.
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Towards a sustainable energy system
A common aspiration in the EU´s and the Nordic countries´ policies is to de-
velop the society in a sustainable direction. The future energy system is an im-
portant part of such a society. In the NEP project we have a general view of a 
sustainable development of the society, but our focus is directed towards the 
demands such a society will put on the energy system.
Since 2001 the EU has a general strategy for sustainable development. A key 
element is that environmental protection, social cohesion and economic pros-
perity must go hand in hand. The strategy should, according to its aims, found 
a basis for reviews and development of EU policy within different areas during 
the coming years. The EU´s energy and climate policy package could be seen in 
this perspective.
The EU´s energy and climate policy package has been viewed as an operational 
expression of an energy policy for the EU, based on the general strategy for 
sustainability. The analysis in the project is based on the targets of the package.
Research focus
The research focus of NEP is described below under four headings (A-D), which 
agree well with the orientation of the EU’s energy and climate policy package.
A. Markets and structures (infrastructure and institutional structure)
NEP is intended to demonstrate consequences and values of continued develop-
ment and integration of the energy markets (for electricity, gas, district heating 
and fuels) in a Nordic perspective. In the event of continued integration with the 
rest of Europe, NEP also aims at demonstrating a number of possible paths of 
development.
This is done by analysing how the Nordic energy markets can be developed 
within the framework of new changes in the surrounding world, how the fun-
ctions involved can be improved, and which types of incentives and political 
control/planning are required for carrying out necessary investments in the in-
frastructures. Central is also the trade-off between the different infrastructures’ 
expansion and the mutual balance of network, production and use. Emphasis is 
also placed on the institutional structures, including e.g. the question of a com-
mon Nordic ISO/TSO.
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B. Lower carbon dioxide emissions, more renewable energy, and 
more energy with lower CO2 emission
NEP indicates ways to meet the demands for lower carbon dioxide emissions, 
and describes the consequences for the Nordic energy system. We analyse both 
the existing and more long-term requirements. In particular NEP clarifies the 
consequences of increased use of renewable energy and energy solutions with 
low CO
2
 emissions. The consequenses for CO
2
 reductions are seen both in a 
Nordic and a global perspective. In addition, the consequenses for the develop-
ment of the energy markets and industrial progress in a Nordic and a European 
perspective. 
Impact analyses are made using NEP’s comprehensive model toolbox, supple-
mented with more traditional qualitative analyses. We demonstrate the conse-
quences of both current and alternative political goals, controls for CO
2
 reduc-
tion and greater use of renewable energy. The project aims at clarifying how the 
development can benefit the Nordic region. Moreover, we elucidate the roles 
of the different kinds of energy in future development. It is of interest to find 
out how increased use of renewable energy in the energy sector influences and 
competes with other sectors/activities and to identify opportunities for industrial 
development in the Nordic countries.
C. Security of supply and energy resources 
NEP indicates how we can increase the security of supplies of energy, by making 
our Nordic energy-system infrastructures safe as regards operation and deli-
very, and by helping to decrease the dependence on imports in the Nordic region 
and the EU/Europe. Moreover, NEP clarifies which roles our own energy resour-
ces and our Nordic energy markets can play for supply security in a Nordic and 
a European perspective.
The analyses of security of supply are not made separately in NEP. The analy-
ses of import dependence are integrated with the energy-system analyses made 
under B and D.  In these analyses NEP’s models are used extensively and are 
supplemented with qualitative analyses. The analyses of the function of the en-
ergy system are integrated with the market analyses in A.
D. Energy efficiency and resource management
NEP indicates means for improved efficiency and resource management at all 
levels (supply, distribution and use) in the Nordic energy system. The project 
describes how these influence the development of the energy markets and CO
2
 
emissions, and the role played by increased efficiency at the different levels in 
the energy system. It also demonstrates the consequences of the political requi-
rements (goals and policy tools) for increased energy efficiency which have been 
set up by the EU and the Nordic countries.
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This is done through impact analyses using NEP’s comprehensive toolbox of 
models, supplemented with more traditional analyses. Analyses of the poten-
tial for energy efficiency are conducted at an aggregated level and with data 
from other experts’ detailed analyses throughout the energy system. Thereby 
we analyse the roles played by different types of energy efficiency measures, 
ranging from end-use measures to the utilisation of surplus heat in the district 
heating system. Moreover, we show the consequences of formulating goals for 
improved energy efficiency as requirements for reducing the use of energy (e.g. 
primary energy) or as reducing environmental influence (e.g. CO
2
).
Important points of departure
The project has the following important points of departure for development of 
the Nordic energy markets and energy systems. These points of departure are 
also central for the interdisciplinary synthesis work in the project.
Welfare development in the Nordic countries and the significance
of energy for it.  
 The project’s overall ambition is to contribute to strengthening economic 
growth and welfare development in the Nordic countries. Therefore, the 
welfare perspective is fundamental for NEP. A central research question 
for the project’s synthesis work regarding energy and welfare is what the 
Nordic countries require in order to continue to be a growth region. 
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For the development of welfare, seen from a perspective of energy
policy, three dimensions and driving forces are central: 
• Efficiency and competitiveness – the role and function of energy 
markets 
 The role of the liberalised energy markets for welfare development in the 
Nordic countries and the European Union is a key focus in the project. In 
the interdisciplinary synthesis, the role and function of the energy mar-
kets is analysed both in terms of the markets and from the viewpoint of 
welfare economics (efficiency and distribution effects). Different energy 
markets (electricity, biomass, peat, district heating, gas etc.) also have 
different logics and the interplay between markets is important, as is 
interplay with the markets for EU ETS and green certificates. 
• Security of energy supply 
 Developments in other countries have led to increased emphasis on se-
curity of supply. The project’s focus is on the consequences this has for 
the Nordic countries. Are there reasons for a special role of the Nordic 
countries in Europe, such as being a “centre for renewable energy”?  
 Security of electricity supply has particularly high political priority. This 
issue raises a number of important research questions. If a power deficit 
occurs, what will receive priority? How is the power capacity influenced 
by increased integration of Europe’s electricity network? Can the Nordic 
countries’ easily regulated hydro power acquire greater importance as a 
balancing/peak load in an integrated European electricity system?
• Climatic and environmental considerations
 Long-term development of welfare must also take climate and environ-
ment into account. The third dimension, and driving force for this de-
velopment, is thus policy on climate and environment. A special focus 
is laid in the second phase of the project upon climate policy after 2012 
and its consequences for the energy markets and energy systems. The 
development of EU ETS during 2008-2012 is also a main topic for the 
project’s analyses. The development is analysed from the perspective of 
what will make the trade-based policy instruments (EU ETS and green 
certificates) function in the long time perspective (both during and after 
the Kyoto agreement’s term of validity). 
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In energy policy, continual assessments and prioritisations are mad
between these three dimensions and driving forces. Political visions,
goals and policy instruments clarify these priorities for the short and
long run. 
• Energy policy: national, Nordic, and within the EU 
 NEP follows and analyses energy policy regarding the political trade-
offs between competitiveness/efficiency, security of supply and climate/
environment, as well as the prioritisations between the energy sector and 
other sectors. We also analyse and clarify the advantages of increased 
coordination of energy policy between the Nordic countries and coor-
dination with EU policy. As a point of departure the political goals and 
visions in the Nordic countries and the EU are emphasised. A question 
is whether current political goals and policy instruments will lead to an 
effective and desirable development of the energy markets in the Nordic 
countries and northern Europe. 
 Our joint effort toward sustainable development, is often expressed in 
the three factors of economic, social and ecological sustainability. These 
have clear connections with the three dimensions described above: com-
petitiveness/efficiency, security of supply and climate/environment. In 
the project’s analyses and syntheses, sustainable development is thus a 
pervasive concept. 
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Other points of departure for NEP 
• The Nordic dimension
 The project is Nordic and asks both what is best for the Nordic countries 
and what it means to deviate from the rest of Europe and/or global de-
velopments. Globalisation and the international energy markets are also 
important geopolitical dimensions. 
• All kinds of energy and the entire chain from supply to consumption
 The whole Nordic energy system with all kinds of energy is in focus. 
The entire chain from supply through transmission/distribution to use, is 
treated by the project’s analytical tools. 
• Infrastructures and institutional structures in interplay and compe-
tition
 An important research focus is on the interplay and competition between 
different infrastructures, including the institutional structures and the 
control of systems driving the expansion of infrastructures. The balance 
between markets and politics has been a recurring theme in the second 
phase of the NEP. 
• Time horizons, short- and long-term 
 The time perspective in Nordic Energy Perspectives is both short- and 
long-term. However, the research focus throughout is on current issues, 
for which the short- and long-term consequences are analysed. This is 
essential since the influence on energy systems and markets is often both 
short- and long-term. It is also important because different actors are 
at different stages or “time windows” in their decision processes. The 
project’s ambition is to produce adequate fact and decision bases for all 
the collaborating actors. 
• Energy models as decision support in the Nordic countries and the 
EU 
 The project makes use of a unique array of professional energy-system 
models which ensures high-quality analysis of the Nordic energy sys-
tems’ development. Moreover, we have excellent possibilities of compa-
ring the models with each other and understanding their special proper-
ties. This insight is important since the models are continuously used for 
political and strategic decisions on energy in the Nordic countries.  
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Objective
Nordic Energy Perspectives has the overall goal of demonstrating means for 
stronger and sustainable growth and development in the Nordic countries. 
Important sub-goals for achieving the overall goal in a Nordic perspective are: 
 
• To identify advantages of continued integration of the energy markets in the 
Nordic countries, and identify obstacles to strengthen the Nordic countries as 
a common marketplace. 
• To identify advantages of continued integration and its influence on the energy 
markets between the Nordic countries and the rest of Europe (as well as glo-
bally).
• To identify opportunities of business development in the Nordic countries, for 
new business development within the field of energy/climate, and to increase 
the competitiveness of existing business.
• To clarify how the EU energy policy influences the Nordic countries (on both 
policy and markets) and how the Nordic countries can contribute to realising 
the EU energy policy not only for market development, but also for:
• reduction of carbon dioxide emissions;
• increased use of renewable energy;
• increased efficiency of energy;
• greater security of supply.
• To identify advantages of an increase in Nordic energy-policy cooperation and 
shared outlook. 
Furthermore:
• The research activity has a scientific basis.
• The project contributes to a constructive dialogue between politicians, autho-
rities, the energy industry and the energy users. 
• It generates results that contribute to improved support for the political deci-
sions both nationally and internationally.
• It actively disseminates the results to decision-makers, opinion-builders and 
others concerned in our Nordic countries.
• It develops or refines purposive and credible analytical methods and model-
ling tools which are used for the impact analyses within the project. The met-
hods and tools can be used for the stakeholders’ analytical needs outside the 
project.
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Method 
The research work of Nordic Energy Perspectives is distinguished by:
Experienced researchers: nearly all of the research work is performed by senior 
researchers at universities, institutes and consultancy companies, who are well-
accustomed to research collaboration and result-oriented research.
Interdisciplinary collaboration and synthesis work: a large part of the research 
work consists of collaboration between researchers from different scientific dis-
ciplines. The synthesis work is also the basis for “dialogue and influence”, in 
other words for the project’s “outward face”. 
Professional energy models: the project has at its disposal a unique set of  around 
ten well-established energy models with different features, system boundaries 
and model approach. This model “toolbox” is applied to a wide range of problem 
issues within the project. Thereby, problem issues can be tackled in a far wider 
manner than would have been possible with the use of only a single model or 
a few models. The multitude and strength of this model tool-box distinguishes 
this project from other related Nordic energy- and climate-policy research. The 
models, and the modelling process, is described in a separate report, “Coordina-
ted use of energy-system models in energy and climate-policy analysis – lessons 
learned from the NEP project”.
Traditional research methods: established analytical methods (literature search, 
surveys, deep interviews, statistical processing and analyses, calculations etc.) 
from the respective scientific disciplines are used.
Intensive distribution and communication of research and results: substantial 
resources are allocated to result distribution and dialogue with the project’s sta-
keholders, not only at the end of the project but also continuously during the 
project. The latter enables frequent feedback from all project participants into 
the research process. 
The broad choice of research methods and models listed above was proven very 
successful in the first phase of this project. In that phase research methods were 
tested and energy models were partly synchronized and adapted to different re-
search issues. 
• It is a forum for fact-based discussion and dialogue between decision-makers 
and other energy actors from different disciplines and countries. The project’s 
researchers and experts are also a resource for investigations and fact compi-
lations which the stakeholders need outside the project.
• It increases the collaboration and knowledge transfer between researchers in 
the Nordic countries, as well as contributing to the reinforcement of Nordic 
knowledge centres. 
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Main scenarios
In this book we present results from model calculations of the development of 
the Nordic energy systems. The NEP model toolbox has been used for the cal-
culations. A certain focus has been on the EU energy and climate package. The 
following scenarios have been calculated:
The reference scenario
The reference scenario includes existing policy instruments such as en-
ergy and CO
2
 taxes and selected support schemes such as the Swedish elec-
tricity certificate system and direct subsidies in other Nordic countries. 
Furthermore, the EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) is included as 
an exogenously given EU emission allowance (EUA) price of 25 EUR/t. 
The EU policy scenario 
The EU policy scenario includes the same policy instruments as the reference 
scenario but, in addition, a requirement to reach the renewable target defined for 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden in accordance with the EU energy and climate 
package, and an assumed target for Norway. The scenario also includes an EU 
emission reduction target of 20 %, also applied for the Nordic region.
The extended EU policy scenario
The extended EU policy scenario includes the same policy measurements as the 
EU policy scenario but, in addition, the target of increasing energy efficiency by 
20 % until 2020 adapted to the Nordic countries.
The global policy scenario
The global policy scenario includes a new global climate policy agreement 
where the EU CO
2
 emission reduction target is increased to 30 % and the rene-
wable target is met. The emission reduction target is included both in the form 
of different global emission reduction targets and in the form of the EU emission 
trading scheme (EU ETS). The scenario also includes existing policy instru-
ments. (The scenario does not include the increased energy efficiency target.)
Alternative scenarios 
A number of additional scenarios are also defined, calculated and analysed. They 
are designed to illustrate the effect of certain specific factors or situations. These 
scenarios are explained in the chapters where they are referred to.
More detailed descriptions of the scenarios can be found in the different chapters 
of this book, and in the research reports from the NEP project.
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Participants and organisation of the project
Nordic Energy Perspectives is led by a board of representatives from the fi-
nancial supporters. The project’s group of researchers is cross scientific, 
including researchers within energy system technology, economics, bu-
siness administration, state planning and law. The host for the project is El-
forsk. The board has the following regular members and deputy members. 
Sweden’s Energy Agency’s Director General is the chairman of the board. 
•  Swedish Energy Agency 
(chairman)
•  Nordic Council of Ministers
•  Nordic Energy Research
•  SwedEnergy and its’ member 
companies and Svenska Kraft-
nät
•  Elforsk
•  Swedish District Heating As-
sociation
•  Svebio, The Swedish Biomass 
Association
•  The Swedish Gas Association
•  Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise
•  Finnish Energy Industries
•  Tekes, the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and 
Innovation
•  Finnish Ministry of Trade and 
Industry
•  Finnish Forest Industries Fede-
ration
•  Association of Finnish Peat 
Industries
•  The Federation of Finnish Tech-
nology Industries
•  Enova
•  Energy Norway, former Norwegi-
an Electricity Industry Association 
(EBL & EBL Kompetanse)
•  Statnett
•  Statkraft
•  Norwegian Water Resources 
and Energy Directorate (NVE)
•  DONG Energy
•  Danish Energy Association
The sub-project KOMPAS, which 
is a part of the NEP project, has 
also been financed by the The Re-
search Council of Norway.
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The project’s research group is interdisciplinary with researchers within energy 
systems technology, economics, business administration, state planning and law. 
The research group consists of the following universities, and research institu-
tes/companies:
• VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
• Profu, Gothenburg 
• Sweco/EME Analys, Stockholm 
• ECON Pöyry, Stavanger and Oslo
• Gothenburg School of Business, Economics and Law
• Xrgia, Oslo 
• VATT – The Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki 
• RAM-løse edb, Copenhagen 
The project leader is Profu. 
The NEP research group has also had a close cooperation with researchers at:
• Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg 
• Stockholm University 
A Nordic venue and a forum for dialogue
Nordic Energy Perspectives has become a venue and a forum for discussions and 
dialogue, based on unbiased facts, among politicians, decision-makers and other 
participants from the Nordic energy field.
An important objective is to serve as a “Nordic energy forum” where market 
participants, researchers and authorities within the Nordic energy field can meet 
and, objectively and freely, discuss, analyze and exchange information and re-
search results concerning the development of the Nordic energy systems and 
markets, and concerning energy and climate-policy issues. 
An intensive distribution of results is given priority in Nordic Energy Perspec-
tives, among other things in order to ensure that the dialogue striven for is ac-
hieved and proves effective, and that relevant questions are confronted to the 
greatest extent possible.
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Nine NEP conferences 
The project has arranged nine conferences, four during the first phase (2005-
2006) and five during the second phase (2007-2010):
• Copenhagen October 5th 2005: Nordic Energy Policies
• Helsinki January 24th 2006: Nordic Energy Policy Perspectives; Tradable quo-
tas for CO
2 
and renewables. Development of Nordic Energy Systems
• Stockholm May 4th 2006: Policy and Market Perspectives
• Oslo September 27th 2006: Ten Perspectives on Nordic Energy
• Gothenburg November 27th 2007: Nordic and European perspectives on 
Pathways to Sustainable Energy
• Helsinki May 14th 2008: Nordic Energy Scenarios; Significant impacts on the 
Nordic energy system of the EU energy and climate policy package
• Oslo March 17th 2009: Nordic Energy Futures; Perspectives on the develop-
ment of Nordic energy
• Helsinki January 21th  2010: Nordic Energy Post Copenhagen; also including 
support schemes for renewable energy in the Nordic countries
• Stockholm April 27th 2010: Towards a Sustainable Nordic energy system
The conferences have been well attended and the purpose of them has been 
fulfilled, i.e. to “stimulate a dialogue with the users of the project, where results 
and knowledge from the project may be spread and a feedback on the results 
may be received.”
A brief presentation of the contents of each conference can be found on the 
project’s website (www.nordicenergyperspectives.org).
... and the purpose [of the conferences] 
”to stimulate a dialogue with the users of the 
project, where results and knowledge from 
the project may be spread and a feedback 
on the results may be received” has been 
fulfilled.
”
27
2. Significant impact of meeting the EU 
energy and climate package on Nordic 
energy markets
The European Union has set three climate and energy targets to be met by 2020. 
The targets are a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20 per-
cent below 1990 levels, 20 percent of EU energy consumption to come from 
renewable resources, and cutting energy consumption by 20 percent of projec-
ted 2020 levels by improving energy efficiency. If the Nordic countries manage 
to meet these targets total carbon dioxide (CO
2 
) emissions in the Nordic region 
may be reduced by around 30 percent by 2020 compared to emissions in 2007. 
All three targets will have a significant impact on the energy systems of the four 
Nordic countries, and it is likely that all energy sectors will be included, albeit to 
different extents, in achieving these targets.
CO2 emissions may be reduced by 30 percent
Three main scenarios have been in-
vestigated with the use of advanced 
energy-systems modelling. The scena-
rios are briefly described in Table 2.1. 
The scenarios differ from each other 
with respect to the degree to which 
the targets of the entire EU climate 
and energy package (including also 
the energy efficiency target which, 
contrary to the other two targets, still 
is non-binding) are met. Also the refe-
rence scenario includes several of the 
most important existing policy instru-
ments. Figure 2.1 below shows that in 
the reference case CO
2
 emissions from 
the energy systems of the four Nordic 
countries are reduced - but only by 
around 5 percent by 2020 compared to 
2007. Thus, additional policy measu-
res are required if emissions are to be 
brought down beyond that. If all three 
policy targets are met (“Extended EU 
Policy”), CO
2
 emissions are reduced 
substantially - by around 30 percent by 
2020 compared to 2007 levels. In this 
scenario, the energy-efficiency target 
is applied to the entire energy system, 
i.e. energy conversion, transmission 
and end use in different sectors. If only 
the climate and renewable targets are 
met (“EU Policy”), CO
2
 emissions are 
reduced by around 15 percent by 2020 
compared to 2007. Thus, fulfilling the 
EU’s energy-efficiency target has a 
significant impact on CO
2
 emissions 
in the Nordic countries. 
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Table 2.1: Brief description of the three investigated policy scenarios (EV=Electric vehicles)
Scenario EU- 
ETS
Renewable 
Directive
Efficiency Target Transports
Reference 25 EUR/t Not implemented Not implemented Biofuel Directive
not reached
EU Policy 25 EUR/t Nordic target Not implemented Biofuel Directive 
is reached
Extended 
EU Policy
25 EUR/t Nordic target Nordic target Biofuel Directive + 
EVs
Figure 2.1: The three investiga-
ted scenarios and their impact 
on total Nordic CO
2
 emissions 
from the energy system.
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Renewables and energy efficiency are the most important 
CO2-reduction measures 
The significant reduction of CO
2 
emis-
sions by 2020 and beyond in the “Ex-
tended EU Policy” scenario is achie-
ved mainly through increased use of 
renewables in all sectors and through 
energy-efficiency measures at the end-
use side as well as at the supply side 
of the energy system. But also nuclear 
power plays a significant part in the 
reduction measures identified through 
model analyses. This includes a fifth 
reactor in Finland and repowering and 
increased availability in Swedish nu-
clear power plants by 2020. The indi-
vidual contributions of these measures 
are shown in Figure 2.2 as CO
2 
-reduc-
tion “wedges”. These contributions 
are estimations related to a trend pro-
jection until 2030, based on the years 
1990-2007. 
Figure 2.2: CO
2
-reduc-
tion measures in the en- 
tire energy system of 
the Nordic countries 
in the “Extended EU 
Policy” scenario put in 
relation to an assumed 
trend projection, based 
on 1990-2007, by 2030.
All sectors will be involved
Extensive analyses show that the EU 
climate and energy package will have 
significant impact on the energy sys-
tems of the four Nordic countries, 
and that all sectors within the energy 
systems are likely to be involved in 
meeting the policy targets. Figure 2.3a 
(see next page) illustrates the impact 
of sectorial CO
2
 emissions (in Mton 
CO
2
, aggregated over the four Nordic 
countries) resulting from meeting the 
entire climate and energy package 
(i.e. the “Extended EU Policy” sce-
nario that includes the efficiency tar-
get). The results are based on model 
calculations and clearly show that 
electricity and district heating account 
for the largest absolute contribution 
towards reducing CO
2
 emissions by 
2020. This is true for all three scena-
rios (Figure 2.3b). The relative reduc-
tion is, however, also very large for 
the residential and commercial sec-
tors. In the same way as for electricity 
and district heating, the residential and 
commercial sectors reduce their emis-
sions by around 50 percent compared 
to 2007 levels in the “Extended EU 
Policy” scenario. 
%
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In this analysis, the transport and 
stationary energy sectors have been 
analyzed separately using different 
approaches. For the transport sector, 
future emissions have been estimated 
using a simulation approach where 
emission reductions are a result of 
what may be possible to achieve, 
within reasonable limits, given the 
inertia in transforming the road trans-
portation capital stock (assuming e.g. 
average lifetimes of cars). For the sta-
tionary energy sector, a cost minimi-
zing model with a very large amount 
of technical, economical and environ-
mental constraints has been used (the 
MARKAL-NORDIC model). Thus, 
in the “Reference” scenario it is as-
sumed a priori that road transporta-
tion increases its emissions despite the 
fact that the use of biofuels increases. 
Increasing demand for road transport 
explains this, which outdoes the inhe-
rent efficiency improvements of new 
cars. In the “Extended EU Policy” sce-
nario, the introduction of approxima-
tely 1,5 million electric vehicles (e.g. 
plug-in hybrids) and the fulfilment of 
the Biofuel Directive yield a reduction 
of around 5 percent compared with 
projected 2020 levels of total Nordic 
emissions. However, with an alterna-
tive demand for transports this figure 
may become larger than that. 
Figure 2.3: Sectorial CO
2
 emissions 
in the Nordic countries as a whole 
under the “Extended EU Policy” 
scenario (2.3a), and sectorial CO
2
 
emissions and reductions achieved 
by 2020 in relation to total CO
2
 
emissions in 2007 (2.3b). El+DH = 
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Nordic electricity supply almost CO2 free by 2020
The share of fossil-based (excluding 
peat) electricity production in the 
Nordic electricity market currently 
amounts to around 15 percent. This is 
a very low figure in an international 
comparison. Moreover, model cal-
culations indicate that by 2020, this 
share may shrink to less than 5 percent 
under “Extended EU Policy” scenario 
assumptions (Figure 2.4), to slightly 
over 10 percent in “EU Policy” and 
to slightly less than 15 percent in the 
reference scenario. These figures are 
backed by an expansion of nuclear 
power (ongoing Swedish capacity in-
creases and a fifth reactor in Finland) 
along with significant increases in 
wind and biomass power (CHP). Ex-
isting coal power is gradually replaced 
while gas power is maintained rough-
ly at today’s level. The “EU Policy” 
scenario results in the largest electri-
city production and the largest output 
from renewables in absolute numbers. 
Combined with a relatively modest 
increase in electricity demand, this 
implies that large volumes of electri-
city may be exported out of the Nordic 
countries. In the “Extended EU Poli-
cy” scenario, a lower demand for elec-
tricity and an assumed efficiency pres-
sure on the supply side (in addition 
to demand-side efficiency measures) 
gives a relatively smaller total elec-
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Figure 2.4: Nordic 
electricity produc-
tion in the “Exten- 
ded EU Policy” sce-
nario (2.4a) and 
in all three scena-
rios for model year 
2023 (2.4b)
a)
b)
32 
tricity production. Even in this case a 
significant amount of electricity may 
be exported due to the lower demand. 
However, we must keep in mind that 
the final outcome of the power balance 
will depend on the impact of the EU 
targets on electricity demand and price 
in the Nordic region’s neighbouring 
EU-countries. 
CCS is generally not a cost-efficient 
option in the model runs for the Nord-
ic electricity system. Relatively low 
assumptions on CO
2 
-prices (generally 
around 25 EUR/t), a growth in nuclear 
power and a significant expansion of 
renewable electricity (in “EU Policy” 
scenario) in combination with stag-
nating demand (in “EU Extended Po-
licy” scenario) leaves few options for 
a significant penetration of CCS in the 
Nordic countries according to these 
model results.  
The EU climate and energy targets 
also have a considerable impact on 
the share of fossil fuels in the produc-
tion of district heating in the Nordic 
countries. In 2005, the share of fos-
sil fuels (excluding peat and the fos-
sil part in waste incineration) used 
for the production of district heating 
was close to 50 percent in the Nordic 
countries as a whole. It should be no-
ted, though, that the share of fossil fu-
els varies widely in the four countries. 
All three scenarios analyzed show 
that the share of fossil fuels declines 
by 2020 (see Figure 2.5). In the “Ex-
tended EU Policy” scenario, the share 
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Significant CO2 reduction also in district heating 
Figure 2.5: District heating production by energy carrier aggregated over all four Nordic countries 
in the “Extended EU Policy” scenario (left) and in all three scenarios for model year 2023 (right). 
The allocation of fuels between district heat and electricity in CHP schemes has been estimated 
according to default assumptions on the electricity-to-heat-ratio (electricity generated by CHP is 
included in Figure 2.3).
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amounts to approximately 15 percent. 
Even the “Reference” scenario, de-
spite meeting neither the renewable 
target nor the efficiency target, shows 
a clear decline in the share of fossil fu-
els used for district heating (down to 
around 30 percent by 2020). This can 
be explained by relatively high fossil-
fuel prices, the EU ETS, and existing 
tax and support schemes. 
The EU policy goals affect each other
The analyses carried out by the NEP 
project frequently show that the va-
rious climate and energy targets af-
fect each other. Sometimes, they may 
even counteract. For instance, the CO
2
 
reduction target results in a higher 
electricity price through the EU ETS, 
while the renewable target may reduce 
wholesale electricity prices due to in-
vestments in renewable capacity, eve-
rything else held constant. This makes 
other non-renewable, but nevertheless 
lean-carbon, options such as coal-to-
gas fuel shift and CCS less viable. If 
costs for renewable electricity are not 
incurred on the consumer electricity 
bills this would also work in the op-
posite direction of the ambitions of 
the efficiency target, where demand 
for energy services is to be dampened. 
In Figure 2.1, it was shown that the 
energy efficiency target (given by the 
“Extended EU Policy” scenario) had a 
significant impact on CO
2
 emissions in 
the Nordic countries. It is likely that 
this also is true on a European level. 
Thus, the energy efficiency target may 
have dramatic consequences for the 
EU ETS with a possible oversupply of 
emission allowances since significant 
emission reductions are initiated also 
by the other policy goals. 
Figure 2.6 shows the increased use of 
renewables in the four Nordic countri-
es as a whole for the three policy sce-
narios. The Directive on the promo-
tion of energy from renewable sources 
(The “EU Policy” scenario) foresees 
that the use of renewable energy sour-
ces increases by around 160 TWh by 
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2020 compared to 2007 levels (speci-
fic asssumptions have been made for 
Norway). At least half of that increase 
will come from biomass used in diffe-
rent sectors (biomass is mainly supp-
lied through domestic resources but 
also import is considered if the market 
price exceeds a certain level). If the 
energy efficiency target is also achie-
ved (“Extended EU Policy” scenario) 
the increase in renewables is reduced 
to around 120 TWh. Specifcally, the 
use of biomass is significantly smaller 
than in the “EU Policy” scenario, but, 
of course, larger than in 2007. This is 
due to lower energy demand but also 
efficiency measures on the supply side. 
Biomass use is especially affected by 
efficiency measures, since biomass is 
generally associated with lower over-
all (applied) efficiencies than e.g. heat 
pumps and wind power, which are 
also included in the Directive. This 
is important since, as mentioned ear-
lier, the efficiency target in this study 
is applied to the entire energy system 
and to all energy resources. However, 
the efficiency goal will only affect the 
use of renewables in their absolute 
numbers. Since the renewable target 
is expressed as a relative target (per-
cent of gross demand), it is still being 
reached by 2020 in the “Extended EU 
Policy” scenario. 
For further information:
Thomas Unger and Bo Rydén, Profu 
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The challenge of implementing 
the EU climate and energy 
package in the Nordic countries
Fulfilling the energy and climate package of the EU and the 
Nordic ambitions within the energy field has a decisive impact 
on the development of the energy markets and systems of the 
Nordic countries. In the previous analyses it was shown that all 
sectors and all energy markets are likely to be affected. Such far-
reaching changes of the energy systems will present a number of 
challenges but also opportunities.
It is a challenge in itself to redirect the energy system in order to meet the po-
litical requirements at the EU level and at the Nordic level. CO
2
 emissions are 
reduced by more than 30 percent and renewable energy is increased by around 
100-150 TWh. Moreover, if energy efficiency also is increased by 20 percent un-
til 2020, primary energy consumption is reduced by up to 200 TWh (compared 
to the outcome of a “Business-as-usual” scenario).
Identifying synergies is the key to cost-efficient solutions, 
and opens up for opportunities 
Meeting the targets in the energy system is costly but identifying synergies is 
the key, and an opportunity, to reduce the additional costs. It is, however, a chal-
lenge to identify and promote such synergies. This may be achieved through:
• choosing policy instruments and other political decisions that in a cost-effi-
cient way promote measures that contribute in reaching all three EU goals 
at the same time. Wind power is a good example. It is renewable and redu-
ces CO
2
 emissions in the Nordic electricity market. At the same time, a shift 
from e.g. coal power to wind power implies significant efficiency gains at the 
electricity-supply side.
• considering policy measures at all levels of the energy system in order to in-
clude system effects. Energy efficiency measures are not only associated with 
end use but also with the supply side.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
• recognizing a certain degree of flexibility in the commitments of the diffe-
rent parts of the energy system. This means that sector-specific goals for e.g. 
renewables should be used with care. Instead, including as many sectors as 
possible in an overall target reduces compliance costs. 
• international cooperation and trade, for instance among the Nordic countries. 
The analysis and results of the NEP project largely comply with a scenario 
where the Nordic countries initiate a far-stretched cooperation in order to col-
lectively meet the EU energy and climate package.
New technology gives new opportunities 
Cost reductions may also be achieved by using a basket of many technological 
options. The NEP project has shown that the path towards meeting the energy 
and climate package of the EU involves many measures, options and techno-
logies at all levels of the energy system. Therefore, ruling out specific techno-
logical choices out of e.g. political reasons is likely to increase the compliance 
cost. However, in certain cases climate and economic considerations must be 
balanced with considerations related to public acceptance (e.g. nuclear power or 
wind power), other environmental pollutants (e.g. biomass) and so forth. Ope-
ning up, and promoting, a wide range of measures in the Nordic countries may 
create business opportunities for Nordic industry. This may not only involve 
technological development where the Nordic countries already today are at the 
very edge within several areas – district heating, biomass, heat pumps, wind po-
wer etc - but also within areas related to e.g. systems planning and development, 
management and markets. 
  
Synergies are also achieved though the encouraging of structural changes of the 
energy systems where, for instance, grid-distributed energy such as electricity, 
district heating and gas (e.g. biogas) are made practically CO
2
-free and largely 
renewable, and subsequently become used as “measures” in the development of 
the energy systems.
A large share of the CO2 reductions is taken by the 
trading sector
The analyses of the NEP project clearly show that meeting all three energy- and 
climate-policy goals of the EU implies significant impact on the Nordic energy 
systems and a reduction of CO
2
 emissions by around 30 percent by 2020. The 
work presented here also shows that a large share of the emission reductions 
take place in the trading sector of the EU ETS which indicates that the Nordic 
region may become a net exporter of emission allowances. However, at the same 
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time the reduction commitments applied to the non-trading sector may become 
tougher to meet without additional policy incentives. This should in particular 
involve the transport sector.  
Measures that transfer the responsibility from the  
non-trading sector to the trading-sector are important 
 – an opportunity advocated by the NEP project
Model analyses of the NEP project have shown that electricity and district-
heating supply are only to a small extent still dependent on fossil fuels by 2020 
if all three EU targets are met. The European Commission has also formulated 
a vision of CO
2
-free electricity production in Europe by 2050. This means that 
electricity and district heating, in itself, become important reduction measu-
res in climate-change mitigation. Such measures could, for instance, include 
switching from oil heating to district heating in dwellings or switching from 
a gasoline car to an electric car. At the same time, a switch from gasoline to 
electricity or from oil to district heating means that the reduction responsibi-
lity is transferred from the non-trading sector to the trading sector of the EU 
ETS. The NEP analyses reported in this book indicate that such a transfer of 
responsibility may account for up to half of the emission reductions set up for 
the non-trading sectors of the Nordic countries (see e.g. chapter 10). This is a 
very important conclusion which may play a decisive role in the fulfillment of 
the Nordic countries’ domestic commitments.   
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Several of the measures and options that may contribute in transferring the re-
sponsibility for emission reductions from the non-trading sector to the trading 
sector, such as district heating, electricity and electric cars are more thoroughly 
discussed in other chapters of this report. 
Our climate is a very complex system
The Earth’s climate system is a complex, interconnected system formed by the 
atmosphere, the oceans and other bodies of water, land surface, snow and ice 
cover together with all living organisms, and linked by flows of energy and 
matter. Changes in the Earth’s climate are influenced mainly by changes in the 
atmospheric composition of gases and particles, but also by changes in solar 
radiation and surface albedo. 
The most important component to influence the atmosphere is CO
2
, which stands 
for 70 % of the global warming potential in the atmosphere. Other gases of great 
importance are long-lived gases like CH
4
 (20 %), N
2
O (5 %) and fluor-contain-
ing gases like HFC, PFC and SF
6
 (5 %). All act on a global scale. Mitigation 
of greenhouse gases must consider not only CO
2
, but also the other long-lived 
greenhouse gases. (The non-CO
2
, gases are included in the commitment of the 
non-tradable sector).
Measures that reduce more than one greenhouse gas at the 
same time
It is therefore important to seek measures that may reduce more than one green-
house gas at the same time. These “synergies” will make the measures much 
more cost-efficient. Such measures identified by the NEP include for instance: 
• waste incineration 
• biogas (e.g. from manure).
Scenarios including a reduction of all greenhouse gases at the same time are 
presented in Chapter 20.
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3. Future options for large-scale energy 
production with low CO2 emissions 
Improved energy efficiency and in-
creased use of renewable energy are 
two of the most obvious measures 
to reduce CO
2
 emissions in the short 
term. Both are discussed in detail in 
other NEP chapters. In this chapter, 
we concentrate on two other measu-
res which by and large have the same 
goal – to reduce CO
2
 emissions in en-
ergy production. These measures are 
nuclear power and carbon capture and 
storage (CCS).
The renaissance of nuclear power in Finland and Sweden is up for debate. In 
Finland, a fifth reactor is under construction, and three companies are seeking 
permission for a new reactor. A sixth and seventh reactor would have similar 
effects on CO
2
 emissions from European electricity production as roughly half of 
each new nuclear power plant’s production might be exported. This means that 
CO
2
 annual emissions in continental Europe could be reduced by approximately 
6-7 Mt CO
2
 per new nuclear power plant. Nordic emissions would go down rela-
tively less, as nuclear energy would not only replace condensing power produc-
tion but also combined heat and power (CHP). Besides investments in nuclear 
power, another option for cutting CO
2
 emissions in large-scale energy produc-
tion is to implement carbon capture and storage (CCS) at condensing power and 
CHP plants. In theory, CCS can also be implemented in plants using biomass, 
resulting in “negative net emissions”.  In the Nordic region, only Norway and 
Denmark have suitable storage sites for CO
2 
, which means that international 
collaboration is a prerequisite for the implementation of CCS in Finland and Swe-
den. Further, the CCS-technology must be proven to be technically and commer-
cially viable before it can be implemented on a large scale.
– nuclear in the near future, CCS a long term option
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The future role of nuclear power in the Nordic region will 
depend on national policies 
Nuclear power has increased quite 
significantly in Finland and Sweden 
since the 1980’s. This is true even be-
fore Finland’s fifth reactor, Olkiluoto 
3, comes into operation and is a result 
of upgrades to existing reactors. Not 
even the shutdown of the two Barse-
bäck units in Sweden has been a se-
vere set-back for nuclear power. Out-
put increases in the remaining reactors 
will compensate for Barsebäck’s shut-
down by 2020. 
However, old capacity will start to 
phase-out by 2030, both in Finland 
and in Sweden. It is still being debated 
whether Sweden will replace old nu-
clear plants with new nuclear plants. 
At the moment, public opinion is not 
contrary to nuclear power but this 
might change as it has in the past. In 
Finland, the Government is expected 
to make a decision concerning con-
struction permits for new reactor(s) 
by December 2010. Three companies, 
Fennovoima, Fortum and Teollisuu-
den Voima, are seeking permission to 
invest in a new reactor. The Finnish 
Government will probably grant at 
least one new licence as nuclear po-
wer is seen as one of the most power-
ful tools to mitigate CO
2
 emissions. It 
is also likely that increased concern 
about security of supply an increasing 
consumer prices of electricity will be-
nefit nuclear power.
It is difficult to say how many nuclear 
plants would be viable in the Nordic 
system in the long term. The number 
will depend on the growth of electri-
city demand in the Nordic area, espe-
cially by energy-intensive industries, 
and in the future contribution from 
other energy sources, especially re-
newables. Moreover, investments in 
transmission capacity to help promote 
the integration of the European elec-
tricity markets could facilitate exports 
and increase nuclear energy’s viabili-
ty. Electricity demand can be expected 
to grow, even taking into account the 
EU’s 20-20-20 targets, (see e.g. Chap-
ters 10 and 20). In Finland, Fortum is 
also including an option to produce di-
strict heating for the Helsinki area at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant, ma-
king the picture even more complex to 
analyse. 
Within the scope of this study, we 
have studied three scenarios: 2008, 
2020 reference and 2020 policy sce-
narios (see Chapter 1 for the scenario 
descriptions). The 2008 scenario cor-
responds to the existing energy sys-
tem, i.e. current electricity production 
capacities. In both the 2020 reference 
and 2020 policy scenarios Finland’s 
Olkiluoto 3 is assumed to be operatio-
nal and included in the base case. The 
share of renewable energy sources has 
been considerably increased. In each 
scenario an extra nuclear capacity of 
1600 MW or 3200 MW is compared to 
the base case having no extra nuclear 
capacity. 
- new Nordic nuclear power could contribute to reduce emissions in 
Central Europe
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Figure 3.1 shows the impact of new 
nuclear power plants on the Nordic 
market price of electricity. Simula-
tions of the electricity market show 
that the market price of electricity de-
creases by 4% ±0.5% for each 1000 
MW of new capacity. This means that 
consumers could benefit from 600 M€ 
annual savings for each 1000 MW of 
new nuclear capacity. 
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Figure 3.1: The impact of ad-
ditional nuclear power plants 
(NPP) on the Nordic market price 
of electricity in the different sce-
narios. The decrease in the mar-
ket price is 4% ±0.5% per 1000 
MW new NPP capacity. (“0 extra 
NPP” refers to four Finnish NPPs 
in 2008 and to five NPPs in 2020)
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Figure 3.2 shows the increase in elec-
tricity exports resulting from the in-
crease in electricity from new nuclear 
power, given that all the other condi-
tions are kept constant (i.e. fuel prices, 
cross border electricity prices outside 
Nordic area, production capacities oth-
er than nuclear, and the price of emis-
sion allowances). New nuclear power 
also replaces other Nordic production. 
As the increase in renewable energy 
sources by 2020 is assumed to be sub-
stantial, less room is left for condens-
ing power. Exports increase with 16 
TWh by 2020 in the case that two new 
nuclear power plants are added. The 
overall annual reduction in European 
CO
2
 emissions could be substantial — 
in the order of 6 Mt CO
2
 per new nu-
clear power plant —  if Nordic exports 
replace fossil condensing production. 
Furthermore, if demand for electricity 
increases more steeply than assumed, 
for example due to an increased use 
of heat pumps or electric vehicles, 
significant CO
2
 emissions reductions 
could also be achieved in the Nordic 
countries.  
Figure 3.2: Increase in electricity exports according to the number of new nuclear power plants in 
the different scenarios. In the simulation for 2008, less than half of all new nuclear capacity would 
result in exports, whereas the share is well above 50% in the reference and policy scenarios.
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Nordic countries have good possibilities to implement CCS 
The largest potential storage sites for 
CO
2
 in Europe are located in the North 
Sea off the coast of Norway. CO
2
 can 
be transported to these sites by pipe-
line or by ship. CO
2
 can also be stored 
in the Danish oil and gas fields in the 
North Sea. Conversely, both Finland 
and Sweden lack suitable storage si-
tes so these countries would have to 
transport carbon cross-border. Howe-
ver, all Nordic countries are currently 
actively involved in CCS R&D, and 
energy companies operating in the 
Nordic region are getting involved in 
large-scale CCS demonstration pro-
jects. StatoilHydro has been storing 
CO
2
 in Norway since the early 1990’s 
by capturing 1 Mt CO
2
/per year from 
natural gas and injecting it into a sa-
line aquifer in the North Sea. Statoil-
Hydro has also been storing carbon 
since 2008 at the Snøhvit gas field. 
Vattenfall, Fortum, and E.ON are 
also all looking into CCS. Fortum has 
joined forces with TVO in a planned 
demonstration project that combines 
post-combustion carbon capture at 
the Meri-Pori condensing coal-fired 
plant with CO
2
 transportation by ship 
to the Danish oil or gas fields. Vatten-
fall has a pilot plant in Germany to de-
monstrate oxyfuel-combustion carbon 
capture and is also involved in Nordic 
demonstration projects in Norway and 
Denmark. E.ON is investing in carbon 
capture projects in the UK, Sweden 
and Denmark. 
Before the numerous large-scale CCS 
demonstration projects currently un-
derway have been completed it is very 
difficult to analyse CCS’s cost-effec-
tiveness as compared to other emis-
sions mitigation options. With cur-
rent capture technologies, the energy 
penalty is large, which is in conflict 
with energy efficiency targets. On the 
other hand, global mitigation scenari-
os indicate that long-term, CCS could 
be one of the main technologies to 
cost-effectively reduce CO
2
 emissions 
(see Chapter 20, Figure 20.1).  Bio-
CCS with “negative net emission” is 
also expected to become viable in the 
future. Figure 3.3 shows the CCS po-
tential in each of the Nordic countries 
calculated using the Nordic TIMES 
model. In the calculations, carbon cap-
ture was assumed to be implemented 
in energy plants (large scale condens-
ing power and CHP) as well as in the 
pulp, oil refining, metal and cements 
industries. Bio-CCS was assumed to 
be implemented in the pulp industry 
and in large scale co-firing coal or peat 
plants.
- but the final benefit of CCS in emission reduction would depend on the 
development future energy and emission markets 
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Figure 3.3: CCS potential in each Nordic country indicated as Mt CO
2
 captured from the total CO
2 
emissions in each country. The assumed CO
2
 price increases linearly from 20 €/t in 2020 to the 
indicated price levels in 2040.
The Nordic scenarios indicate that 
CCS could be a viable option after 
2030 in all the Nordic countries gi-
ven a CO
2
 price above 50 €/t CO
2
. By 
2050, about 60% of the total Nordic 
CO
2
 emissions could be handled by 
CCS compared to the Baseline emis-
sions in the 90 €/t CO
2
 case. The sce-
nario results indicate that the largest 
CCS potential is found in Sweden and 
Finland as these countries have good 
opportunities to implement bio-CCS. 
Also, CCS seems to be more cost-
effective in CHP because a better in-
tegration of heat streams lowers the 
energy penalty of the capture process. 
However, before bio-CCS can be con-
sidered a viable option, the rules of the 
EU’s Emissions Trading System must 
be changed to take into account emis-
sion reductions which don’t originate 
from fossil fuels.
Table 3.1 gives an example of the 
set-up by showing emission reduc-
tions as calculated using VTT’s elec-
tricity market model. In the first case, 
two Norwegian combined cycle gas 
turbine plants (CCGT) are assumed 
to have implemented CCS by 2020, 
leading to a capacity drop from 700 
MW to 560 MW. The power output is 
less with CCS as the plants’ efficiency 
is impaired. The second case is a coal 
condensing power plant (coal PP) that 
sees a drop in  capacity from 550 MW 
to 440 MW due to the implementation 
of CCS. According to the policy sce-
nario (see Chapter 1 for scenario des-
criptions), the plants are not fully ex-
ploited in 2020 regardless of CCS, as 
the need for condensing power is quite 
low. This means that CO
2
 emissions 
cuts are quite low in 2020, at best 0.8 
Mt CO
2
. A higher CO
2
 price (50 €/t 
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Table 3.1: Changes in CO2 emissions for the different CCS cases compared to emis-
sions from same plants without CCS
20 €/t 50 €/t
2020 2030 2020 2030
Coal PP Mt CO2 -0.8 -3.0 0.0 0.2
Gas CCGT Mt CO2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.7
SUM Mt CO2 -0.8 -3.4 0.0 -0.5
CO
2
) limits emissions reductions even 
further due to the lower operating time 
of the power plants. In 2030, the coal 
PP runs at full capacity both with and 
without CCS given a CO
2
 price of 20 
€/t. This influences CO
2
 reductions, 
at around 3 Mt CO
2
. However, only 
slight decrease in emissions were ob-
tained with 50 €/t. The differences 
come not only from the implementa-
tion of CCS, but also from how well 
the different plants fit into the market, 
and from changes in their capacities.
In this study, the combination of CCS 
and condensing power plants was 
found not to be a very effective solu-
tion for the Nordic countries if the EU 
target of 20% renewables by 2020 is 
fulfilled. The need for condensing po-
wer in the future may be high, but also 
very narrow. Thus CO
2 
 emissions cuts 
would not be that remarkable unless 
the production replaces high-emission 
condensing power production in con-
tinental Europe. As indicated above, 
because of higher operating times it 
might be better to combine CCS with 
CHP rather than with condensing po-
wer in the Nordic countries. On the 
other hand, if only very limited invest-
ments in new nuclear power are under-
taken (and old nuclear power is phased 
out), CCS would be fundamental for 
achieving large emission reductions in 
energy production due to the greater 
use of other condensing plants.
For further information:
Tiina Koljonen,  
Göran Koreneff, VTT
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4. The EU´s renewable target is the main 
driver for reducing Nordic CO2 emissions 
by 20 %
In early 2008 the EU commission pu-
blished a directive containing measu-
res and targets for the increased use of 
renewable energy sources in member 
countries. At about the same time, a 
proposal for a directive concerned with 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 
20 percent was published. The EU has 
also set a target to reduce energy use 
by 20 percent through improvements 
in energy efficiency. These three sepa-
rate targets will have a profound effect 
on the energy systems of the Nordic 
countries. To analyze the consequen-
ces of these targets on the energy sys-
tems, a series of calculations with the 
energy model MARKAL-NORDIC 
have been performed. The analysis 
concerns the stationary energy sector 
- the transport sector is not included in 
the analysis. In this NEP perspective 
we focus on the effects on the use of 
renewable energy.
Existing policy instruments used in the Nordic countries will lead to a significant 
increase in the use of renewable energy in the region. The use of renewable 
energy will rise even further if measures to reach the EU renewable target are 
implemented. If these measures are implemented, our calculations show that 
renewable energy sources will account for a further 50 TWh by the year 2020, 
compared with the case with only existing policy instruments. Biomass and wind 
power, in that order, are the renewable energy sources that contribute most to 
these higher levels of use. The combination of current policy instruments and 
the EU renewable energy target also leads to a reduction of CO
2
 emissions from 
the Nordic stationary energy system by 20 percent over the period 2005-2020. 
So this combination is by itself sufficient to meet the EU emissions reduction 
target of 20 percent for the stationary energy system. If measures dedicated to 
meeting the EU energy efficiency targets are also implemented, CO
2
 emissions 
decrease even further. However, these measures also reduce the use of renewa-
ble energy sources.
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The reference case – current policy instruments will lead to 
a significant increase in the use of renewable energy
Figure 4.1: Increased use of renewable energy technologies in the Nordic region relative to 
2005, with no new EU targets (but keeping current emission-rights trade and national policy 
instruments) 
As a point of departure for the ana-
lysis, a calculation of the energy 
system’s development assuming only 
already existing policy instruments 
has been carried out. This analysis 
does not, therefore, include the rene-
wable target. [Examples of current 
policy instruments that have a stimu-
lating effect on the use of renewable 
energy are high taxes on fossil fuels, 
the European Union Emission Trading 
System (a CO
2 
price of 25 €/ton has 
been assumed), investment and opera-
tion support for different renewable al-
ternatives, and the Swedish electricity 
certificate system.] Figure 4.1 shows 
how the use of renewable energy in 
the Nordic region increases in the refe-
rence case. The figure reveals that, gi-
ven current costs for different renewa-
ble energy technologies, the reference 
case especially leads to strong growth 
in the use of bio-fuels. The increased 
use of bio-fuels will be only partially 
driven by the effects of current policy 
instruments – an assumed expansion 
of the Nordic forest industry is an-
other important factor. The figure also 
shows that the use of wind power and 
hydropower also increases in the refe-
rence case, but only moderately. 
The heading “Others” in the figure co-
vers other energy sources that are re-
garded as renewable energy sources in 
the EU directive. The most important 
category is heat pumps, but industrial 
waste heat and solar heat are also im-
portant.
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The RES directive – the renewable target
In the next step of the analysis we stu-
died what would happen if measures 
put in place to fulfill the EU’s Direc-
tive on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources (po-
pularly known as the RES Directive) 
were implemented. The Directive sets 
individual targets for each member 
state. The target is expressed as the 
share of total energy use that must be 
met by renewable energy. We have as-
sumed that a proportional part of the 
target will be met by measures direc-
ted at the transport sector. The coun-
try-specific targets imply that just over 
120 TWh of renewable energy must be 
added to the stationary energy system 
of the Nordic region by the year 2020 
if the combined targets of the Nordic 
countries are to be met. We have assu-
med that the renewable energy target 
will remain in place at the same level 
in the period following 2020. (Since 
Norway does not belong to the EU 
there is no specific EU renewable en-
ergy target for Norway. We have assu-
med that Norway is given a target cor-
responding to the average value of the 
targets for the other three countries.)
To analyse the effects of the renewable 
target we modified the model by ad-
ding a condition that 120 TWh of re-
newable energy production is added to 
the region as a whole. Thus, we have 
not imposed country-specific targets, 
but instead allowed the total amount 
to be produced in the most effective 
way in the region as a whole. (The di-
scussed common Swedish/Norwegian 
electricity certificate system is an ef-
fort in this direction.)
THE RES DIRECTIVE 
Targets: In order to reach the 20% RES target, the 
electricity sector is set to increase RES-E genera-
tion to an estimated 30-35% from today’s level of 
around 8,5%.
Burden sharing: Remaining potentials for RES-E 
generation and the ability to lift such massive 
investments vary across EU member states. The 
Commission has proposed a burden sharing which 
takes these factors into account. The result is that 
RES-E investments will be unevenly distributed 
among member states.
Measures: An EU wide market in Guarantees of 
Origins have been rejected by major member 
states. Certificate trade in the form of joint target 
compliance, joint projects of transfer certificates 
will be permitted.
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Bioenergy and wind power – a large increase due to the  
renewable target
The result of our analysis of what 
would happen if the RES Direc-
tive was implemented in the Nordic 
countries is shown in Figure 4.2. It 
turns out that the use of renewable 
energy in the Nordic region increases 
substantially. The outcomes for the in-
dividual renewable energy technologi-
es vary significantly. The use of hydro-
power is virtually unaffected, since its 
expansion is constrained by conditions 
stipulated in the model. The use of 
bio-fuel increases considerably. Most 
of the bio-fuel is used for heat produc-
tion in industry and district heating 
systems, often through combined heat 
and power production. Demand for 
district heating and industrial process 
heat places a limit on how much bio-
fuel heating can be introduced in a 
profitable manner. 
Moreover, the bio-
fuel price is descri-
bed with a “supply 
stairway”, where 
the bio-fuel range 
becomes gradually 
more expensive as 
the amount used in-
creases. At the same 
time, the results 
show that the use of 
bio-fuel is strongly 
stimulated by cur-
rent policy instru-
ments.
The EU’s renewable target also leads 
to more wind power. In the reference 
case, wind power production growth 
does not exceed 10 TWh, but in the 
scenario where the renewable target is 
included, the growth reaches 30 TWh. 
Most of the new wind power plants 
will be built over the next 10-15 years.
The growth of other renewable energy 
technologies in the renewable scena-
rio is similar to that of the reference 
scenario.
To summarize, there will be a marked 
increase in the use of renewable ener-
gy in the Nordic countries if the RES 
directive is implemented. Renewable 
energy use will be 70 TWh larger than 
in the reference case by the year 2020, 
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Figure 4.2: Increase of renewable energy technologies in the 
Nordic region relative to 2005, when measures for the EU renewa-
ble energy target are applied (also keeping current emission-rights 
trade and national policy instruments)
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which is 15 percent higher. However, 
it is worthwhile to note that even in the 
reference scenario where only measu-
res relating to existing policy instru-
ments are implemented, the use of re-
newable energy increases by 60 TWh 
over the period 2005 to 2020.
The use of renewable energy country by country 
– both similarities and differences 
How does the use of renewable energy 
develop in each of the Nordic countri-
es if the RES Directive is implemen-
ted? This is shown in Figure 4.3 (see 
next page) where the levels of rene-
wable energy use in 2020 are shown, 
broken down by both technology and 
country. As can be seen, the outcome 
is quite different for different countri-
es. These differences are to a large ex-
tent attributable to the countries’ dis-
similar energy systems. For example, 
we can see that Norway currently has 
very little district heating and that this 
will not increase in the future.  The 
only clear trend that is present in all 
four countries is that the use of wind 
power increases. 
In absolute terms (in TWh) bio-fuels 
is the renewable energy technology 
that increases the most by 2020 (com-
pared to 2005). The use of bio-fuels 
will increase in the industrial sectors 
of Finland and Sweden, in the housing 
sector of Norway, and especially in the 
electricity and district-heating sectors 
of Sweden, Denmark and Finland. 
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Figure 4.3: Increase of renewable energy in the Nordic countries by 2020, 
assuming the EU renewable energy target in combination with current policy 
instruments
Also noticeable is the increased use of 
heat pumps (these dominate the cate-
gory “Others”) for heat production in 
Norway and Sweden, and to a lesser 
degree in Finland.
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Consequences of a decline in Nordic forest industry
In the calculations presented so far 
in this chapter we have assumed that 
the Swedish forest industry will grow 
5-15 percent over the period 2007-
2020, and that the Finnish forest in-
dustry will grow by 10-15 percent in 
the same period. Recently, however, 
the Nordic forest industry has suffe-
red a number of setbacks because of 
events such as the global downturn 
and the threat of increased Russian 
export duties for timber. Problems in 
the Finnish forest industry have been 
particularly severe due to the strength 
of the Euro. These setbacks may very 
well have long-term consequences for 
the industry. 
To analyse the consequences of these 
events an additional scenario where 
the forest industry in Sweden does not 
grow at all and the forest industry in 
Finland shrinks by 5-10 percent has 
been studied. 
The current out-
look for the in-
dustry is even 
worse than this, 
but since our fo-
cus is on the year 
2020, and since 
there is a risk 
that prognoses 
tend to exagge-
rate the impact 
of recent events, 
we have chosen 
these relatively 
modest changes.
The figure 4.4 shows that the decline 
of the forest industry leads to conside-
rably less growth in the use of biomass 
in industry, especially in Finland. The 
remaining increase of biomass in the 
industrial sector is a result of a fuel 
switch, mainly from peat to biomass. 
Lower use of biomass means that use 
of other renewable energy sources 
must grow by a corresponding amount 
if the targets are to be met. These in-
creases are split between different 
technologies and different countries. 
Reduced energy consumption in the 
forest industry also reduces total en-
ergy demand in the region. Since the 
renewable energy target is a fractional 
target, the total levels of renewable en-
ergy use will be considerably lower in 
this scenario. So reduced levels of re-
newable energy use in Finland are not 
altogether balanced by higher level of 
use in the other countries.
Figure 4.4: Increase of renewable energy in the Nordic countries by 
2020, assuming the EU renewable energy target, current policy instru-
ments, and a decline of the Nordic forest industry
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CO2 emissions are reduced by more than 20 percent when 
the renewable target is implemented
If the RES Directive is implemented 
and if existing policy instruments are 
kept, CO
2
 emissions from the Nordic 
stationary energy system are redu-
ced by approximately 20-25 percent 
by the year 2020. This means that if 
the emissions target is that CO
2
 emis-
sions should be reduced by 20 percent 
by that year, no further policy instru-
ments are needed.
The transport sector is not included in 
this analysis. If, as is widely predicted, 
it becomes impossible to cut emis-
sions by 20 percent in the transport 
sector, the total reduction of Nordic 
emissions will not be as large as the 
reduction shown for the stationary 
energy system, and the total emission 
reduction could in that case be lower 
than 20 percent. 
Figure 4.5: CO
2
 emissions from the Nordic stationary energy system with 
present policy instruments (“Reference case”) and the EU renewable energy 
target (“EU green package”)
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In this section we discuss what would 
happen if a policy mix consisting of 
current policy instruments and the 
EU’s renewable target is combined 
with measures related to the EU’s 
energy efficiency target. The energy 
efficiency target aims at a 20 per-
cent reduction in primary energy use 
compared with projected levels, to 
be achieved by improving energy ef-
ficiency. How the energy efficiency 
target has been expressed in the mo-
dels is discussed in detail in Chapters 
2 and 6.
Implementation of energy efficiency 
measures leads to lower overall en-
ergy use, and to lower use of rene-
wable energy. A combination of en-
ergy efficiency and renewable energy 
measures leads to the proliferation of 
heat pumps. This happens because the 
waste heat that is used in heat pumps’ 
heat production is not included in 
the energy amount that is to be redu-
ced. Conversely, the use of bio-fuels 
is expected to fall in the presence of 
energy efficiency measures. For in-
stance, certain bio-fuel boilers may 
be replaced by heat pumps and even 
by natural gas boilers that are more 
efficient (the energy efficiency target 
places no distinction between reduced 
use of fossil-fuel based energy and re-
duced use of renewable energy). Im-
proved energy efficiency also leads 
to reduced demand for heat, which 
in turn leads to reduced demand for 
bio-fuels in district heating production 
plants. Finally the use of wind power 
is reduced since improved energy ef-
ficiency leads to a reduced demand for 
electricity.
Implementing energy efficiency measures reduces the use 
of renewable energy
Figure 4.6: Increase of renewable energy technologies in the Nordic region between 2005 and 
2020, when the EU renewable target is applied together with the EU energy efficiency target (also 
keeping current emission-rights trade and national policy instruments)
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To conclude, when renewable energy 
measures are implemented in combi-
nation with energy efficiency measu-
res in the Nordic countries, the use 
of renewable energy is clearly higher 
than in the reference case when only 
current policy instruments are assu-
med to be in place. 
However, in the scenario that includes 
energy efficiency, the use of renewable 
energy is clearly lower than that found 
in the scenario where current policy 
instruments are combined with rene-
wable energy measures. It is mainly 
the use of bio-fuels that decreases 
when energy efficiency measures are 
added to the mix.
The EU’s energy efficiency target con-
tributes to further reducing CO
2
 emis-
sions. This issue, and the consequen-
ces of including the transport sector 
in the analysis, are discussed further 
in other chapters of the “20 perspec-
tives”.
For further information:
Håkan Sköldberg and Thomas Unger, Profu
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The Nordic renewable energy  
resources provide opportunities  
- but also challenges
The EU target for increased use of renewable energy, often referred to as the RES 
Directive, will be a challenge to meet for many EU member states. It will lead 
to challenges also for the Nordic countries, but it also creates opportunities here. 
The RES Directive includes a burden sharing scheme since different countries 
have different sizes of their renewable energy resources. The Nordic region is 
unique in the sense that both renewable energy potentials and present renewable 
energy use is large in an EU perspective. (The Nordic renewable energy potenti-
als are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.) The present use of renewable en-
ergy in relation to total energy use is shown for a selection of European countries 
in the adjacent figure. 
The dominating Nordic 
renewable energy sources, 
both presently and during 
the coming 10-20 years, 
are hydro power and bio-
mass. In the future the use 
of other renewable sources 
is likely to grow substanti-
ally. Wind power is an ex-
ample of this. Future Nord-
ic use of renewable energy 
is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4, where three dif-
ferent policy scenarios are 
analysed.
Hydro power and wind po-
wer are naturally directly 
associated with electricity, 
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whereas biomass could be used for a number of purposes, e.g. electricity pro-
duction, heat production and production of bio-fuels for the transport sector. 
Biomass could also be used for non energy purposes, e.g. as a raw material for 
the pulp and paper industry. 
The renewable energy issue highlights a number of opportunities for the Nordic 
energy systems, but also challenges. The challenges are typically related to the 
question of making the most effective use of the Nordic renewable energy re-
sources. 
Opportunities for Nordic cooperation in order to effectively 
utilize the renewable resources – within the Nordic region
The first question is where, geographically, the renewable energy resources 
should be used. Although the RES Directive includes a burden sharing scheme 
in order to define national targets for renewable energy use that corresponds to 
the prerequisites of each country, there may still be different marginal costs for 
the use of renewable energy in different countries. This indicates that it would 
be cost effective for some countries to utilize more renewables than the national 
target specifies, while other countries use less. The RES Directive offers such 
possibilities. This is an opportunity for cooperation between the Nordic countri-
es. The challenge is to find effective ways to implement such cooperation. The 
proposed Swedish / Norwegian electricity certificate system is in line with this. 
Effective use of the Nordic renewable energy resource  
– the EU perspective
Opportunities for Nordic cooperation in order to effectively utilize the rene-
wable resources are relevant both within the Nordic region and in relation to 
neighbouring countries. The relatively large resources for renewable energy in 
the Nordic region will of course provide opportunities in a situation where re-
newable energy will be an increasingly valuable resource in Europe. Electricity 
trade between the Nordic region and the rest of EU and how this relates to the 
RES Directive is analysed in Chapter 11.
Increased renewable electricity production and stagnating 
electricity use lead to Nordic export
The Nordic targets for renewable energy use probably results in a large increase 
in renewable electricity production. In combination with stagnating electricity 
use in the Nordic region this will put pressure on the capabilities to export elec-
tricity to other EU countries. This can be seen as another challenge for the Nord-
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ic region that is closely related to the opportunity mentioned directly above. In 
order to facilitate such export it could become necessary to increase capacity in 
cables to neighbouring countries as well as in the national electricity transmis-
sion grid. If the export capability is very limited the described situation would 
result in low electricity prices in the Nordic region (“supply and demand”).
The optimal national mix of where to introduce the 
renewable energy
A challenge will be to find the optimal national mix of where to introduce the 
renewable energy that the EU target specifies. The most effective way to find this 
balance is probably identified by the market itself. Here it is, however, important 
that the policy instruments that are used in order to get the desired renewable 
energy use does not distort the balance. In order to mobilize an even larger part 
of the Nordic renewable energy potential, more powerful policy instruments 
will have to be implemented. Existing policy instruments will not be power-
ful enough to reach the EU renewable targets. The balance between policy and 
market is discussed further in the section “The challenge of finding the balance 
between policies and market”.
A proper balance between different demands for biomass 
Finding a proper balance between different demands for the biomass resource 
can be seen as the next challenge. Since this is a limited resource, both in the 
Nordic region and globally, not all future demands may be possible to satisfy, 
at least not at the historical price levels. The increased demand for biomass for 
energy purposes in the Nordic region, encouraged through different policy in-
struments, has not only increased the use of felling 
residues, but also imposed an upward pressure on 
the price of wood qualities that typically have been 
used as pulp wood. This may lead to decreased in-
ternational competitiveness for the Nordic pulp 
and paper industry if corresponding raw material 
price increases does not occur in other regions. 
A balancing factor is here that the pulp and paper 
industry also could benefit from the renewable en-
ergy target, e.g. through combined heat and power 
(CHP) production based on biomass. The Nordic 
pulp and paper industry is subject to a number of 
structural threats and the future of this industry is 
discussed further in Chapter 18.
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Public acceptance and permitting procedures
Another challenge is related to public acceptance and regulations and permitting 
procedures for land use. Utilization of parts of the renewable energy resources 
lead to conflicts with other interests. Hydro power and wind power are examples 
of this. The theoretical potential to increase hydro power production is large, but 
public acceptance and political goals limits further development. Much of the 
increase in hydro power production comes from refurbishment and enlargement 
of existing hydro power plants. Norway is probably the only country where a 
significant increase in hydro power production can be expected. (Sweden also 
has large unexploited hydro power resources, but they are strictly limited th-
rough political goals.) Public acceptance and permit procedures are also im-
portant issues in connection with wind power development. There are currently 
large uncertainties as to how these factors will influence the possibility to build 
large quantities of wind power. 
Intermittent electricity production, e.g. wind power, is a 
challenge for the Nordic electricity market
Increased use of renewable energy often includes significant expansion of wind 
power. Wind power can be seen as an intermittent production source, since it 
relies on wind that cannot be stored. (The operation of the Nordic power system 
with increasing volumes of intermittent power is discussed further in the sec-
tion “The challenge of making Nordic electricity CO
2
 free”.) The introduction 
of wind power contributes to reduced operation of condensing plants, which 
will eventually lead to phasing out of such plants due to economical reasons. 
Although wind power plants will most likely be spread geographically over the 
entire Nordic region, there will be periods with high demand and unusually low 
wind generation. This will increase the risk for capacity shortage in the region. 
To balance this risk can be seen as a security of supply challenge related to rene-
wable energy. This issue is touched upon in Chapter 22.
Renewable energy also creates other opportunities for the 
Nordic region
All in all it is, however, probably correct to look upon the issue of renewable 
energy more in terms of opportunities than threats. The challenges presented 
above are often directly associated with opportunities for the Nordic region. 
Here follows some additional examples of such opportunities:
• Increased use of renewable energy decreases CO
2
 emissions in the Nordic 
region.
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• The Nordic renewable resource can contribute to lower CO
2
 emissions in 
other countries, either through export of primary energy or through electricity 
export. This is valuable for the receiving countries and therefore represents an 
asset for the Nordic region.
• Increased use of renewable energy reduces Nordic import dependency, 
especially for fossil fuels.
•  Increased use of renewable energy in the Nordic region stimulates development 
of new technologies and industries that produce equipment related to the 
utilization of renewable energy. It may also create export opportunities when 
the demand for such equipment outside the Nordic region grows.
• Improved energy efficiency when electricity production in condensing plants 
is substituted by CHP production and wind power.
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5. Large renewable resources in the 
Nordic region 
The theoretical potential to increase 
renewable energy use in the Nordic 
area is large but techno-economic po-
tentials depend on a number of factors, 
e.g.:
•  Accelerated support mechanisms 
and/or increased fossil fuel prices.
•  Changes in environmental legisla-
tion for the future utilization of 
rivers for hydropower.
The countries in the Nordic region have ample potential to increase their use 
of renewable energy in the stationary energy and transport sectors. However, 
investments are still constrained because renewable energy production is still 
more expensive than conventional production. In some cases, investments are 
also hampered by immature technologies. Denmark is the only country that has 
significant wind power use today, but there is excellent potential for substantial-
ly increased use of wind power in all countries in the region. The use of biomass 
in energy production is already high in Finland and Sweden, and this use is ex-
pected to grow due to large forest resources in these two countries. In Denmark, 
field biomass could also notably contribute to energy production in the future. 
However, the assessment of future bioenergy production has great uncertain-
ties due to future policies of Nordic countries, which might lead to increased 
exports of biomass or biofuels to those countries which have higher supports 
for renewable energy. On the other hand, EU’s sustainability regulations could 
limit import of liquid biofuels to the EU area from South America of South-East 
Asia, which have large potential to increase their bio-fuel production. The share 
of hydropower is already above 50% of total electricity production in the Nord 
Pool area, and the theoretical potential to increase hydropower production is 
also large. However, public opinion in the region is currently opposed to further 
exploitation of rivers, so further hydropower development will probably be limi-
ted. Given these constraints, in the absence of stronger renewable energy sup-
port schemes very large increases in renewable energy production cannot be 
expected until 2030. If existing support schemes are strengthened, and/or new 
support schemes introduced, the process could be speeded up.
- but the extent to which the use of these resources can be 
increased varies significantly from country to country
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•  Changes in regulation and proce-
dures for acquiring permits to build 
land-based wind power plants.
•  Sustainability criteria for biomass.
•  The future of the forest industry 
(biomass).
•  Technology development.
Ambitious plans for new wind power in each country
- but also concerns for lack of public acceptance and conflicts over criteria for 
land use
Denmark has the longest tradition in 
wind power in the Nordic region. The 
share of wind power in Denmark’s to-
tal electricity consumption is currently 
about 20% and the Danish target is to 
increase this share to 50% by 2030. In 
the other countries, wind power makes 
up less than two percent of total elec-
tricity consumption. However, Nor-
way and Sweden have plans to radi-
cally increase wind power production. 
Sweden has set a national planning 
target for 30 TWh annual wind power 
production by 2020, of which 10 TWh 
would be offshore. Norway has plans 
for 3 TWh (~1000 MW) by 2010, and 
the target for 2020 is approximately 
20 TWh of wind power production. 
In Finland the new energy and climate 
strategy targets include a 2000 MW 
(~5 TWh) increase in wind power pro-
duction by 2020 in order to fulfil the 
renewable energy targets set by the 
EU. Figure 5.1 shows a summary of 
the investment plans for each country 
(taken from several country-specific 
studies). In Denmark, much of the 
onshore capacity increase shown in 
the Figure 5.1 is coming from the mo-
dernization of old turbines, but most 
of the new capacity is coming from 
offshore wind farms. In Norway and 
Sweden a large number of wind power 
projects are either in the planning or 
development stages. However, there is 
no guarantee that any of these projects 
will be completed. Financial conside-
rations are not the only obstacle. Just 
as important are lack of public accep-
tance and conflicting land use criteria.
65
Figure 5.1: Installed and planned wind power plants in the Nordic countries. Sources: The Euro-
pean Wind Energy Association, Swedish Wind Energy, Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate, VTT.
The theoretical potential of biomass and waste is large, but 
economic potentials have large uncertainties
Biomass is feasible for the produc-
tion of heat, electricity, and liquid or 
gaseous bio-fuels. In the Nordic area, 
wood resources are largely utilized by 
forest industry, which also produce 
industrial waste liquors (i.e. black li-
quor) and solid biomass by-products 
suitable for energy production. A large 
share of these industrial side products 
are utilized at site but some solid by-
products (i.e. saw dust, bark, wood 
chips) may be also considered as a 
biomass resource for energy or bio-
fuel production. On the other hand, 
biomass from thinning and felling of 
forests (i.e. forest residues) represent 
a large share of wood resource po-
tentials, which could be used more 
effectively than today. However, the 
future techno-economical potential is 
very difficult to estimate and the re-
ported Nordic estimates therefore vary 
significantly. The techno-economic 
biomass potential of expected bio-
mass and biofuels export areas, such 
as South America, South-East Asia 
and Russia, are even more difficult to 
estimate, especially because of sus-
tainability criteria set by the EU and 
other barriers for extended biomass 
or biofuel production. Transporta-
tion distances limit the use of wood 
for large-scale energy production, so 
the use of wood can be complemen-
ted with agricultural residues, energy 
crops, and bio-wastes. Production and 
trade of pellets can be increased sig-
nificantly. 
The EU and several other OECD 
countries have set targets for renewa-
ble energy production in order to en-
sure security of supply and to combat 
climate change. To meet these targets, 
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renewable energy support schemes 
must be implemented. As national tar-
gets for renewables and the levels of 
incentives for bioenergy have signifi-
cant variations, biomass trade could 
increase. It can be expected that in the 
near future, bioenergy will become an 
internationally traded energy resour-
ce, and not just a local energy source. 
There is already competition for fibre 
wood between the energy sector and 
the forest industry in some countries, 
and competition for agricultural land 
can be expected to become more in-
tense in the future.
Figure 5.2 summarizes information 
about domestic biomass and waste re-
sources in the Nordic countries drawn 
from selected literature resources. The 
line segment indicates the variation 
of estimates, which clearly shows the 
great difference between the different 
analyses. 
Figure 5.2: Estimated biomass resources reported in selected literature resources. The line 
segment indicates the upper and lower estimates.
National environmental protection legislation limits 
investments in new hydropower production
The theoretical potential to increase 
hydropower production in the region 
is large, but further hydropower de-
velopment will probably be limited 
because of legislative constraints and 
widespread opposition to further ex-
ploitation of the river system. Much of 
the increase in hydropower production 
would come from refurbishment and 
enlargement of existing large-scale 
- but in the longer term climate change can increase the potential of hydropower
Fig 5.2
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hydropower plants in Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden. 
In the long-term climate change could 
lead to increased hydropower out-
put since climate change is expected 
to lead to more rainfall in the region. 
This is especially the case in Nor-
way where an additional 10 TWh of 
hydropower production is expected 
by 2025. Increased precipitation is 
expected to account for 6 of these 10 
TWh. In Finland, it has been estimated 
that it is technically and economically 
feasible to increase hydropower pro-
duction by 1 TWh by the year 2020. 
Approximately a quarter of this en-
ergy will probably be realized by re-
furbishment of existing large scale 
hydropower plants. In Sweden, the 
government has drawn up guidelines 
for the future utilization of rivers for 
hydropower. These imply that the ma-
jor part of rivers and individual stret-
ches of rivers, which have not yet been 
claimed for development, will remain 
undeveloped. What then remains to be 
developed include small-scale hydro-
power plants and refurbishment and 
enlargement of existing large-scale 
plants. The unexploited Swedish ri-
vers account for about one-third of the 
hydropower potential that is presently 
unexploited and estimated to be eco-
nomically feasible, and about half of 
the technically viable remaining hy-
dropower resources.
Increasing role of solar and geothermal energy in the residential sector, 
ocean energy a new longer term option 
The use of renewable energy resour-
ces other than wind, biomass or hydro 
will definitely increase in the future 
as technologies evolve and fossil fuel 
prices increase. They are, however, 
not expected to contribute significant-
ly to the total energy balance in the co-
ming 20 years. Solar and geothermal 
energy have the largest potential in 
the residential sector. In fact, Sweden 
is already the world’s second largest 
user of geothermal heat after China. 
The existing photovoltaic capacity in 
the Nordic region is small (a total of 
approximately 20 MW compared to 
5400 MW in Germany). Thermal so-
lar collectors are common in Denmark 
and Sweden, with both countries ha-
ving approximately 300 MW of instal-
led capacity. In the future, solar energy 
could have a larger role as passive en-
ergy homes become standard. Another 
long-term option is the exploitation of 
different types of ocean energy. Both 
Norway and Denmark are developing 
wave energy in the North Sea. Howe-
ver, the potential of ocean energy in 
the primary energy mix will obviously 
remain marginal in the Nordic region 
in the next 20 years.
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By 2050 the share of renewables could increase to 50% of total primary 
energy
Figure 5.3 shows the long term deve-
lopment of primary energy resources 
in the Nordic region with different 
emission allowance price levels cal-
culated with VTT’s Nordic TIMES en-
ergy system model. As the scenario’s 
focus extends to 2050, the different 
support schemes (i.e. green certifica-
tes and feed-in tariffs) have not been 
included in the calculations. Also, the 
EU’s renewable target for 2020 has 
not been taken into account in these 
simulations. The figure clearly shows 
that the use of wood fuels accounts 
for the largest increase while the in-
crease of wind power is not as large. 
This indicates that support schemes 
are needed to fulfil national renewable 
energy targets. However, it should be 
noted that wood fuel includes residues 
from the pulp and paper industry in-
cluding solid biomass by-products 
from imported log wood. Since the 
future of the Nordic forest industry 
and the cost of imported raw materials 
are presently uncertain, the prospects 
for using wood as fuel may be smaller 
than shown. The sector “other” inclu-
des waste fuels and renewables other 
than hydro, wind and wood fuels, and 
it is obvious that this sector increases 
rapidly. By 2050, the share of renewa-
bles from total primary energy could 
be close to 50%, if high emission al-
lowance prices are assumed, even wit-
hout additional support schemes for 
renewables.
 
Figure 5.3: Total primary energy supply in the Nordic countries.
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Other scenario calculations from the 
NEP project that incorporate the EU 
renewable energy target and existing 
policy instruments supporting renewa-
ble energy show similar results (see 
figure 5.4). The similarities are most 
obvious if these results are compa-
red to the results presented above for 
relatively high CO
2
-prices. In these 
scenarios the use of renewable en-
ergy in the Nordic region increases 
substantially. Outcomes for the indi-
vidual renewable energy technologies 
vary significantly. The use of hydro-
power increases but the expansion is 
constrained by political conditions 
stipulated in the model. The use of 
biofuel increases considerably. Most 
of the biofuel is used for heat produc-
tion in industry and district heating 
systems, often through combined heat 
and power (CHP) production. Taken 
into account the EU renewable target 
also leads to more wind power, which 
is expected to reach 30 TWh. (These 
calculations are described in more de-
tail in Chapter 4, “The EU renewable 
target alone will reduce Nordic CO
2 
emissions by 20 percent”.)
 
Figure 5.4: Increase of renewable energy technologies in the Nordic region relative to 2005, 
when measures for the EU renewable energy target are applied (also assuming current emis-
sion allowance trade and national policy instruments)
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6. Energy efficiency measures in the 
entire energy system leads to synergies 
Implementation of the 20 % energy efficiency target with maximum profitabi-
lity by aiming for increased efficiency in the entire energy system – leads to sy-
nergies between energy efficiency measures and measures related to climate 
and renewable energy obligations.
A cost-effective implementation of the 20 % target for energy efficiency by 2020 
should in-clude all parts of the energy system, from supply to end-use. NEP’s 
analysis shows that in this case about half of the energy efficiency improve-
ment measures will be energy conversion measures and half will be end-use 
measures. Most of these energy efficiency improvement measures will reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and lead to increased use of renewable energy sour-
ces in addition to increasing energy efficiency. These synergies will make the 
measures much more cost-effective. 
Important energy conversion efficiency measures include conversion from elec-
tricity produced by condensation to cogeneration and wind power, and measu-
res to replace electrical heating by heat pumps. End-use measures would mostly 
include more straightforward measures with relatively low investment costs.
The EU’s energy and climate package 
includes a requirement for energy effi-
ciency improvements of 9 % by 2016, 
and a proposal for 20 % energy effi-
ciency improvements by 2020. The 
EU is now discussing making this 20 
% target binding for all member states. 
One way to formulate the target could 
be as requirement to reduce the use of 
primary energy by 20 % by 2020. For 
the Nordic energy system, a 20 % re-
duction of primary energy use in the 
energy system (excluding the transport 
sector) means a reduction of approx-
imately 200 TWh. This is relative to 
primary energy use in 2020 calculated 
assuming a business-as-usual scena-
rio. NEP participants have conducted 
comprehensive consequence analyses 
of the 20% target.
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A cost-effective package of measures to achieve the 20 % 
energy efficiency target
NEP’s analyses show that a cost-ef-
fective package of energy efficiency 
measures designed to achieve the 20% 
efficiency improvement by 2020, in-
cludes approximately equal amounts 
of energy conversion efficiency 
measures and end-use measures: 
• 4-5 % is efficiency measures in the 
large-scale energy conversion., e.g. 
more electricity produced in coge-
neration plants, wind power plants 
etc. instead of a production in con-
densing plants. This corresponds to 
40-50 TWh primary energy.
• 6 % is substitution in the building 
sector and industry, e.g. change from 
electrical heating to heat pumps in 
small houses. This corresponds to 
around 60 TWh.
• 9-10 % is conservation measures in 
the building sector and industry, cor-
responding to 90-100 TWh primary 
energy. Most of these measures are 
relatively straightforward and with 
modest investment costs (see Chap-
ter 7).
The NEP energy efficiency package 
has been developed by means of a 
comparative analysis of energy con-
version efficiency measures and end-
use efficiency measures. Potential be-
nefits and costs (including transaction 
costs) for end-use measures have been 
calculated in a traditional manner (see 
Chapter 7). Potential benefits of en-
ergy conversion measures have been 
computed using MARKAL-NORDIC 
modelling. The MARKAL model has 
also been used to calculate (marginal) 
costs of energy conversion measures.
The NEP energy efficiency package 
was then constructed by adding mea-
sures one by one, sorted in order of 
decreasing profitability, until a 20% 
reduction in primary energy use had 
been achieved. Included in the profita-
bility of each measure is the savings in 
energy purchases that can be attributed 
to that measure. By using MARKAL 
Figure 6.1: The ”NEP package” 
of measures to achieve 20 % 
improved energy efficiency in 
the Nordic countries. 
Fig 6:1
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measures in end-use 
in buildings and industry
9-10%
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modelling in the construction process 
we were able to model the fact that the 
most profitable measures that are im-
plemented early affect the profitability 
of other efficiency measures that are 
implemented later (and the profitabi-
lity of other changes to the energy sys-
tem). At any point in time the model 
takes the current energy balance into 
account when it computes the profita-
bility of a measure.
CALCULATION OF REFERENCE LEVEL FOR THE 20% TARGET
Fig 6:2
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By means of the MARKAL model, we have established the primary energy use that will form the refe-
rence level for the 20 % target for the Nordic energy system. Model calculations were used to make 
a reference case – or business 
as usual scenario — in which 
the policy measures and instru-
ments that directly influence 
the size of the primary energy 
use are not included. We can 
call it a reference case without 
policy measures. The figure to 
the right shows that the prima-
ry energy use in this scenario 
for the year 2020 is approxima-
tely 12-13 % above the actual 
2005 primary energy use level.
The definition of the energy 
service directive that prescribes 
9 % energy efficiency until 2016 – the ESD-directive – allows member countries to take credit for the 
improved energy efficiency which is brought about by already implemented policy measures/instru-
ments. We have used the MARKAL Nordic model to calculate the primary energy reduction that will 
be achieved by today’s policy measures in the Nordic countries by 2020. This is done by comparing the 
primary energy use in the reference case to the case with fewer policy instruments (“reference case – 
no policy measures” in the figures). The comparison shows that today’s policy measures will result in a 
decrease of primary energy by about 5 % in 2020. 
Another important experience from the MARKAL analyses, illustrated in the figures by the scenario 
that include the targets of 20 % renewable energy and 20 % reduction of CO2 emissions, is that in 
reaching these two goals, the primary energy use is reduced by another 5% in 2020. 
The remaining 10 % energy effi-
ciency therefore has to be achie-
ved through new policy measures. 
All together, the “NEP package of 
energy efficiency” described above 
fulfills the 20 % target. The “packa-
ge” is schematically included in the 
figure to the left.
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Which energy efficiency measures are most important?
Some of the measures described above 
are noteworthy in several ways. Not 
only do they lead to significant im-
provements in energy efficiency, they 
also contribute towards achieving tar-
gets for reduced CO
2
 emissions and 
increased use of renewable energy. 
These synergies improve the cost-ef-
fectiveness of implementing the EU’s 
climate change and energy package.
Large-scale energy conversion
Cogeneration and wind power are the 
most important large-scale energy 
conversion efficiency measures. Low 
production efficiencies in older coal- 
and oil-powered plants lead to high 
CO
2
 emission rates. When these are 
replaced by biofuel- or gas-fired co-
generation plants, energy efficiency 
is vastly improved. At the same time, 
CO
2
 emissions are greatly redu-
ced and the share of renewable 
energy is increased. 
Nuclear power has been handled 
in NEP’s analyses with a prima-
ry energy weight of 1, i.e. wit-
hout losses in energy conversion 
(see sections below). 
Heat pumps and district heating are 
two examples of small-scale energy 
conversion efficiency measures. In the 
transport sector, a large-scale intro-
duction of electric cars would result 
in a considerable efficiency increase. 
However, these measures do not al-
ways yield a reduction in primary en-
ergy use.
Replacing oil-fired boilers by district 
heating often yields a reduction in 
primary energy use, and an improve-
ment in efficiency. This improvement 
is significant if the district heating is 
produced with a large share of waste 
heat. Large and clear-cut energy 
efficiency improvements are 
also achieved when heat pumps 
replace electric heating. Heat 
pumps are included in NEP’s 
efficiency package mostly as a 
substitute for electric heating. 
When heat pumps are used to 
replace other energy sources such as 
oil-fired boilers and district heating, it 
is necessary to consider the efficiency 
of the energy source being replaced in 
order to determine if the replacement 
yields improvements or not.
Small-scale energy conversion
Large-scale 
conversion 
is mainly 
electricity and 
district heating 
production, and 
distribution.
Small-scale 
conversion is 
mainly heating 
and process en-
ergy in housing, 
services and 
industry.
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End-use: useful energy in households, service and industry 
The cost-efficient potential for energy 
efficiency in useful energy is large, but 
naturally the profitability differs bet-
ween the different measures. A very 
large part of the measures are actually 
quite straightforward to implement, 
and many of them require no invest-
ment. Examples of such measures are: 
• Adapting air flows and operation ti-
mes for ventilation and illumination 
to the times when premises are used. 
This often only requires the right ad-
justments of existing clocks or the 
like. 
• Electricity efficiency in households, 
buildings and businesses, by using 
best available technology when 
changes are to be made anyway. 
Change to low-energy lamps. 
• Insulation of attics. 
These simple and inexpensive measu-
res constitute more than half of the en-
tire gross potential, and can lead to an 
energy efficiency of around 10-15 %.
In order to reach the 20 % target it is 
sufficient to implement these simple 
measures as long as energy conversion 
measures that yield improvements on 
a similar scale are also carried out.
For further information on end-use ef-
ficiency measures, see Chapter 7.
Figure 6.2: Energy efficiency measures in the entire energy system
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Energy efficiency in the entire energy system
In NEP, we are calculating with pri-
mary energy. (The EU does the same 
on its documents on a 20 % energy ef-
ficiency improvement target by 2020). 
Primary energy should include all en-
ergy losses in the paths that precede 
the final use. This is intended to reflect 
all energy which is used, from the fuel 
market (or equivalent) to the end user.
By measuring efficiency improve-
ments in terms of primary energy, it 
becomes possible to include efficiency 
improvement measures in the whole 
energy system and not just in end-use 
(as is the case of the 9% target).
Since the EU’s 20% energy efficiency 
target relates to primary energy,  pri-
mary energy weighting is done at this 
level in NEP and not at the level of fi-
nal energy as is the case for the 9 % 
target (the ESD Directive). We have 
weighted all fuels and energy resour-
ces in our main scenarios by the factor 
one (1), with the exception of the free 
(heat) energy which is utilized in heat 
pumps, which has been weighted by 
zero (0). As far as we can tell, this is 
similar to the factors used by the EU. 
This means that free renewable ener-
gy, such as hydropower and wind po-
wer, has also been assigned a weight 
factor of 1. 
For nuclear power, we have used two 
alternative methods:
1. Weighting based on the energy 
content of the fuel (uranium), by 
a factor 3
2. Weighting electricity output by a 
factor of 1
1. Nuclear becomes an efficiency
  measure
The NEP analysis show that if nuclear 
power is primary energy weighted 
from the uranium energy content point 
of view, a phasing out of nuclear po-
wer becomes a cost-effective “energy 
efficiency measure”. The efficiency 
target can then be largely met by pha-
sing out nuclear power. 
2. Nuclear is not an efficiency
  measure as such
If nuclear power, on the other hand, 
is primary energy weighted from the 
electricity produced in nuclear power, 
a phasing out of nuclear power be-
comes not a cost-effective efficiency 
measure. 
The primary energy weighting is important
Figure 6.3: The concepts of primary energy, final energy 
use and useful energy. In NEP, primary energy weighting 
has been performed for each fuel and energy resource.
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In this analysis we thus demonstrate 
how important it is to select an 
appropriate weighting for nuclear 
power since the choice of weighting 
method has profound effects on the 
selection of measures for the EU’s 
20 percent energy efficiency target. 
When we constructed the 
NEP package of 
energy efficiency 
measures we selected 
the second weighting 
method for nuclear 
power – the one 
where the produced 
electricity is assigned 
a weight factor of 1.
One important reason for this choice is 
that the NEP project does not consider 
energy efficiency in isolation, but in 
combination with the climate change 
and renewable energy programs 
where nuclear power is identified 
as a key technology for reaching the 
CO
2
 emission reduction targets by the 
EU. Since nuclear power is free from 
CO
2
 emissions (at least in the energy 
conversion stage) we do not see that 
the purpose of the energy and climate 
policy package is a phasing out of 
nuclear power.
PRIMARY ENERGY WEIGHTING
Within NEP, primary energy weighting is done for 
each fuel and energy resource. No explicit weights 
have been assigned to the energy carrier’s elec-
tricity and district heating. Their primary energy 
weighting is instead based on how the production 
of electricity and district heating will develop over 
the period studied – which is a result from the NEP 
model calculations - and can change from one year 
to another.
• Fuels: oil, coal, gas and bio-energy were assigned 
a weighting factor of 1. 
• Wind power, hydropower and other free renewa-
ble energy sources were also assigned a weighting 
factor of one, in the main scenarios.
• In some NEP scenarios wind power was assig-
ned a factor zero.
• Nuclear power was assigned a factor of one
• In some NEP scenarios a factor three (3) was 
used instead
• Free (heat) energy for heat pumps was assigned a 
weight factor 0. 
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It is generally easier to get measures and decisions implemented in energy supply, distribu-
tion, and large-scale conversion, than on the demand side. Construction of power plants, 
heating plants or power grids is handled by professional organizations in a limited number 
of (rational) decisions. Realizing the efficiency improvement potential on the user side often 
requires millions of decisions by millions of residence owners, tenants, and people in owner 
and administrator organizations, for whom energy is often only a fraction of all the issues 
they must deal with.
Decision making: the demand side is more complex
Synergies with the CO2 and renewable targets
The vast majority of the energy effi-
ciency improvement measures will, 
with the exception of resource ma-
nagement measures, also reduce CO
2
 
emissions and/or increase the use of 
renewable energy sources in the Nord-
ic countries. Such synergies naturally 
make these efficiency measures more 
cost-effective.
DIFFERENT DECISION POWER IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE 
ENERGY SYSTEM
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The CO2 target
The efficiency measures that reduce 
the use of fossil fuels also reduce CO
2
 
emissions. Over the period up to 2020, 
most measures fall under this catego-
ry, especially in the EU. 
Figure 6.4: Improved energy efficiency is an important CO
2
 measure in the Nordic region, and even more 
so in the rest of Europe. The figure on the left shows measures that reduce carbon dioxide emission in 
the Nordic countries, while the figure on the right is for the EU (as shown in by the Chalmers Pathways 
project), when the EU climate and energy package is implemented
The renewable energy target
Energy efficiency improvement mea-
sures also have a positive impact on 
renewable energy targets in the Nordic 
countries. This happens in two ways:
•  The renewable energy target is a 
percentage target, measured in 
relationship to the amount of con-
sumed energy, here called final 
energy. With improved energy 
efficiency, the total amount of en-
ergy used decreases, and thus the 
amount of renewable energy that 
must be added to the system. 
•  Many of the energy conversion ef-
ficiency measures also contribute 
towards increasing the share of 
renewables, if, for example:
• biofuel cogeneration and wind 
power replace electricity produc-
tion in coal powered plants;
• buildings that are oil-heated are 
connected to district heating, 
given that the district heating is 
produced with renewable energy 
sources;
• heat pumps are installed, as the 
free heat to heat pumps counts 
as renewable according to EU’s 
directive. 
For further information:
Bo Rydén and Anders Göransson,
Profu
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Three energy efficiency  
challenges
How to accelerate the implementation of the energy efficiency potential and 
use the most cost-efficient measures in the entire energy system.
The EU’s energy and climate package includes an increase in energy efficiency 
by 20 % by 2020. The EU has plans to make this target binding and to formulate 
it as a reduction in primary energy. Previous research shows that there is a large 
and profitable efficiency potential in all sectors, both in the Nordic region’s and 
the EU’s energy systems. The research also warns that political programmes and 
clear incitements are needed if this potential is to be realised. 
In previous section we have described a package of energy efficiency impro-
vement measures. This package results in increased efficiency by 20 % and in-
cludes the measures that are most cost-effective for the Nordic energy system. 
However, it is not obvious that these measures will be the ones that are chosen 
to be implemented if the EU makes its 20 % target binding. NEP has identified 
three major challenges for the Nordic and European energy systems that need 
to be met: 
1. Formulate a policy that gives equivalent incentives to increase efficiency in 
the whole energy system, in energy conversion as well as in end-use, so that 
the most cost-effective measures are chosen.
a. Possible distribution of responsibility between the different sectors in 
the energy system (buildings, industry, etc.) should be open and not locked 
by fixed percentage targets.  
b. It is also important that individual efficiency measures are allowed to 
transfer responsibility between sectors, as for example, an increase in use 
of heat pumps, district heating and electric cars can do.
2. Balance policy instruments for improved energy efficiency with other policy 
instruments, including carbon emissions and renewable energy profiting from 
the synergies that arise from the different targets. 
3. State clearly that efficiency measures – especially in end-use – require clear 
incentives in order to be carried out. Do not believe that it is enough that a 
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calculation model shows profitability. That there is an economic viable effi-
ciency potential is not a guarantee that a measure will be actually carried out. 
Choose a policy that gives equivalent incentives to improve 
efficiency in the whole energy system
A cost-effective implementation of the 20 % energy efficiency improvement by 
2020 target in the Nordic energy system should include all parts of the energy 
system, from supply to end-use. NEP’s analyses show that cost-effectiveness 
is attained with approximately equal amounts of energy conversion efficiency 
measures and end-use measures. Most of these energy efficiency improvement 
measures will, in addition to increasing energy efficiency, also reduce greenhou-
se gas emissions and lead to an increased use of renewable energy sources in the 
Nordic countries. These synergies will make the measures more cost-effective.
In both Nordic and European energy policy, the reasoning for energy efficiency 
improvements have traditionally been brought forward by the energy users. 
The consequence can be seen in the European Commission’s document on ef-
ficiency, where end-use measures get the most attention. Many cost-effective 
measures on the supply side are overlooked, resulting in a sub optimization that 
can be expencive. However, if the EU and the Nordic countries are to achieve a 
20 % efficiency improvement in the 10 years until 2020, sub optimization cannot 
occur. Key challenges in order to avoid sub optimization include: 
• To formulate energy efficiency targets so that they provide incentives 
for improving efficiency in the whole energy system. The most appa-
rent way is to formulate targets focused on reducing primary energy. 
The EU’s document has also primary energy as a starting point. 
• Focusing on final energy, as the EU’s energy services directive does 
with a requirement of 9 % energy savings by 2016, limits the out-
come and does not promote large-scale energy conversion measures.
• Working with weighted primary energy carriers like electricity and 
district heating is not an answer, as it does not promote large-scale 
energy conversion measures.
• The definition and measurement of primary energy is important. A dis-
cussion on which energy types are to be included is currently going on 
within the EU: 
• NEP has shown that the weighting factor of nuclear power is of cru-
cial importance in the Nordic energy system, see further Chapter 6.
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The choice of policy instruments – finding a good balance
The above reasoning shows that there seems to be large possibilities for im-
proved energy efficiency, and that this would justify the introduction of policy 
instruments. The items below are a more general reasoning about policy instru-
ments for effective energy use. Common arguments for policy instruments are:
• The price of energy is too low
• The costs of energy are not paid directly by those who can influence the use 
of energy. 
• In order for us as consumers to be able to make rational decisions, know-
ledge is needed, but it is sometimes effective instead to limit the choices by 
having the state place requirements on the products that are sold.  
• A certain type of activity yields positive diffusion/external effects.
Align energy efficiency policies with other policy instruments
Policy instruments such as the EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS), CO
2
 
emission taxes, green certificates, and feed-in tariffs are examples of policy in-
struments that are designed to reduce CO
2
 emissions and increase the use of 
renewable energy sources. At the same time, these policy instruments provide 
incentives to improve energy efficiency, especially through energy conversion 
measures. An effective approach to achieve improved efficiency through energy 
conversion could therefore be to strengthen related policy instruments. NEP has 
not made a detailed analysis on the best way to do this. Instead, we merely list a 
couple of measures that might contribute to energy efficiency:
• Dedicated support for wind power as a complement to existing certificate sys-
tems.
• Feed-in-tariffs that are higher than the levels required to meet renewable tar-
gets.
• It is also important to decide whether renewable energy sources like 
wind power, waste heat and free heat for heat pumps are to be regar-
ded from the same primary energy perspective as fuels like coal and 
oil. 
• The trading sector should be included, as it covers many cost-effec-
tive energy efficiency measures. Wind power, industrial waste heat 
and large heat pumps are good examples of cost-effective measures 
to improve efficiency in the trading sector. 
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Policy instruments for more effective use in the end-use sector must of course 
also be implemented. Below is a list of examples of possible policy actions in 
order to eliminate or mitigate the effects of the obstacles described above: 
• Different types of taxes, price regulations or competition laws.
• Voluntary agreements with energy users to reduce energy consumption. 
• Regulation can also be an efficient method to reduce costs for information 
gathering or as an alternative to taxation. 
• Strengthened status and prominence for energy declarations. 
• Building codes with energy-conservation requirements for rebuilding.
Examples of policy instruments for more effective use of energy – in the 
end use sector
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Large incentives might be required to reach the 20 % energy 
efficiency target 
– especially if the EU places the focus on end-use measures
NEP’s analyses show that only a small fraction of all profitable energy efficiency 
improvement measures are carried out unless specific policy instruments are 
put in place. Clearly 
articulated political 
programs are the-
refore required if 
these measures are 
to be carried out. 
Go for the simple 
measures!
Evaluations of pre-
vious efficiency 
programmes show 
two types of out-
come:
1. Even modest econo-
mic incentives give 
rise to substantial im-
provements in energy efficiency. This is confirmed by the volontary agree-
ments in Finland and the Enova program in Norway, see Chapter 7 for details.
2. Significant incentives are required for all measures to be carried out fully. This 
is confirmed by several Swedish energy efficiency programs from the 1990’s.
The NEP project has not had the opportunity to analyze these outcomes further. 
However, an initial analysis indicates that a strongly focused political program 
might be required to reach the 20 % energy efficiency target by 2020. Such a 
program might be necessary despite the fact that current energy and climate 
policy, which includes a 9 % energy efficiency target, already includes energy 
efficiency incentives, and despite the fact that many energy efficiency measures 
give rise to synergies with other programs because they also contribute positi-
vely to CO
2
 emission reduction and renewable targets.
If the EU decides to focus energy efficiency improvements on end-use while 
retaining high ambitions for reductions in primary energy use, more expensive 
Calculation of potentials for efficiency improvement. 
Insulation, appliances etc in the Swedish building sector. 
Final energy (end use). From the Swedish NEEAP
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measures will be required. We know by experience that strong incentives are 
required for such measures to be implemented. Compared to a policy in which 
the most cost-effective measures for the entire energy system, the ones included 
in the NEP energy efficiency package, are selected, such a restricted policy leads 
to a higher total cost for reaching the 20 % energy efficiency target.
Energy efficiency has been a prioritized area in the Nordic region ever since 
the oil crises of the 1970s. For instance, Sweden carried out a very successful 
heating savings programme in the 1980s, which was followed by an electricity 
efficiency programme in the 1990s. In Denmark and Finland, voluntary energy 
efficiency improvement programmes directed at the industrial sector have re-
ceived a lot of attention. In Norway, the ENØK-programmes, where funds were 
earmarked for energy efficiency measures, grew strongly in the 1990s. The re-
sponsibility for these programmes was then transferred to Enova in the early 
years of the new millennium.
At the same time, other ener-
gy and environmental policies 
have provided incentives for 
energy efficiency measures, 
both in end-use measures and 
energy conversion measures. 
This has especially been the 
case when it comes to pro-
grammes such as energy and 
carbon taxes, renewable en-
ergy programmes, and the 
EU Emission Trading System 
(ETS).
The National Energy Ef-
ficiency Action Plans 
(NEEAPs) of the Nordic 
countries also provide a good 
illustration of the extent of 
end-use energy efficiency im-
provements in the Nordic re-
gion in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Lessons learned from efficiency improvement programmes of the 1990s 
and 2000s
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Improved efficiency due to energy conversion measures 
– an example from Sweden
In the Swedish housing and services 
sector, energy efficiency has improved 
by approximately 1% per year in the 
last two decades.  Detailed NEP ana-
lyses show that a very large part of this 
improvement cannot be attributed to 
measures that reduce final consump-
tion of useful energy. Instead, most 
of the improvement can be attributed 
to energy conversion measures such 
as replacement of electrical heating 
by heat pumps. This is noteworthy 
since NEP analyses show that energy 
conversion measures will be very 
important components of energy effi-
ciency programs in the future as well.
Energy consumption in the Swedish housing sector is calculated to have fallen by 
approximately 20 TWh over the period 1995-2004. This amounts to a decrease of 
10-12%. End-use consumption has fallen, but only slightly, so energy conversion 
accounts for most of the reduction. The large increase in the number of heat pumps 
is an important reason for this.
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7. Large, profitable efficiency  
improvement potential in end-use
As described in Chapter 6, the EU’s ESD-directive sets a 9 % indicative energy 
efficiency target, to be achieved by 2016. Existing programmes allow the 
Nordic countries to reach this target.
EU has, within its climate and energy 
package, adopted a framework for 
energy end-use efficiency and energy 
services. This includes an indicative 
energy savings target of 9 % to 2016 
for the Member States, as well as obli-
gations on national public authorities 
with regards to energy savings and en-
ergy efficient procurement and measu-
res to promote energy efficiency and 
energy services. 
The potential and program-
mes for increased energy 
efficiency in the Nordic 
countries, which has been 
identified to fulfil this 9 % 
target, are shown in the ta-
ble. It has been calculated 
from the National Energy 
Efficiency Action Plans 
(NEEAP:s) and other natio-
nal efficiency plans for the 
Nordic countries. The potential will, 
as shown in Table 7.1, reach above the 
9 % energy efficiency target in 2016 
in the end-use sectors, so-called final 
energy. Industries and other plants 
that are included in the EU’s emission 
trading scheme (EU ETS) are not in-
cluded in the table. For further infor-
mation, see NEP research report on 
energy efficiency.
- existing programmes and simple measures can result 
in significant improvements in energy efficiency
Table 7.1: The  programmes for increased energy 
efficiency in the Nordic countries to 2016, which has 
been identified to fulfil this 9 % target
TWh %
Final energy use, 2003 700
Early actions and exis-
ting policy instruments
21 3.0%
Suggested efficiency 
programmes to 2016
71 10.2%
Total 92.0 13.2%
- above the 9% level  30 4.2%
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Existing programmes and simple measures
In addition to the ESD directive, the 
EU has a target for 20 % improved 
energy efficiency until the year 2020. 
This target is, in principal terms, in-
cluded in the EU climate change and 
energy package from December 2008. 
At present, the target for 
20 % improved energy ef-
ficiency does not include 
any legally binding targets. 
In a memorandum publis-
hed during 2009, the EU 
presents the prerequisites 
for this 20 % target. The 
EU is now discussing ma-
king this 20 % target bin-
ding for all member states. 
The target might be formu-
lated as a requirement to 
reduce primary energy by 
20 % by 2020, as explai-
ned in Perspective 6.
It is however, not only 
the target level and the fi-
nal year that separates the 
EU targets for 9 % and 
20 % improved energy 
efficiency. The base year 
to which the target refers 
is also different: the base 
year of the 9 % target in 
the ESD directive consists 
of an average for the first years from 
2000, while the base year for the 20 % 
target is 2020 and a projected level of 
primary energy use for a business-as-
usual scenario for that year.
The purpose of Directive 2006/32/EC on energy 
end-use efficiency and energy services, from the 
European Parliament and the Council, and the re-
pealing of Council Directive 93/76/EEC is to make 
the end use of energy more economic and effi-
cient by:
• establishing indicative targets, incentives and 
the institutional, financial and legal frame-
works needed to eliminate market barriers 
and imperfections which prevent efficient end 
use of energy; 
• creating the conditions for the development 
and promotion of a market for energy services 
and for the delivery of energy-saving program-
mes and other measures aimed at improving 
end-use energy efficiency. 
The Directive applies to the distribution and retail 
sale of energy, the delivery of measures to impro-
ve end-use energy efficiency – with the exception 
of activities included in the greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading scheme – and the armed forces, to 
a certain extent. It targets the retail sale, supply 
and distribution of extensive grid-based energy 
carriers, such as electricity and natural gas as well 
district heating, heating oil, coal and lignite, fo-
restry and agricultural energy products and trans-
port fuels.
THIS EU DIRECTIVE ON ENERGY 
END-USE EFFICIENCY AND  
ENERGY SERVICES (ESD)
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European leaders committed themselves to reduce primary energy 
consumption by 20 % compared to projections for 2020. Improving 
energy efficiency also addresses the key energy challenges of climate 
change, energy security and competitiveness.
Current energy efficiency legislation alone will not deliver sufficient 
energy savings to meet the 20 % saving target. Main obstacles to en-
ergy efficiency improvements are the poor implementation of exis-
ting legislation, the lack of consumer awareness and the absence of 
adequate structures to trigger essential investments in, and market 
uptake of, energy efficient buildings, products and services. The as-
sessment of national energy efficiency action plans shows that there 
is a gap of 9-10 % between the Member States political commitment 
to energy efficiency and their actions. Member States need to imple-
ment more swiftly and effectively energy efficiency legislation. New 
instruments must be developed to further enhance energy efficiency. 
(Source: EU memorandum from 2008 and 2009)
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: DELIVERING THE 20% TARGET 
A cost-effective package of measures to achieve the 20 % 
energy efficiency target
It is a challenge to go from the ESD 
directive’s target for 9 % improved 
energy efficiency to the EU’s more 
ambitious target of 20 % improved 
energy efficiency in only the four 
years from 2016 to 2020. The analy-
ses carried out by NEP show that a 
cost-effective package of energy effi-
ciency measures designed to achieve 
the 20 % efficiency target for pri-
mary energy by 2020, should include 
all parts of the energy system, from 
supply to end-use, in approximately 
equal amounts of energy conversion 
efficiency measures and end-use me-
asures. This is described in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
The menu of conservation measures in the building sector 
and the industry
The conclusion from our calculations 
of the energy efficiency measures, 
set up to fulful the 9 % target in the 
ESD-directive, is that there is – in the 
NEEAP’s and other efficiency plans – 
additional potential for cost-efficient 
measures presented above 9 %, large 
enough to contribute to reaching a 
target of 20 % improved energy ef-
ficiency calculated as primary energy 
use from a business-as-usual scenario 
for the year 2020. We can call this ”the 
gross potential”. 
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In our analysis we have tried to esti-
mate the segment of this gross poten-
tial  that can be realistically achieved 
by 2020. The estimate is based on the 
assumption that:
• the marginal cost for end-use energy 
efficiency improvement measures is 
about the same as the marginal cost 
for energy conversion measures.
• end-use measures would be mostly 
simple measures with relatively low 
investment costs. 
The NEP analysis shows that end-use 
measures in the building and industrial 
sectors make up approximately half of 
the measures in the energy efficiency 
improvement package that achieves 
the 20 %-target. Table 7.2 shows the 
segment of end-use measures in these 
sectors (electricity and heating/fuel 
measures). For further information see 
NEP reports on energy efficiency.
Table 7.2: Energy efficiency in the building sector and industry by 2020, relative to a 
business-as-usual level (TWh)
Heating Electricity Sum %
Residential and service 29 19 48 11%
Industry 15 8 24 7%
Total 44 27 71 9-10%
Calculation of the size of the efficiency potential for 2020
It is previously de-
scribed how NEP 
has come up with 
an estimate of the 
share of the gross 
potential that can be 
realistically achie-
ved by 2020. Be-
low, it is  illustrate 
how NEP arrived at 
this estimate. This 
is done by consi-
dering a specific 
example, namely 
that of energy effi-
ciency in buildings 
in Sweden.
Figure 7.1: Calculation of potentials for efficiency improvement.
Insulation, appliances etc in the Swedish building sector. 
Final energy (end use). From the Swedish NEEAP
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It is not quite clear in the EU documents if the 
20 % target, as the 9 % target, only deals with 
energy use in plants outside the EU emission 
trading scheme (EU ETS). NEP’s choice is that 
in the analyses of the 20 % target, the energy 
use in all plants of the energy system will be in-
cluded. This may lead to a situation where we 
analyse a somewhat larger energy efficiency 
ambition than the EU finally will decide, but we know that the both other 20 % targets, re-
garding reduced CO
2
 emissions and increased use of renewable energy, also give incentives 
for reduced primary energy use. Our judgement is therefore that we will not deviate too 
much from the real development, even if the EU chooses to keep the plants within the EU 
ETS outside the 20 % energy efficiency target.
The ESD directive allows, the including of already decided policy instruments in the 9 %. 
Among those are for example energy tax, CO
2
 tax and voluntary agreements. In the EU’s 
document about the 20 % target it is clear that the member countries will not be allowed in 
the same manner to include measures that are results of existing policy instruments. It is ho-
wever not easy to isolate these measures, at least not in the energy conversion stages. Thus, 
an exact judgement of which measures requires new policy instruments will be difficult to 
make. NEP has therefore chosen to compromise in its analyses, and exclude a majority of 
the measures in the final user stage, identified in the NEAAP:s, for which existing policies 
give incentives, but include a majority of the measures in the energy conversion stages for 
which existing policies give incentives. 
NEP CHOICES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Figure 7.1 above shows the gross po-
tential of energy efficiency in Swe-
dish buildings. In this case, the gross 
potential is about 34 TWh, or 22 %, 
of the total final energy use. The con-
cept gross potential refers to what is 
private-economically profitable in a 
present-value calculation. The poten-
tial includes all types of measures, i.e. 
supplementary insulation, ventilation, 
change of electrical equipment, etc. 
Conversion of heating technology is 
not included. The implementation is 
distributed over time according to 
usual lifetimes for apparatuses, buil-
ding parts etc.
How much of the gross potential is spontaneously implemented?
Only a part of the gross potential will 
be spontaneously implemented in rea-
lity. This has been established and de-
scribed in a large number of contexts 
and inquiries. The Swedish EnEff in-
quiry estimates that only about 15 % 
of the efficiency measures, excluding 
conversions, will be implemented in 
a business-as-usual case. This cor-
responds to about 5 TWh in year 2016 
in Figure 7.1.
”20% energy 
efficiency target”
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Obstacles to implementation
There are many reasons why not eve-
rything is implemented. Examples of 
these are
• Deficient knowledge about the ex-
istence of improved efficiency pos-
sibilities
• Doubt of the suitability of certain 
measures
• Stricter profitability requirements or 
problems with financing
• Too narrowly or short-sighted cal-
culations of profitability
• Doubt whether the business will last 
in its present form
• Lack of time to handle this type of 
issue or produces an inadequate ba-
sis
• Lack of sufficient competence in the 
organization or focus on other issues
How much of the gross potential should be easy to realize?
All of the measures in the gross poten-
tial are profitable in calculation terms, 
but naturally their profitability differs. 
A very large group of measures are ac-
tually quite simple to implement, and 
many of them cost nothing in invest-
ment. Examples of such simple mea-
sures are
• Adapting air flows and operation ti-
mes for ventilation and illumination 
to the times when premises are used. 
This often requires only the right ad-
justments of existing clocks or the 
like. 
• Electricity efficiency in households, 
buildings and businesses, in the form 
of change to the best on the market 
when changes are to be made any-
way. Change to low-energy lamps. 
• Insulation of attics. 
These simple and cheap measures 
constitute more than half of the en-
tire gross potential; see Figure 7.2. 
The potential of the simple measures 
is thus much greater than what is im-
plemented spontaneously. And what is 
implemented spontaneously may not 
be the most profitable – experience 
from elsewhere indicates that real 
implementation is widely spread bet-
ween the more and the less profitable.
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The efficiency gap can be explained
Our conclusion is that there are cer-
tainly obstacles which lead to a great 
deal not being done, but that the house 
owner has many very profitable pos-
sibilities within reach when the obsta-
cles have been passed. Policy instru-
ments that help the decision-maker 
over the obstacles therefore seem to 
be well justified.
The energy-efficiency gap, which re-
fers to the fact that apparently profita-
ble measures are not carried out, and 
how its causes can be systematized, 
have been discussed in depth in NEP. 
There are also careful discussions 
of what should be defined as market 
failures or market barriers in general. 
Further, NEP has tried as far as pos-
sible, to find specific and concrete cau-
ses of the gap and to express them in 
figures where this is feasible. 
For each measure, NEP has made 
a rough estimate of the time it takes 
for a building owner and his/her em-
ployees or family members to acquire 
information, purchase, follow up etc. 
With transaction costs included in this 
way, the potential decreases from 34 
TWh of final energy to 28 TWh, or 
82 % of the base case. This calcula-
tion is made with ample expenditure 
of time, and with a time valuation of: 
10-12 SEK/hour for private persons’ 
own free time. If we also add the in-
fluence of split incentives and the in-
vestor market, the potential decreases 
to 24 TWh of final energy, which is 
72 % of the base case. We can now 
observe that this potential of 24 TWh 
has the same order of magnitude as the 
assessment of the potential for simple 
measures, which is about 20 TWh as 
shown above.
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Figure 7.2: Calculation of potentials for efficiency improvement. Insulation, appliances 
etc in the Swedish building sector. Final energy (end use). From the Swedish NEEAP
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The above reasoning shows that there 
seems to be large possibilities for im-
proved energy efficiency, and that this 
would justify the introduction of poli-
cy instruments. A set of various policy 
instruments and their impact on energy 
use was analyzed in the EnEff inquiry. 
Some of the policy instruments inclu-
ded was a ban on incandescent light 
bulbs, norms and regulations, volun-
tary agreements, and pricing feedback. 
The investigation justified the choice 
of these policy tools with their ability 
to bridge over several of the obstacles 
that were identified as most important 
to overcome for realizing large energy 
efficiency potential. In this case they 
are also made so that the influence 
between different policy tools is not 
counted twice. The analysis showed 
a potential of 20 TWh, including 5 
TWh of measures that were carried out 
spontaneously. 
A realistic efficiency target
The sections above illustrate a way of 
reasoning about how to set up a realis-
tic efficiency potential” for buildings. 
In part, one proceeds from the gross 
potential, with the engineering entries, 
and makes reductions with regard to 
transaction costs and other obvious, 
calculable causes of the efficiency gap. 
This calculation gives a result which 
has the same order of magnitude as the 
assessment of the potential for simple 
measures. Secondly, we proceed from 
the spontaneous development and add 
the estimated impact of the proposed 
policy tools. 
The conclusion is that both approaches 
have about the same outcome, in the 
range of 20-24 TWh of final energy for 
Swedish buildings.
Ongoing energy efficiency programmes and activities up to 
2020 in two Nordic countries
The first separate programme for en-
ergy efficiency was launched in 1992 
and the programme has been renewed 
on a regular basis (1995, 2000 and 
2002). The Action Plan for Energy Ef-
ficiency defined energy efficiency me-
asures for the period 2003-2006, but 
the target year for energy efficiency 
improvements was 2010. In 2005, 
this Action Plan was incorporated into 
Finland´s new National Energy and 
Climate Strategy. The target defined in 
the strategy, was to achieve an addi-
tional 5 % energy savings by 2015 by 
intensifying existing measures and by 
introducing new measures connected 
to the implementation of EU directi-
ves. 
In order to replace and update some of 
the energy saving agreements that ex-
pired in 2007 a third generation of vo-
luntary energy efficiency agreements 
for the 2008-2016 was prepared:
Energy efficiency activities in Finland up to 2020
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Table 7.3: Energy efficiency activities in Finland
Target group Savings
Energy-intensive industry
All energy-intensive industrial companies in 
Finland
The target (presented no later than 2010) 
will reflect the energy efficiency improve-
ment targets set by the companies on the 
one hand and on the other, the energy ef-
ficiency improvement targets of the national 
Energy and Climate Strategy set at the time
Energy production
Companies with combined or separate genera-
tion of electricity and heat, 80% of energy 
production
Total saving of 1,000 GWh in the use of primary 
energy and an improvement of 1,000 GWh in 
electricity generation calculated in electrical en-
ergy by the year 2016 when compared against 
the situation where these new measures are not 
taken.
Medium-sized industry and private service sector
Companies with no sites exceeding a maximum 
annual energy consumption of 100 GWh. A 
least 60% of the energy use of the medium-
sized industry and private service sector.
The indicative target of energy conservation to 
be set for each branch will be 9%
Energy services
Companies delivering district heat and district 
cooling to end users and those carrying on 
electricity transmission, distribution and retail 
sale. The target is to have 80% of the electricity 
transmitted to end customers (electricity dist-
ribution), the electricity sold to end customers 
(electricity sales) and the district heat sold to 
end customer.
Saving of 150 GWh of electricity in the transmis-
sion and distribution losses of electricity and in 
the electricity consumption of district heat pro-
duction and transmission, and a saving of 150 
GWh in the distribution losses of district heat 
and the consumption of  fuel energy in separate 
production by the year 2016 when compared 
against the situation where no new measures 
are taken.
More than 30 companies of energy-in-
tensive industries have signed the new 
agreement. By signing the agreement, 
a company undertakes to analyze its 
own energy consumption and to draw 
up an action plan on implementing 
cost-effective useful efficiency measu-
res. Accordingly, municipalities adhe-
ring to the municipal sector agreement 
scheme are. The new agreements will 
promote the deployment of new tech-
nology and innovation activities more 
intensively, while including targets 
and measures for encouraging the use 
of renewable energy.
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Table 7.4: Reported energy savings of Finnish  energy-intensive industry in 2008 and future 
saving approximations (based on Motiva report on December 2009)
Action Energy saving actions Other actions
Saved  
energy 
total
TWh/a
Saved  
electricity
TWh/a
Invest-
ment 
M€
Saved  
energy 
total
TWh/a
Saved  
electricity
TWh/a
Invest-
ment 
M€
Deployed 0.7 0.2 16.9 0.1 0.02 5.1
Decided or 
considered
3.0 0.6 156.7 1.3 0.7 260.5
The voluntary energy saving agre-
ement for residential buildings was 
signed in November 2002 for the 
2002-2012 period. The targets were:
• 15 % decrease in heat and water 
consumption by 2012
• Turn electricity consumption to de-
crease by 2008
• Get 80 % of the communities that 
have signed the agreement to be 
analyzed and under consumption 
follow-up by the end of 2010.
Savings in Finland by 2020 according to Energy Efficiency Committee 
Energy Efficiency Committee esta-
blished by the Ministry of Employ-
ment and the Economy proposed in 
June 2009 long term energy saving 
and energy efficiency measures that 
would impact approximated 37 TWh 
savings in final energy consumption 
by 2020. Note that transport is inclu-
ded here, but is excluded in the NEP 
analyses. 
Electricity savings would be 6.4 TWh, 
see Table 7.5. The highest savings cal-
culated would be achieved through 
new automotive technology (8.5 
TWh), regulations for new building 
and renovation building (4.9 TWh), 
more challenging energy efficiency 
agreements (2.8 TWh), and energy 
performance requirements for appli-
ances (2.1 TWh). Due to the proposed 
measures, final energy consumption 
will be approximately 11 % lower in 
2020 than it would be without these 
measures.
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Table 7.5: Approximated energy savings in Finland by 2020 according to Energy 
Efficiency Committee
Target group Savings by 2020 approximately
Heat and fuels 
[GWh]
Electricity
[GWh]
CO2 
[1000 tons]
Buildings 5 600 1 050 1 400
Traffic 12 600 130 3 600
Domestic 580 360 210
Agriculture 490 30 140
Industry and services 10 700 2 700 3 500
- energy intensive industry (6 420) (1 530) (2 180)
Device energy eff. 2 100 430
Total 30 000 6 400 9 300
The approximated savings of energy-
intensive industry are 1.5 TWh in elec-
tricity and 6.4 TWh in heat and fuels. 
The proposed measures cover a wide 
range of actions including e.g. emis-
sions trading, training, education and 
innovations. The savings achieved by 
the actions of the energy efficiency 
agreements have a key role.  In forest 
and metal industry, the main saving ac-
tions included process improvements, 
the use of more efficient equipments 
and systems like improved pumping, 
systems, inverters, turboblowers and 
efficient motors, and waste energy re-
covery. Energy efficiency impro-
vements in logistics 
and in overall 
energy mana-
gement will 
be also taken 
care of.
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Energy efficiency in Norway up to 2020
The governmental enterprise Enova 
SF, which is the Norwegian authori-
ties’ most important policy instrument 
in the shift to a more environmentally 
friendly energy system, has for seven 
years offered different support arrang-
ements that are to stimulate to energy 
efficiency. Enova makes yearly re-
ports on the achieved energy savings 
and their costs. The support has to be 
the trigging factor for the initiative to 
be able to receive Enova support. Eno-
vas reporting procedure, including the 
used methodology, is audited regular-
ly. We therefore have confidence that 
this data material is of good quality. 
Total potential for energy efficiency and costs
Looking at the three sectors industry, 
office buildings and households com-
bined with a certain set of assumption, 
it is possible to realize a substantial 
potential (12-14 TWh)  at a cost of less 
than 70 NOK/MWh or 10 €/MW). 
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Enova’s evaluation of the potential for energy efficiency
Enova’s goal is a sum of different ini-
tiatives within energy efficiency, shift 
from fossil fuels to renewable energy 
and establishing new production capa-
city for electricity and heat. Enova has 
a total of 18 TWh by 2016 and 40 TWh 
by 2020 regulated by contract.  It is up 
to Enova to decide how this should be 
distributed among the different initia-
tives, but 3 TWh has to be wind power 
and 4 TWh has to be renewable heat.
Enova believes that about 15 TWh 
worth of energy efficiency can be rea-
lized almost without investment costs. 
For further information:
Bo Rydén, Profu, Benedicte Langseth, Xrgia 
and Raili Alanen, VTT
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8. The development of the Nordic 
electricity system 
– towards zero CO2 emissions? 
The future electricity system will be shaped by policies, market forces and ex-
pectations. The Nordic countries are endowed with significant renewable en-
ergy resources, but bringing down CO
2
 emissions while sustaining competitive 
electricity prices is still a challenge. The NEP policy scenarios show to what ex-
tent CO
2
 emissions from Nordic electricity generation are reduced with different 
combinations of renewables policies and the emission cap in the EU ETS. CO
2
 
emissions from Nordic electricity are likely to decline in all scenarios by 2020. 
The share of renewable generation is found to be the most important factor in 
reducing emissions, but reductions also depend on the degree to which surplus 
electricity generation can be exported to Continental markets. Although natio-
nal renewable energy policies are likely to reduce emissions, the emission cap 
in the EU ETS and global climate policies are also crucial for CO
2
 emissions from 
the Nordic electricity system. Model results indicate however, that net electri-
city exports are roughly in line with electricity generation based on fossil fuels 
in the scenarios with a high share of renewables generation. As such, Nordic 
electricity consumption can be said to be CO
2
 free in the scenarios with a strict 
climate policy. 
Energy markets are formed and trans-
formed under the influence of mar-
ket forces, policies and expectations 
about the future. Current policies and 
measures, as well as expectations of 
future policy targets and frameworks, 
and how the market is perceived to 
react to these conditions, determine 
investment behavior in the market to-
day. And it is today’s investments and 
decisions which will ultimately form 
tomorrow’s electricity system. 
Analyzing the development of the 
electricity system in the next two de-
cades can therefore not be based ex-
clusively on numerical simulations in 
market models. Equally important for 
the outcome are the analysis of basic 
policy drivers, the implementation of 
policies and how the stakeholders re-
spond to these policies. Since the futu-
re balance between national policies, 
EU policies and global climate policy 
developments is currently undetermi-
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ned, uncertainty abounds and expec-
tations become decisive. Adequate 
predictions should hence be based on 
thorough scenario analyses as well as 
quantitative market simulations. 
The NEP policy scenarios identify EU 
and global energy and climate change 
policies and the development in global 
markets as the crucial driving forces 
for the Nordic electricity market. The 
central elements are the cap on CO
2
 
emissions imposed by the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the 
implementation of the renewable en-
ergy target in the Nordic area, fuel pri-
ces, and the export/import balance of 
the Nordic electricity market. 
Scenarios
We have identified a reference case 
and two policy scenarios, each repre-
senting distinct development paths for 
Nordic electricity. The analysis natu-
rally focuses on 2020, but also sees 
beyond the 2020 targets towards 2030. 
The main scenario assumptions are di-
scussed in more detail in the NEP final 
report “Coordinated use of energy-
system models in energy and climate-
policy analysis”. Therefore, only a 
brief summary is given here. 
Reference scenario
The reference scenario carries forward 
today’s energy policy status. In terms 
of EU policy compliance, the EU ETS 
is carried forward with a 20 percent re-
duction in CO
2
 emissions by 2020, but 
the EU renewable target is not fully 
met. The Nordic governments conti-
nue to support increased investments 
in renewable generation. 
European policy scenario  
In the European policy scenario, EU 
policies are enforced, but in the ab-
sence of a binding and ambitious in-
ternational climate agreement. This 
means that the cap in the EU ETS is 
not reduced compared to the reference 
scenario. Investments in renewable 
generation increase, and the overall 
EU target of 20 percent renewables in 
the energy mix by 2020, is reached. 
In the Nordic market, this means that 
renewable generation increases by 29 
and 35 TWh by 2020 and 2030, re-
spectively. 
In Figure 8.1, the development of the 
Nordic electricity-generation system 
is shown for the European policy 
scenario as es-
timated by the 
ECON-Classic 
model.
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The scenarios have been analyzed 
using a suit of different models with 
differing coverage and functionalities 
(see more in the NEP report “Insights 
from NEP policy scenario simula-
tions” for more detail). In this section, 
we will concentrate on results from 
the electricity market models Econ-
Classic, PoMo and VTT-EMM (for 
more information on the models, see 
NEP final report “Coordinated use of 
energy-system models in energy and 
climate-policy analysis”). 
Global policy scenario 
In the Global policy scenario, climate 
negotiations result in a binding and 
ambitious climate policy agreement, 
which prompts the EU to reduce the 
EU ETS cap to a 30 percent emis-
sions reduction. In this scenario the 
renewable target is also met. The same 
amount of renewable generation in the 
Nordic region is assumed in both the 
European and Global policy scenarios. 
The EU’s 2020 targets include an am-
bition to increase energy efficiency by 
20 percent compared to a baseline. We 
have not taken the energy efficiency 
target specifically into account in these 
scenarios (the impact of the efficiency 
target is discussed in e.g. Chapter 2). 
The main reason for this is that it is 
very uncertain how the efficiency tar-
get will affect electricity demand. 
The policy scenarios are the basis 
against which we have analyzed the 
development of the Nordic electricity 
market and the resulting CO
2
 emis-
sions.
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Figure 8.1: Nordic electricity generation in the European policy scenario (based 
on ECON-Classic model run).
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Figure 8.2 shows the development in 
CO
2
 emissions calculated by NEP’s  
electricity market models. Although 
results vary somewhat, all models 
show that CO
2
 emissions are redu-
ced, even in the Reference scenario. 
In the Econ Classic and PoMo model 
runs, CO
2
 emissions in 2020 are 40 
percent lower in than in the Base year 
(2007/2008), whereas VTT-EMM 
shows a somewhat lower reduction. In 
the European and Global policy scena-
rios emissions are 40-60 percent lower 
than in the Base year. 
In Econ Classic for example, CO
2
 
emissions are reduced by around 30 
million tons in the Reference scenario 
and by around 40 million tons in the 
European and Global policy scenarios.
Why do we get these reductions? 
The results show that the Nordic elec-
tricity market is likely to develop an 
increasing electricity surplus, due 
to an increase of investments in re-
newable generation combined with 
moderate demand growth. Even in 
the Reference case there is a signifi-
cant increase in renewable generation, 
whereas reaching the EU target re-
quires an additional 29 TWh by 2020 
(European and Global policy scena-
rios), see Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.2: Development in CO
2
 emissions from Nordic electricity based on resuts from Econ Clas-
sic, VTT-EMM and PoMo, and the average of all three electricity market models. Emissions relative 
to modelled Base year (2007). 
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Figure 8.3: Increase in policy-induced 
new renewable electricity generation 
in the Nordic power sector in the sce-
narios, plus difference between Refe-
rence case and European and Global 
Policy scenarios. 
The full cost for renewable genera-
tion capacity is high and investments 
are driven by government subsidies. 
However, once renewable capacity is 
brought online, marginal generation 
costs are low. Hydro and wind power 
are based on free resources, and elec-
tricity from CHP based on biomass 
is a side product of heat generation. 
Hence, the generation from this ad-
ded capacity will replace conventional 
fossil fueled capacity with higher mar-
ginal costs, or be exported. Figure 8.4 
illustrates this general effect. As gene-
ration from hydro, wind and biomass 
increases, generation in condensing 
plants based on fossil fuels goes down. 
The PoMo model yields some reduc-
tion in CHP generation as well. This 
can probably be attributed to restric-
tions in the export opportunities in the 
simulations. So as the overall effect is 
clear and consistent across the models, 
the results also show that different mo-
dels capture different effects.  
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Figure 8.4: Changes in 
electricity generation 
from different energy 
carriers per scenario 
and electricity 
market model.  
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With the assumed increase in renewa-
ble generation and nuclear capacity, 
our model simulations show that it is 
not profitable to invest in new fossil-
based capacity in the Nordic market 
before 2030. This also means that 
Nordic electricity prices will stay low, 
i.e. below the long-term marginal cost 
of new capacity and below Continen-
tal price levels. In the Continental 
markets new renewable generation 
replaces old fossil-fueled capacity 
which would have been phased out 
anyway, leaving room for new profi-
table investments in conventional ca-
pacity. 
As indicated by the results shown abo-
ve, assuming a certain level of electri-
city demand in the Nordic countries 
and a certain share of policy-induced 
investments in renewable capacity, the 
opportunity to export surplus electri-
city generation is crucial for the CO
2
 
emissions from Nordic electricity 
generation. We expect transmission 
capacity between the Nordic market 
and adjacent market areas to increase 
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significantly, as shown in Figure 8.5. 
As the Nordic fossil fuel-based gene-
ration (coal and gas) – mainly loca-
ted in Finland and Denmark – is very 
competitive compared with German 
and Polish fossil fuel generation, in-
creased trading opportunities imply 
that fossil fuel-based generation in the 
Nordic region is exported, thereby ef-
fectively replacing less efficient gene-
ration capacity on the Continent. The 
increased exports imply that European 
CO
2
 emissions are reduced, but Nord-
ic CO
2
 emissions are higher than they 
would be without this export opportu-
nity (more on electricity trade between 
the Nordic countries and Continental 
Europe is found in Chapter 11). 
Figure 8.5: Development in intercon-
nector capacity between the Nordic 
market and adjacent market areas, MW. 
Using the Econ Classic results, we find 
that in 2020 only 1,4 TWh of the fossil 
generation is consumed in the Nordic 
region in the European policy scena-
rio, whereas in the Global policy sce-
nario Nordic exports are 0,3 TWh hig-
her than fossil generation. Similarly, 
fossil fuel generation is higher than net 
exports in 2030 in the European policy 
scenario. In the Global policy scena-
rio a larger share is consumed in the 
Nordic region in 2030, as lower prices 
result in increased demand. Hence, the 
results should be interpreted with cau-
tion as demand growth and price deve-
lopments play a role. 
The effect on Nordic CO
2
 emissions 
is largely the same in the European 
policy scenario and the Global po-
licy scenario. This indicates that it is 
the increase in renewable generation 
capacity that has the most significant 
impact on emissions from Nordic 
electricity generation. The level of 
renewable generation is the same in 
the European and Global policy sce-
narios, but represents a significant in-
crease compared with the Reference 
scenario. CO
2
 emissions in the Nordic 
countries are roughly at the same le-
vel in both scenarios, despite the fact 
that the assumed price of emission al-
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lowances in 2020 is much higher in 
the Global policy scenario than in the 
European policy scenario. The reason 
is that the increase in carbon costs af-
fects all power generation in Europe, 
and the Nordic fossil fuel generation 
retains its competitiveness as the cost 
increase is general. 
For further information:
Berit Tennbakk, Econ Pöyry and 
Per Erik Springfeldt, Sweco
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The challenge of making Nordic 
electricity CO2 free
From a political perspective it would be positive to be 
able to claim that the Nordic power sector is CO
2
 free. 
On the other hand this may not be a very rational goal 
since small quantities of fossil fuel generation can be 
very profitable to keep in the system as regulatory po-
wer, enabling more intermittent power like wind po-
wer to be introduced. Fossil fuel generation can bee 
seen as ”lubrication” in an almost CO
2
 free electricity 
system.
The model results from the NEP toolbox indicate that CO
2
 emissions in the 
Nordic region are likely to be substantially reduced in coming decades. Howe-
ver, none of the models yield zero CO
2
 emissions from Nordic electricity. This is 
also the case for the results from the models that include the heat market.
We also know from our work that there will be large unexploited resources of re-
newable energy in the Nordic area that would be profitable to develop compared 
to investments in renewable energy in central Europe. With the right economic 
support for example through common electricity support schemes, there is mo-
ney to be saved.
A strict marginal perspective 
A strict marginal perspective implies that we (the Nordic countries) are ex-
porting our fossil generation and keeping the non fossil for our self?
Increase of renewable generation in combination with more nuclear and a weak 
demand growth result in large electricity exports from the Nordic countries to 
Continental markets. Since coal and gas-fueled capacity, which is the generation 
capacity that emits CO
2
, is also the marginal capacity in the Nordic electricity 
system, it can be argued that it is coal and gas generation which is exported to 
the Continent: if export opportunities were curbed, Nordic coal and gas genera-
tion may be reduced. 
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  ELECTRICITY DISCLOSURE AND TRADE IN GUARANTEES OF ORIGIN (GO)
Large quantities of hydro power “attributes” are being exported from the Nordic market to 
countries in central Europe. This export is carried out through the exchange of certificates, 
so called guarantees of origin, not physical power. According to the EU legislation for electri-
city disclosure (2009/28/EC) member States shall ensure that the same unit of energy from 
renewable sources is taken into account only once (Art 15 §2). This means that disclosure 
regulation has to take GOs in the account and this regulation has to be coordinated with other 
countries. 
Exports of renewable electricity through guarantees of origin have to be balanced by an equal 
amount of imports of “attributes”. These imported attributes can refer to a specific genera-
tion resource, proven by GO (or some other accepted tracking device), or mirror the so called 
residual mix. If the present trends of exporting GO from the Nordic region will continue - the 
electricity consumed in the Nordic countries from an electricity disclosure perspective, can 
deviate a lot from the physical generation mix.
However, the perspective on CO
2
 emissions from the Nordic power sector should 
be somewhat broader than on emissions from Nordic power generation alone. If 
Nordic fossil generation is more competitive than generation on the Continent, 
even though CO
2
 emission costs are the same, exports from the Nordic region 
replace higher cost and thus lower emission generation on the Continent. Within 
the framework of a common cap-and-trade system for emission allowances such 
as the EU ETS, the total CO
2
 emissions are not reduced, but the cost of comp-
lying with the cap is reduced, contributing positively to the competitiveness of 
European economies in a carbon-constrained environment. 
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9. Can we expect electricity demand 
to grow?
The development of electricity demand will have a large impact on the Nordic 
electricity market in the coming years. Large volumes of new power are coming 
into the market both through market forces and public support schemes. Wit-
hout a substantial increase in domestic demand, much of this power will most 
likely be exported out of the region.
The demand for electricity is flattening out 
As long as there has been electricity, 
demand for it has grown. During long 
periods the demand for electricity 
in the Nordic region has even grown 
faster than the economy. This is illus-
trated in Figure 9.1. A change of eco-
nomic policy in the 1990’s can partly 
explain why demand for electricity 
has declined. The devaluations that 
were so common in the 70’s and 80’s 
and that provided an invaluable boost 
to industries with high exports and 
low imports – which is the case for the 
electricity intensive industry - were re-
placed with among other things, a low 
inflation policy. Consequently, many 
electricity intensive industries have 
faced tougher conditions that have re-
sulted in smaller increases in produc-
tion and electricity use.
Figure 9.1: Total electricity 
demand and GDP in Demark,  
Finland, Norway and Sweden.
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There are two sectors that are especi-
ally important in the Nordic electricity 
market for the total level of electricity 
demand: the electricity intensive indu-
stry and electricity heating including 
heat pumps. During the financial crisis 
that started in 2008 some electricity 
intensive industries made significant 
cuts in production. When it comes 
to the heating sector, new heat pump 
technology is not only making electric 
heating much more efficient but also 
more competitive. In some areas, elec-
tric heating is even taking market sha-
re from district heating. Whether this 
development increases or decreases 
demand for electricity remains to be 
seen. 
The price sensitivity of industrial elec-
tricity consumption in the Nordic regi-
on is proportional to the geographical 
scope of climate change policies. The 
more countries that implement climate 
change policies similar to those in the 
Nordic region, the less price sensi-
tive Nordic electricity demand will be. 
Widespread adoption of stiff climate 
change policies will lead to overall 
higher worldwide product prices, lo-
wer competitive pressures on indu-
strial firms in the Nordic region, and 
higher electricity demand from these 
companies. Conversely, if many deve-
loping countries refrain from imple-
menting ambitious climate change po-
licies, worldwide product prices will 
not rise as much, competitive pressure 
on firms in the Nordic region will in-
crease, and electricity demand from 
these companies will fall. If only the 
EU implements climate change poli-
cies, the price sensitivity of electricity 
demand in the Nordic region can be 
expected to be quite high.
In the Global scenario we have assu-
med that OECD adopt ambitious cli-
mate change policies, which leads to 
higher prices for electricity and other 
forms of energy both inside and out-
side the EU. In this scenario industrial 
firms in the Nordic region have rough-
ly the same conditions as competitors 
in the rest of the rich world, but they 
are still at a disadvantage compared to 
competitors from developing countri-
es such as China. Here the leakage ef-
fect is reduced, but not eliminated. In 
the two scenarios, Reference and Po-
licy, we assume that EU adopts a more 
ambitious climate policy than the rest 
of the world. The effect of this policy 
is that the electricity intensive indu-
stry in Europe loses more in the global 
competition. 
The two curves shown in Figure 9.2 
describing the relationship between 
the electricity price and demand for 
electricity from industry has been cal-
culated from statistics from different 
industries, such as the aluminium and 
Ferro alloys industries. Yearly invest-
ment costs are included in the costs, 
implying an ability to pay for electri-
city in long run. From the curves we 
Price sensitivity of demand in the industry depends on 
global climate policy
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see that 25 % of the heavy industry or 
100 TWh of electricity demand and 
electricity heating could be threatened 
if we get electricity prices in the range 
of 60 EUR/MWh. The ETS Directive 
does, however, offer an opportunity 
for national governments to compen-
sate industries with a risk of “carbon 
leakage” – relocation resulting from 
an increase in costs due to carbon 
cost pass-through in electricity prices. 
Such compensation, if applied, could 
help strengthen the Nordic electricity 
intensive industry’s competitiveness 
in world markets even if climate chan-
ge policies in the EU are stricter than 
elsewhere. 
Small changes in demand could have significant impact on 
the market
In Finland, Norway and Sweden elec-
tricity consumption decreased by 25 
TWh, or 7%, from the top levels seen 
in July 2008 to November 2009, as 
rolling 12-month values. In the last 
quarter the rate of the reduction slo-
wed down, but was still significant. 
Demand has decreased in the iron and 
steel, mines, Ferro alloys, aluminium, 
base chemistry and pulp & paper in-
dustries. The greatest reductions were 
seen in the iron and steel industry, in 
the mining industry, and in the pulp 
and paper industry in Finland.
We believe that the long-term effects 
of the crisis will be small, and that the 
situation will be normalized by 2020, 
even though IEA in their WEO 09 
have slightly lowered projected ener-
gy demand by 2025 as a consequence 
of the crisis. The IEA believes that the 
situation will be fully normalized by 
2030. 
Figure 9.2: The price sensitivity of electricity demand in the Nordic region in the three NEP scena-
rios “Reference”, Policy  and “Global”  
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Even though the different models used 
in NEP calculate demand in different 
ways, they all predict slow demand 
growth at the market equilibrium pri-
ce, see Figure 9.3. It is also interesting 
to note that even small variations in 
demand growth rates lead to signifi-
cant changes in net exports, and there-
fore the need for grid investments. The 
horizontal line represents the present 
demand level.   
Energy efficiency policy may increase certain types of 
electricity use
More efficient energy use does not 
necessarily imply lower electricity 
demand for all types of use. The pos-
sibility of large amounts of plug-in 
hybrids by 2030 is one example. We 
have for example in the NEP-project 
assumed about 20 TWh of electricity 
demand, which replaces a much lar-
ger volume of petrol demand. Heating 
pumps is another example. This is also 
the outcome of the Global Times mo-
del runs presented in Chapter 20, even 
though these results are on a global 
scale.
Figure 9.3: Different electricity demand forecasts  in different NEP models, The 
model year is 2020
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For further information:
Peter Fritz and Per Erik Springfeldt, Sweco
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Finding the balance between politics 
and markets
The challenges related to coordination of policy incentives and targets, and at 
the same time providing sufficient room for the market to provide proper price 
signals, are formidable in the transformation of the energy system to a sustai-
nable, low-carbon world. The balance between markets and politics has been 
a recurring theme in the Nordic Energy Perspectives project. 
Climate policies profoundly changes the energy system
The climate policy focus promises to profoundly restructure the energy system. 
As we enter the second decade of the 21st century, energy investments are less 
driven by market signals than perhaps ever since the liberalization of energy 
markets started. The EU energy and climate policy package, particularly the 
implementation of the renewables directive, implies that energy investments are 
set to be determined by policy targets and measures, and not by market prices, 
in the foreseeable future.
The Nordic electricity market is increasingly policy-driven
Although the policy measures implemented in the Nordic countries, procure-
ment auctions for offshore wind as in Denmark, feed-in premiums as in Fin-
land, investment subsidies as in Norway and green certificates as in Sweden, are 
linked to the development of power market prices, the overshadowing driver is 
the political renewables target. Against the background of weak demand growth, 
the prospect for the Nordic power market is a growing surplus situation with 
correspondingly declining market prices. The lower the prices, the higher are 
the needed auction price/investment subsidy/feed-in premium/green certificate 
price to realize the ambitious renewables targets. The market still plays a role, 
and aids policies by providing cost efficient solutions within the limits set by 
policy targets and measures. Nevertheless, the overall market development is 
policy driven.
New types of generation create new challenges for the grid, for existing genera-
tion and for consumers. More low cost, but intermittent generation capacity, in-
- a recurring theme in the Nordic Energy Perspectives project
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centivized by support schemes, creates new system challenges and requires new 
solutions. A pressing question is whether the market will be made able to deliver 
in a future system heavily influenced by a mosaic of regulations and policy tar-
gets. The strength of the market is to generate and utilize flexibility where it can 
be found. When policy intervention overrides market adjustments, the necessary 
flexibility may not be provided. 
As markets may have failures in terms of failing to generate efficient solutions, 
so can policies. The (lack of) balance between different policy targets, e.g. 
emission abatement, renewable electricity vs. renewable heat or fuel, energy 
efficiency improvement in an energy surplus situation, are examples of such 
failures. 
The deregulated Nordic electricity market has produced 
proper price signals 
The Nordic electricity markets 
were deregulated and integrated 
during the 1990s. At the beginning 
of the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury, the Nordic electricity market 
was commonly regarded as the 
most well-functioning international 
power market in the world. 
The most prominent characteristic 
of a well-functioning market is to 
provide proper price signals. In the 
power market, market prices should 
yield proper incentives for demand 
flexibility and energy conservation, 
operation of generation capacity 
and investments in new genera-
tion capacity, grid investments, and 
substitution between electricity and 
other energy carriers.  
During the last decade, market fun-
damentals have shifted. One im-
plication is that the market is more 
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frequently divided into several price areas, and in some areas there is talk of a 
looming power “crisis”. This development can be seen as a strength – given 
the cost of infrastructure investments and the variations in generation levels 
(hydro, but even nuclear) and generation structure (hydro vs thermal systems), 
and changes in demand (activity fluctuations in industry, cold winters) – prices 
should differ between market areas (at least from time to time) to provide proper 
price signals for investments in infrastructure and generation capacity. On the 
other hand, price differences can be seen as a sign that the market has not been 
able to generate the proper investments. 
Successful deregulation requires adequate reregulation
To provide adequate price signals, most markets must be regulated to correct 
price formation for so-called market failure, i.e. external effects such as envi-
ronmental damage from emissions, and natural monopoly, such as the electricity 
network and transmission lines. Moreover, regulations should ensure a market 
structure sufficiently decentralized to mitigate market power. 
The electricity market is complex and all these concerns, and more, are relevant. 
Hence, successful deregulation of power market is to a large extent a question of 
successful reregulation of the markets. The regulations and market design of the 
power market has been constantly developed over the course of the last decade. 
At the same time the markets around us have developed, and the Nordic market 
has become increasingly linked to continental markets through investments in 
infrastructure and improved market coupling. 
The market cannot always be blamed
Sometimes the market is blamed, when in fact it is regulations that should be 
blamed. When it comes to price differences and possible inadequate investments 
in infrastructure, these should primarily be blamed on regulations. A one-price 
policy for a larger area (country) with bottleneck problems will for example 
obscure price signals and expose the system to erroneous investment signals. 
In a future where we expect more distributed investments in new generation 
capacity, adequate locational price signals may prove to be crucial for the cost 
efficiency of accommodating the targeted volumes of renewable energy. 
With a growing Nordic power surplus and increasing market coupling with 
neighboring market areas, there should be a significant basis for expansion of 
interconnector capacity. Investments in interconnector capacity are however not 
purely market based, nor should they be. Although parallel transmission lines 
118 
OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
may be profitable up to a point, publicly owned TSOs with the objective of 
maximizing social surplus are prone to make marginal investments that may 
render privately owned transmission lines unprofitable in the long run. Thus the 
market is not likely to provide such investments “on its own”. New intercon-
nectors are large investments which take time and huge resources to realize. 
Such investments are moreover subject to regulations in more than one country. 
Hence, it would be optimistic to assume that interconnector investments can 
“keep up with” a rapidly changing market based on strong policy measures. 
On the other hand, infrastructure investments, including new interconnectors, 
should be taken with a view to the market implications, i.e. the price effects, of 
such investments. As we also pointed out in the NEP book ”Ten Perspectives 
on Nordic Energy”, a coordination between generation and grid development 
requires a “visible hand” in the market.
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10. Millions of electric vehicles will 
have manageable impacts on the 
Nordic power system
NEP’s analyses show that a large com-
mitment to electric vehicles can make 
a significant contribution to the Nordic 
countries reaching the EU’s climate 
and energy targets by 2020: 
1. EVs can markedly reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions in the non-trading 
sector and can become a decisively 
important measure for fulfilling na-
tional obligations, which would oth-
erwise be difficult to fulfil. Energy 
conversion is moved to the trading 
sector, where petrol and diesel con-
sumption is exchanged for electri-
city production. 
2. Renewable energy sources are well 
represented in the Nordic power 
system. Nordic EVs will therefore 
rely mainly on renewable electri-
city for power. Since the EU scales 
up renewable electricity for electric 
vehicles by a factor of 2.5, the con-
tribution from electric vehicles be-
comes large.
Electric vehicles (EV) have been a hot topic in the past year. Several car manufac-
turers have announced their intentions of introducing plug-in and/or full electric 
vehicles to the market in the coming years. The Royal Academy of Engineering 
Sciences of Sweden visions 600,000 plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles by 2020 
in Sweden. Scaled up to the Nordic level, this corresponds to 1.3 million plug-in 
hybrids and electric vehicles in the Nordic countries. This would help us in reach-
ing our EU targets for renewables, including the 10 percent renewables share 
in transport fuels, the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the non-trading 
sector, and the energy efficiency target. Security of supply would also improve. 
All kinds of practical issues will, of course, have to be sorted out for this to hap-
pen. In NEP we have looked at the effect five million electric vehicles would have 
on annual electricity usage and on peak load.  Five million vehicles amount to 
half of all personal vehicles in the Nordic countries. According to our estimates, 
the annual Nordic electricity consumption would grow less than 4 % while peak 
load would grow even less, just 1.5 %, assuming very basic smart charging of 
the vehicles.
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The electricity requirement for a mil-
lion electric vehicles in the Nordic 
countries will depend on the distribu-
tion of different models of EVs being 
used and their consumption, but can 
be estimated at roughly 2.3 - 2.7 TWh 
per year. This corresponds to less than 
one percent of electricity consumption 
(year 2020) in the Nordic countries. 
NEP’s analyses show that the Nordic 
electricity system can meet this grea-
ter need by reducing its export of 
electricity. The export of electricity 
is otherwise estimated to grow until 
2020 hand in hand with an increased 
capacity for renewable power pro-
duction resulting from the EU’s Re-
newables Directive. Moreover, nuclear 
power capacity will also increase as a 
result of upgrades and the new Finnish 
fifth reactor, Olkiluoto 3. Thus, accor-
ding to NEP, while the introduction of 
a million EVs in the Nordic countries 
does not require extra electricity pro-
duction, electricity exports will not 
increase as strongly. However, the 
amount of electric vehicles can very 
well rise quite steeply from 2020 to 
2030. 5-10 million electric vehicles 
will need roughly 12-27 TWh. At the 
same time a lot of older capacity will 
be shut down, so the power balance 
would be much more strained without 
additional new capacity by 2030,  re-
newables and otherwise.
3. Electric operation makes plug-in 
hybrids and electric vehicles very 
energy-efficient. An electric motor 
converts more than 90 percent of 
the electrical energy to mechanical 
energy. A petrol engine can convert 
only 20-30 percent of the petrol’s 
energy content for propelling the 
vehicle.
4. Moving from fossil fuels to electri-
city in the transport sector increases 
security of supply in the Nordic 
countries both as a whole and as se-
parate nations.
The large-scale introduction of EVs 
brings to light issues concerning the 
distribution of responsibility for reach-
ing the EU targets between different 
sectors, in this case the energy con-
version and transport sectors, and the 
possibilities of collaboration and sy-
nergies. The ambition in NEP has been 
to try and understand the big picture, 
to see what happens when we broaden 
the analysis from a sector responsibi-
lity view to a holistic approach.
Need for new electricity production due to electric vehicles
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Electric vehicles reduce CO2 in the non-trading sector, but 
increase the price of EUA
A large investment in plug-in hybrids 
and electric vehicles would greatly 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
help the Nordic countries meet natio-
nal targets within the non-trading sec-
tor. If 1.3 million plug-in hybrids and 
electric vehicles are introduced in the 
Nordic countries by 2020 (of which 
600,000 in Sweden and approximately 
200,000 in each of the other countries), 
CO
2
 emissions from private cars are 
reduced by approximately 20 percent. 
For the transport sector as a whole, 
carbon emissions decline by approx-
imately 8-9 percent and for the non-
trading sector (in CO
2
 equivalents) as 
a whole, electric vehicles provide a 
decrease in emissions of around 4%. 
This corresponds to one quarter of the 
entire reduction commitment by 2020. 
CO
2
 emissions are thus reduced in the 
transport sector. Moreover, the energy 
conversion is shifted to the trading 
sector as energy is needed for the elec-
tricity production instead of as petrol/
diesel. Electricity production is cove-
red by the EU Emission Trading Sys-
tem, and at a given emission ceiling of 
carbon dioxide for the trading sector 
the introduction of electric cars will 
result in higher carbon prices (EUAs). 
NEP calculations show that if electric 
cars are introduced in the entire EU at 
a similar market share as in the Nordic 
countries by 2020 carbon prices will 
increase by 5-10 euro/ton. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2005 2010 2015 2020
Reference scenario
Scenario 1 – Baseline
Scenario 2 – Electric cars and plug‐in hybrids
The Transport Sector in the Nordic countries
[Mtons CO2]
Emissions 1990
Electric
vehicles
Figure 10.1: CO
2
 emissions from the transport sector in the Nordic countries in two scenarios 
compared to 1990 emissions and emissions in the reference scenario. The emission reduction due 
to the introduction of 1.3 million plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles are highlighted.
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Electric vehicles are an efficient way to achieve national  
renewable energy targets
In the EU’s Directive on the promo-
tion of the use of energy from rene-
wable sources, which calculates the 
share of renewables according to the 
end use, electricity used in vehic-
les is part of the country’s electricity 
mix and displaces fossil fuel use. By 
2020, the Nordic countries will be able 
to count almost two thirds (about 65 
percent according to NEP’s analyses) 
of their electricity as coming from re-
newable energy sources and contribu-
ting towards fulfilling the Directive’s 
targets. Furthermore, for the calcula-
tion of the electricity from renewable 
energy sources consumed by electric 
road vehicles, that consumption shall 
be considered to be 2.5 times the en-
ergy content of the input of electricity 
from renewable energy sources. This 
means that one kWh used in an elec-
tric vehicle is equivalent to 0.65*2.5 
= 1.63 kWh renewable energy in the 
directive implementation calculations. 
Using electricity to power vehicles is 
therefore an efficient way of attaining 
national renewable targets. 
If the introduction of electric cars also 
results in higher carbon prices, the 
profitability of wind power and bio-
mass power in the Nordic countries 
could be further strengthened. Electri-
city production from coal and gas will 
become more expensive, especially in 
the rest of Europe. Since the Nordic 
countries have a great potential for 
renewable power production, the pro-
spect of higher European electricity 
prices strengthens our motivation for 
increasing electricity production, and 
thus exports, from renewables. (NB: 
we have not analyzed within NEP 
whether the increase of electricity ex-
ports due to the rise of carbon prices 
would be larger or smaller than the 
decrease of electricity exports when 
electric cars are introduced in the 
Nordic countries.)
            ENERGY EFFICIENCY GETS A BOOST
An electric motor converts more than 90 
percent of electrical energy into mechanical 
energy. A petrol engine can convert only 20-
30 percent of the petrol’s energy content for 
propelling the vehicle. Electric vehicles are 
very energy efficient, even if we look at the 
chain from the grid to the road. Even if elec-
tric vehicles were powered by electricity only 
produced in coal condensing plants total ef-
ficiency would still be better than for petrol 
cars. The biggest gain would come from city 
traffic, which is very fuel guzzling, but suits 
electric vehicles just fine. The average energy 
used per unit transport (e.g. passenger-km) 
will decrease, helping to bring down the over-
all energy demand. 
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Security of supply is better off
Electricity for electric vehicles will be 
produced in the Nordic countries. NEP 
calculations show that less and less 
imported fossil fuel will be needed for 
electricity production. This has a huge 
impact on the security of supply of the 
Nordic countries as a whole and also 
as individual nations. 
The electricity production mix is also 
more diverse, which makes it easier to 
adapt to changes in the operating en-
vironment. Domestic fuel resources 
like natural gas in Denmark, oil and 
gas in Norway and biomass and peat 
in Finland and Sweden need refineri-
es, conversions etc. to become usable 
transportation fuels while they can be 
used more or less directly in existing 
power plants. 
The Nordic power system would manage a massive  
introduction of EVs, but at a cost
The NEP study has assessed the im-
pact on peak load of 5 million electric 
vehicles. One million vehicles were 
assumed to be battery powered elec-
tric vehicles (BEV) while 4 million 
were assumed to be plug-in hybrids 
(PHEV). According to our analysis 
peak load will rise with 6 percent. 
Figure 10.2: The effect of charging 5 million electric vehicles on the Nordic peak load, as-
suming uncontrolled charging. The Nordel peak load week from 2006 is used as basis. The 
peak load hour shifts from Friday morning to Thursday evening, and increases by 3 800 MW 
(6 percent)
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Figure 10.3: Smart charging. The peak load moves to the next hour compared to 
the case of no EVs, and increases by a measly 1 000 MW. The load also looks much 
nicer making a better use of the Nordic power production capacity
Fig 10:3
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The daily driving and charging of EVs 
was stochastically modelled using 
Finnish survey results about typical 
distances driven each day, timing of 
the travel, average trip lengths, trips 
per day, etc. as basis. It was assumed 
that all cars were charged through 
household electricity outlets (max 
2500 W) and that 20 percent of the 
EVs had the possibility to charge at 
work, while two percent didn’t ever 
charge at home. PHEVs differ from 
BEVs in that they have smaller bat-
teries, enough for 20-100 km, after 
which the car’s fuel-based motor is 
used. Smaller batteries mean shorter 
charging times. Cars were assumed to 
be charged without any controlling in-
telligence (smart charging), i.e. char-
ging started as soon as the cars were 
plugged in. The changes in the peak 
load can be seen in the previous figure. 
The charging of the EVs will hopeful-
ly be affected by future policy recom-
mendations otherwise the burden ad-
ded to the peak load from unregulated 
charging would be somewhat heavy as 
new peak load capacity of 3800 MW 
is needed.
Smart charging of EVs will help make better use of the  
Nordic power system 
Just a few simple rules or recommen-
dations concerning smart charging 
would achieve a much nicer picture. 
For example, if 90 percent of all char-
ging otherwise taking place between 
16:00 and 23:00 local time is moved 
to the night hours (0:00 - 07:00), peak 
load increase is limited to 1 000 MW. 
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The gap between day-time and night-
time consumption diminishes clearly.
The smartness could and probably 
would be tied to price signals, for ex-
ample the Nordic spot market price 
and/or balance regulation prices. And 
of course express charging places, 
where a battery can be charged in mi-
nutes at high power, will in all pro-
bability be available. However, they 
are considered to be of no actual im-
portance in this study. Most charging 
is likely to take place at home even 
when fast charging is available.
For further information:
Göran Koreneff, VTT and Bo Rydén, Profu
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11. Huge opportunities for Nordic 
electricity export in a widened 
European electricity market
Results from the NEP models clearly 
demonstrate that ambitious targets for 
renewable energy profoundly affect 
market balances in the Nordics. Fi-
gures 11.1 and 11.2 show correspon-
ding results from two different model 
approaches, the Econ Classic and the 
MARKAL-NORDIC model (see more 
on the NEP model toolbox in the NEP 
final report “Coordinated use of ener-
gy-system models in energy and cli-
mate-policy analysis”). Both models 
reveal the huge potentials for Nordic 
electricity export to Continental Eu-
rope. As can be seen in Figure 11.1 
(results based on (European) Econ 
The EU Renewable Directive requires significant increases in renewable elec-
tricity generation in the Nordic countries. In terms of potentials and costs, the 
natural conditions for new renewable electricity generation are better in the 
Nordic countries than in many other North European countries. The expected 
increase in renewable generation in the Nordics is likely to lead to increased net 
exports to Continental Europe. According to model results around 30 TWh may 
be exported in 2020. This amount may grow even larger if a common European 
scheme for tradable green certificates (TGCs) is introduced, particularly if this is 
combined with increased interconnector capacity between the Nordic countries 
and Continental Europe. In a “high renewables-high interconnector” case, mo-
del results indicate that Nordic electricity export may approach 50 TWh per year 
around 2020. Such an expansion of renewable electricity will require massive 
investments in generation capacity and interconnections, and present a huge 
challenge to the electricity grid. On the other hand, potential benefits from elec-
tricity and certificate exports are substantial, and may contribute to an overall 
reduction in the cost of fulfilling the EU renewables target. 
A common European TGC market and new interconnectors 
may significantly increase Nordic electricity exports
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Classic model runs and calculations 
in the Eureno model — a model for 
long term European renewable energy 
sources (RES) generation potentials 
and costs), the market balances in the 
Nordics are almost reversed compared 
to 2007 (modelled). Denmark beco-
mes a net electricity importer, while 
Norway and Sweden become large ex-
porters in 2020. Finland is also a net 
exporter to the Nordics (imports from 
Russia and Estonia are not included in 
the figure). 
The pattern is similar in all three RES 
2020 scenarios analyzed here: 
Base: RES generation is developed ac-
cording to national policies and there 
is no certificate trade – the RES target 
is not fulfilled
No TGC Trade: The EU RES target is 
fulfilled without European certificate 
trade
TGC Trade: The EU RES target is 
fulfilled with full European certificate 
trade. 
The results indicate that in a common 
TGC market, Nordic RES potentials 
and costs are competitive compared to 
potentials and costs in the rest of Eu-
rope, and hence the Nordics become 
net exporters of TGCs in a common 
market. Nordic net electricity exports 
to Continental Europe become signi-
ficantly larger than today, around 35 
TWh if unrestricted TGC trade is as-
sumed. The common TGC price in the 
TGC Trade scenario is estimated by 
the model to around 65 EUR/MWh.
Calculations using the energy system 
model MARKAL-NORDIC, show 
similar results: The Nordic RES-E 
potential is highly competitive on a 
European level. Applying increasing 
TGC prices, the MARKAL-NORDIC 
model finds increasing electricity ex-
ports from the Nordic area, see figure 
11.2. The figure shows the electricity 
balance between the Nordic countries 
as a whole and Germany/Poland for 
different TGC price levels in an assu-
Figure 11.1: Results from 
the European Econ Classic 
model, showing net ex-
ports to Germany, Nether-
lands and Poland in 2020 
for three different TGC-
scenarios. Both existing 
and new interconnectors 
are utilized 
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med common European TGC market. 
Letting investments in new intercon-
nector capacity being optional (i.e. 
investments are chosen endogenously 
by the model if they are profitable), the 
Nordic export may approach 50 TWh 
in 2020 given relatively high TGC 
prices*. The main explanation for the 
higher exports found by MARKAL-
NORDIC compared to Econ Classic, 
is the assumed potentials and costs 
for RES-E generation and the export 
capacity from the Nordics. RES-E 
investments are based on the sum of 
the wholesale electricity price and the 
TGC price. With less export capacity, 
increased RES-E investments will 
yield lower wholesale electricity pri-
ces and, hence, less investments for a 
given European TGC price.
As the price differences and traded 
volumes increase, so does the income 
from trade. In the “TGC trade” sce-
nario analyzed by the Econ Classic 
model the NorNed cable is fully uti-
lized for exports from Norway to the 
Netherlands, i.e. prices are higher in 
the Netherlands than in Norway in 
all load blocks. The price differen-
ces indicate that an expansion of the 
transmission capacity may be profita-
ble (see Figure 11.3a, next page). The 
results are however very sensitive to 
changes in the RES-E level, or more 
*) The model does not consider an actual market price for TGCs but rather a marginal cost for generating TGCs (i.e. 
marginal cost for producing renewable electricity minus the wholesale electricity price). Therefore, the “TGC price” used 
in MARKAL-NORDIC should be considered as a “lower equivalence” to an actual market price which also includes other 
features such as market uncertainties etc. The TGC price used in MARKAL-NORDIC is also not fully comparable with the 
TGC price used in ECON-Classic since they are calculated somewhat differently
New interconnectors more profitable with TGC trade?
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Figure 11.2: MARKAL-NORDIC model results showing total Nordic exports and imports to and from 
Germany and Poland for different TGC prices in an assumed common North European TGC market. 
Both existing and new interconnectors are utilized. 
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precisely to the power balances inclu-
ding demand responses and changes 
in conventional capacity, and to the 
way trade is modelled (price structu-
res). It should also be noted that results 
for 2020 are not representative for the 
full lifetime of an interconnector. In 
addition, the utilization of cables va-
ries significantly between seasons and 
years, and these aspects are not cap-
tured by the long-term scenario model 
used here (Econ Classic). 
The impact on Nordic wholesale elec-
tricity prices of the assumptions on 
available interconnector capacity is 
shown in Figure 11.3b, based on the 
MARKAL-NORDIC model. Per-
mitting the model to invest in new 
interconnector capacity between the 
Nordic countries and Continental Eu-
rope leads to higher wholesale elec-
tricity prices for any given price on 
the assumed European TGC market, 
than if only existing interconnector 
capacity is available. However, if the 
model is limited to using only existing 
interconnectors, this still leads to a 
significant net export from the Nordic 
countries, typically more than 20 TWh 
(see Figure 11.2). It is assumed that 
the availability on existing capacity 
can be increased somewhat compared 
to historical levels of utilization. Limi-
tations in the availability of existing 
interconnector capacity may be due 
to maintenance, larger than anticipa-
ted safety margins for system stabi-
lity, imperfect market coupling (e.g. 
explicit capacity auctioning), domes-
tic grid limitations and interruptions. 
Such factors are not included in the 
model. Furthermore, reported NTC 
(Net Transfer Capacities) values for 
a given interconnector may change 
between years and seasons, which is 
why the observed NTC values over a 
certain period can differ significantly 
from the default values that have been 
used in the modelling. If such features 
were taken into account in the model 
simulations, net electricity exports 
from the Nordic area to Continental 
Europe would be even lower in the 
case with only existing interconnector 
capacity, and Nordic electricity pri-
ces correspondingly be lower (cf. the 
green line in Figure 11.3b).
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Huge challenges for national grids
The reversal of trade patterns and the 
dramatic increase in net exports from 
the Nordic countries indicate that the 
RES-E expansion poses a huge chal-
lenge for TSOs. The description of the 
system in 2020 shows increased trans-
it, particularly through Sweden and 
Denmark, increased intermittency as 
the share of wind power increases, and 
reduced flexibility on the supply side 
as the share of conventional power ge-
neration is reduced. The challenge for 
the electricity grid and for transmis-
sion system operators is amplified by 
the relatively large amounts of inter-
mittent wind power that we can expect 
as a result of renewable policies, espe-
cially if trade in renewable certificates 
and increased interconnector capacity 
is made available, as shown by this 
analysis. Such a development will also 
affect existing thermal power plants 
with a likely increase in the number of 
annual starts and stops. Large volumes 
of wind power (and other intermit-
tent production) will, therefore, also 
require a higher degree of flexibility 
on the demand side, e.g. from electric 
boilers, both at the end user side and 
in district heating, and electric vehic-
les and other means for temporarily 
storing electricity. 
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Figure 11.3a (above) and 
11.3b (below): Two NEP mo-
dels showing the decrease in 
Nordic wholesale electricity 
prices from increasing the in-
comes from renewable electri-
city production in the Nordic 
countries (Econ Classic model 
above and MARKAL-NORDIC 
model below). 
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As the share of renewable electricity 
generation increases, the generation 
levels in conventional thermal power 
plants are reduced. The generation in 
existing coal and gas plants is reduced 
and investments in new conventional 
capacity are postponed. The Econ 
Classic results indicate that no new 
investments in conventional capacity 
are profitable before 2020 in the TGC 
trade scenario. Figure 11.4 (based on 
MARKAL-NORDIC model runs) 
show that with increasing TGC price 
on an assumed common European 
TGC market, renewable electricity 
generation in the Nordic countries in-
creases. This involves both biomass 
and wind power (hydro power expan-
sions are considered equally cost-effi-
cient for all investigated TGC prices). 
At the same time the output from both 
gas and coal power generation is gra-
dually reduced.
As fossil-fuelled generation is crow-
ded out, CO
2
 emissions are of course 
reduced. This is further discussed in 
Chapter 8.
Increased investments in renewable electricity generation 
crowd out fossil-fuelled electricity generation
Figure 11.4: Nordic electricity generation today and in 2020 in a reference case 
(”Ref”; including only existing policy instruments) and a case with a common 
European TGC scheme with three different TGC prices
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Differences between the Nordic countries and Continental 
Europe are likely to remain in a foreseeable future
The driving force for increased cross-
border electricity trade between the 
Nordic countries and Continental Eu-
rope is, of course, differences in price 
structure due to differences in elec-
tricity supply and demand patterns. 
Although price differences prevail in 
a future with increased trade, trade is 
likely to impact Nordic prices as well. 
One such indicator for regional diffe-
rences in electricity-price structure is 
found in Figures 11.5 and 11.6. Here 
the Econ BID model has been used to 
calculate wholesale electricity prices 
Figure 11.5: Average weekly price structure for South Norway, North Germany and Nether-
lands, European Policy scenario 2030. 
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Figure 11.6: Average weekly price structure for South Sweden, North Germany and Poland, 
European Policy scenario 2030. 
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by 2030 for different North European 
regions in the NEP main scenario “Eu-
ropean policy” with a high level of re-
newable generation in the Nordic area 
(for a detailed description of the main 
scenarios see the introduction of this 
book and NEP final report “Coordi-
nated use of energy-system models in 
energy and climate-policy analysis”). 
Nordic electricity prices are generally 
much flatter (and lower) than prices on 
the Continent, at least for some Nordic 
regions (Figure 11.5). For other Nord-
ic regions situated geographically clo-
ser to Continental Europe, e.g. South-
ern Sweden, electricity-price patterns 
resemble much more of the ones on 
the Continent (Figure 11.6). 
Although known expansions of the 
Nordic grid are taken into account, 
today’s internal grid capacities are as-
sumed. In the BID model Norway is 
divided into seven market areas and 
Sweden into four. Hence, the results 
indicate that the expansion of renewa-
bles in the Nordic countries increases 
internal bottlenecks. On the other 
hand, the results can be interpreted to 
show that a future increased integra-
tion with Continental Europe is also 
likely to affect domestic Nordic grid 
investment, or that the location of re-
newables investments may be crucial 
for the general profitability of such in-
vestments in the Nordic area. 
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The NEP project has in various aspects analyzed effects of, and preconditions 
for, a widening of the North European electricity market. Such a widening in-
cludes both increased electricity trade through new interconnectors and a joint 
effort to meet the renewable targets defined by the EU through e.g. green cer-
tificate trading. 
Using renewable energy in the Nordic countries in a 
European context
It is likely that conditions for investing in new renewable electricity are supe-
rior in the Nordic counties due to abundant natural resources (the potentials for 
renewable energy in the Nordic countries are further discussed in Chapter 5). 
Therefore, a further integration and increased electricity trade with Continental 
Europe could increase the exploitation of these resources and provide substantial 
benefits from electricity (and green certificate) exports, and at the same time 
reducing the overall cost of fulfilling the 
EU renewable target. Thus, the exploita-
tion of renewable resources in the Nordic 
countries is valuable also for other Euro-
pean countries where renewable resources 
are less abundant. Some of this has been 
taken into consideration in the burden-
sharing of the renewable goal within the 
EU but there are reasons to believe that the 
Nordic region, in a European context, may 
supply a larger amount of renewables than 
is domestically required in the burden-sha-
ring agreement. Hence, further integration 
of electricity provides for important opp-
ortunities in the Nordic region. However, 
such an integration of the North European 
electricity markets also presents a couple 
of challenges that must be considered.
Important issues to consider in a 
further integration of the electri-
city markets in Northern Europe
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Intermittency and public acceptance – two decisive issues
Integrating an increased share of intermittent electricity production is a chal-
lenge in itself. The Nordic countries are blessed with large amounts of hydro 
power which may be used for regulating purposes. Nevertheless, a significant 
expansion of wind power will have impact on the operation of thermal-based 
electricity generation, e.g. increasing the number of starts and stops. 
Renewable electricity production is frequently associated with public resistance 
when it comes to choosing appropriate sites. This is especially relevant for wind 
power and hydro power. The question is: will citizens of the Nordic countries 
quietly accept a massive expansion of renewable electricity from which a large 
part may be assigned for export?
Significant investments in cross-border and domestic 
transmission grids
Model analyses of the NEP project have shown that meeting the EU energy and 
climate package in a cost-efficient way is likely to involve new interconnector 
capacity between the countries in Northern Europe. This would be further amp-
lified if a common trade regime for e.g. green certificates were to be launched. 
Massive investments in renewable electricity generation and large investments 
in new interconnectors will change electricity flows within the Nordic region. 
More frequent and new internal bottleneck situations may be the result, and the 
electricity market may more frequently become divided into several price areas. 
Regions close to the interconnectors may experience prices more equal to the 
prices on the other side of the interconnector (border). This also indicates that 
significant investments in both cross-border and domestic transmission grids are 
likely to be needed (more on this is discussed in Chapter 11). 
Increased exposure of differences in national policy 
measures 
Further market integration is likely to further expose differences in national 
policy measures. For instance, investing in renewable electricity is not only a 
question of where natural conditions are favourable but also where national sup-
port schemes generate the highest incomes or profits. From an electricity-system 
operational point of view, there might even exist a third consideration: to balance 
the location of wind power over a larger region with respect to wind availability, 
thereby reducing the risk of having high or low wind situations simultaneously. 
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Market considerations
What happens with electricity demand in Northern Europe? The energy-effi-
ciency target of the EU may actually lead into two, equally possible, but oppo-
site directions. More efficient energy use may result in increased electricity use, 
e.g. in transportation (this is, among others, discussed in Chapter 2). However, 
a future decrease in electricity demand is also a possible outcome of a general 
increase in energy efficiency in e.g. industries (prospects for electricity demand 
are elaborated on in Chapter 9). If demand is reduced significantly during the 
coming years, Northern Europe may face a significant “oversupply” of genera-
tion capacity partly initiated by the renewable targets of the EU. Such a situation 
would imply relatively low wholesale electricity prices in the Nordic market if 
the export possibilities were limited due to bottlenecks in interconnector capa-
city.
Electricity-price volatility is likely to rise as the share 
of intermittent production is increased. However, a 
geographical widening of the electricity market may 
reduce the significance of such volatility.   
Increasing electricity trade and creating an integra-
ted North European market for renewable support, 
through e.g. green certificate trading, is likely to 
change the electricity balances significantly in some of the countries participa-
ting in such a market. Thus, depending on the country consumers and producers 
may face higher or lower electricity prices. Therefore, generators of the Nordic 
countries may increase their profits while consumers of the Nordic countries 
may face increased costs. Increasing interconnector capacities is likely to imply 
increasing wholesale electricity prices for the Nordic countries while a common 
European market for renewable electricity support is likely to imply also higher 
support costs, paid e.g. by the consumers, for the Nordic countries (this is further 
discussed in Chapter 12)
The role of non-renewable electricity generation
The significant electricity-export opportunities of the Nordic countries pointed 
out by the NEP project is not only enabled through an expansion in renewable 
electricity generation, but is also largely dependent on maintaining the existing 
non-renewable thermal electricity generation. In the case of nuclear power, the 
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capacity is likely to increase during the coming decade due to the fifth nuclear 
power station in Finland and due to repowering of several nuclear power stations 
in Sweden. A more rapid phasing out any of the non-renewable electricity capa-
city due to economic or political reasons will, of course, reduce the electricity-
export potentials of the Nordic countries that have been identified by the NEP 
project. 
In Chapter 8 it is argued that increased interconnector capacity may imply so-
mewhat higher CO
2
 emission from Nordic electricity production than other-
wise. This is due to the fact that fossil-based thermal electricity generation in 
the Nordic countries generally have higher efficiencies than their counterparts 
in Continental Europe. Thus, increasing the export capabilities of the Nordic 
countries may imply crowding-out of fossil-based electricity generation in Con-
tinental Europe rather than in the Nordic countries. In a European perspective 
this is, due to the EU ETS, equivalent in terms of reducing CO
2
 emissions. But 
will this be in accordance with political ambitions in the Nordic countries? 
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12. Scenarios for the Baltic Sea Region
The EU Policy scenario as an achieving future
The countries in the Nordic and Baltic regions are diverse with respect to recent 
history and economic developments, as well as to energy supply technologies 
and energy resources. Thus, the energy intensity in the new democracies have 
over the past 20 years been cut to almost half, yet still being twice as large as in 
the old democracies, leaving room for energy savings. 
The countries are united through physical infrastructure (electricity transmis-
sion lines) as well as trends toward developing a common electricity marked. 
Moreover, national environmental goals blend with EU targets and regulations, 
leaving room for co-operation options in their achievement. 
The Nordic and Baltic regions together contain large renewable energy sour-
ces, including substantial amounts of unexploited hydro, wind and biomass, and 
hence ambitious targets for reducing CO
2
 and increasing the share of renewable 
energy can be met with local resources. Shifting from national targets to a com-
mon regional target in relation to renewable energy will permit overall savings 
in achieving the target. Similarly, energy saving will have large impacts on such 
costs. However, the consequences and benefits will be unevenly distributed bet-
ween countries and between actors in the markets.
Three scenarios for possible develop-
ments are presented in this analysis. 
Two of the scenarios are different ver-
sions of the NEP main scenario “EU 
Policy”. The third scenario broadly 
corresponds to the NEP main scenario 
“Extended EU Policy” (more on the 
main-scenario definitions is reported 
in the introduction of this book). The 
first version of the “EU Policy” scena-
rio analyzed here, the baseline scena-
rio, is taken as a simulation showing 
a way forward to actually achieving 
the EU targets of reducing CO
2 
 emis-
sions by 20 % in 2020 and increasing 
the share of renewable energy to 20 %. 
Moreover, a target of a 50 % reduction 
of CO
2 
 compared to 1990 is applied 
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for 2030 (corresponding to a reduction 
of CO
2 
emissions by 38 % compared 
to 2005). The means to achieve the po-
licy targets in this scenario are to a lar-
ge extent determined by the modeling 
tool based on a least cost analyses of 
supply side measures. Hence, CO
2 
and 
renewable energy targets are formula-
ted as constraints, while the associated 
prices/costs/subsidies are derived as 
the marginal costs of achieving these 
targets. Consequently, the CO
2 
 price 
is common to the region while in the 
Baseline scenario there are differing 
national renewable energy prices. 
A further consequence is that the si-
mulated electricity price internalizes 
the marginal CO
2 
 cost (driving the 
price upwards). Likewise the marginal 
cost (in form of subsidies) for renewa-
ble energy is reflected in the electricity 
price (driving it downwards).
Figure 12.1 shows the development of 
the simulated annual electricity prices 
from 2015 to 2030 for each country. 
The decline in prices between 2015 
and 2020 is explained by the simulta-
neous mandatory introduction of rene-
wable energy. Hence, to the consumer 
electricity prices as shown in the fi-
gure should be added the proportional 
costs of renewable energy subsidies 
(assuming that the expansion of the 
renewable energy is financed by the 
electricity consumers).
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Figure 12.1: Wholesale electricity prices in the countries of the Baltic Sea region in the “baseline” 
scenario (Balmorel model runs).
In these model runs, the CO
2
-reduction target has been 
applied as a cap which implies that the CO
2
-allowance 
price becomes a model result. In other model runs of the 
NEP project, the EU Policy scenario has exogenously as-
sumed a CO
2
-allowance price rather than a CO
2
 cap. The-
refore, CO
2
 costs are not identical even though they are 
of similar. Also other differences are present, the origin of 
them are that the present analyses are derived from a pa-
rallel work, Sustainable Energy Scenarios, http://ea-ener-
gianalyse.dk/reports/Sustainable_Energy_Scenarios.pdf.
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The renewable energy prices differ 
between the countries. In 2020, Fin-
land, Lithuania, Latvia and Germany 
have the highest marginal costs (ap-
prox. 30 €/MWh) of expanding rene-
wable energy electricity generation, 
while Denmark, Estonia, Norway and 
Sweden have the lowest (approx. 10-
20 €/MWh), with Poland in between. 
The difference in compliance costs re-
flects the costs of new renewable ener-
gy generation in each of the countries 
compared to the value of new renewa-
ble energy electricity in the electricity 
markets
Between 2020 and 2030 another goal 
becomes dominant: electricity market 
prices increase as the CO
2
 target beco-
mes an increasing constraint causing 
the CO
2
 price to increase significantly. 
Thus, the simulated marginal cost of 
abating CO
2
 is approx. 7 € per ton 
in 2020 and approx. 50 € per ton in 
2030. This is in turn reflected in the 
electricity price. On the other hand, 
in 2030 the renewable target is hardly 
binding, implying vanishing or low as-
sociated renewable energy prices. 
The region has a number of old power 
plants with low efficiency. In the short 
run, the model chooses to replace 
these old power plants with new coal-
fired power plants or combined heat 
and power plants with high efficiency. 
This strategy could be reasonable to 
meet the CO
2
 targets in the short run, 
but it may not be the most viable in the 
long run with more strict CO
2
 targets.
Figure 12.2 (see next page) shows the 
electricity generation, grouped by fuel. 
The utilization of natural gas decreases 
initially as a result of the investments 
in wind power and new efficient coal 
power plants. The role of wind power 
is gradually increased over the period 
and by 2030 wind power is the largest 
source of electricity next to coal power 
and hydro power. Biomass and biogas 
only gain significance by the end of 
the period. 
As shown, coal gains impetus initially 
(mainly in Germany), however, new 
biomass-fired power plants, biogas 
plants and coal fired power plants with 
CCS are close to being competitive 
with new conventional coal-fired po-
wer plants, but CCS only in Germany 
and Poland.  Thus, these technologies 
could be part of the region’s focus on 
new energy technologies with a strong 
global potential.
  
Generation technology and energy sources
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Sweden and Norway are net expor-
ters of electricity in the beginning of 
the period and remain so until 2030, 
whereas Estonia, Finland and Germa-
ny are net-importers during the course 
of the period. Poland starts out as net 
exporter but eventually become im-
porter. Latvia, Lithuania and Russia 
follow more mixed patterns. 
In the end of the period a significant 
export of electricity, approximately  65 
TWh, takes place from Denmark, Nor-
way and Sweden toward the thermal 
based systems in Germany, Poland 
(where coal is still dominant) and Fin-
land. In the Baseline scenario the na-
tional renewable energy targets imply 
national – and hence differing – prices 
and costs related to achieving the tar-
gets. Alternatively, the targets might 
be formulated as a common regional 
target, presumably with total lower 
costs in achieving the targets; this is 
analyzed in the second version of the 
“EU Policy” scenario, here defined as 
the Regional renewable energy targets 
scenario. 
In this scenario the marginal cost of 
reducing CO
2
 is 14 €/ton in 2020 
compared to 7 €/ton in the Baseline 
scenario. The reason for this is that the 
renewable energy targets are met with 
less effort in the Regional renewable 
energy target scenario; hence the CO
2
 
target is a more binding constraint 
than in the Baseline scenario. 
Regional co-operation on renewable energy: the renewable 
energy target scenario
As a result the electricity market pri-
ces are also slightly higher in 2020 
in some countries than in the Base-
line scenario (see Figure 12.3); this is 
particularly the case in German and 
Poland where the cost of CO
2
  has a 
high impact on the short run marginal 
generation costs due to the high shares 
of coal power in the generation mix. 
As in the previous section, to the 
consumer electricity prices should be 
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added the costs of renewable energy 
subsidies assuming that the expansion 
with renewable energy is financed by 
the electricity consumers. The added 
cost to the consumer electricity price 
is the product of the price of a rene-
wable energy certificate (now 19 €/
MWh) and the share of renewable en-
ergy. 
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energy target” scenario (Balmorel model runs)
The economic consequences of the Re-
gional renewable energy target scena-
rio may be illustrated to comparing the 
socio-economic consequences between 
the Baseline and the present scenario. 
Moreover, the economic consequences 
are here distinguished as follows:
•  Generators: Revenues from elec-
tricity and heat sales, minus 
fuel costs, CO
2
, operations and 
maintenance, and capital costs 
related to new investments.
•  Consumers: Expenses for 
electricity and heat.
•  TSOs (transmission system 
operators):Income from bottlenecks 
on interconnectors.
•  Public profit: Expenses for sup-
port of renewable energy.
The sum of these figures is taken as the 
total socio-economic benefit. It is here 
assumed that the public (the state) sup-
ports the development of renewable 
energy, while in many countries this 
commitment lies with the electricity 
consumers. Note that the figures shown 
in the table are calculated as differences 
between two scenario results, and thus 
for instance a negative generator profit 
does not imply that generators do not 
earn money, but only that they earn less 
money in the present scenario than in 
the Baseline scenario. 
The simulations show that the benefit of 
this relocation of investments is approx-
imately 5 billion € in net present value 
(2009, assuming a 6% discount rate), a 
figure which should be interpreted with 
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caution due to significant uncertainty 
associated with specific estimates of 
renewable energy potentials and costs.
As always, there are winners and lo-
sers. From the table is seen that Ger-
many is the greatest beneficiary from 
the Regional renewable energy target. 
The main benefit here stems from im-
proved public profit due to lower sub-
sidies for renewable energy. 
Table 12.1: Calculated economic consequences of the regional renewable energy 
target compared to the baseline scenario
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Generator 
profits:
9082 219 12.609 -159 421 1.907 1.805 25.883
TSO profit: 1874 47 -331 29 1 91 337 2.048
Consumer 
surplus:
3755 -374 -14.659 -320 -298 -3.062 -1.417 -16.365
Public profit: -18245 -134  15.531 854 98 -665 -3.641 -6.202 
Socio economic 
benefit:
-3534 -232 13.150 404 222 -1.729 -2.916 5.364
In this scenario the international elec-
tricity exchanges are largely the same 
as in the previous scenario. The chan-
ges in socio-economic benefits the-
refore are mainly due to changes in 
electricity prices. The main changes 
are here observed for the years 2015 
and 2020, and due to the discounting 
these first years dominate the overall 
picture. In a country where electricity 
prices  are lower in the present scena-
rio compared to the first one genera-
tor profits are, accordingly reduced. 
Meanwhile, consumer surplus in that 
country is increased for the same rea-
son. The changes in TSO profits relate 
mainly to the changes in electricity- 
price differences between the counti-
ries on each side of a specific intercon-
nector.  
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Improved energy efficiency: potential gains for all countries
Some main consequences of a target 
of improved energy efficiency are 
next analyzed, assuming bluntly that 
the electricity consumption is reduced 
by 20 % relative to the baseline sce-
nario. As mentioned before, this cor-
responds broadly to the NEP main sce-
nario “Extended EU Policy”. Whether 
such reduction is the result of energy 
policy action or e.g. reduced economic 
growth is left unspecified.
The lower demand for electricity, in 
combination with the targets for incre-
asing the share of renewable energy, 
results in an overachievement of the 
CO
2
  targets in the period 2015 - 2025. 
Only by 2030 the target on CO
2
  beco-
mes binding. At that time the marginal 
cost of reducing CO
2
  emissions is 38 
€ per ton in the scenario compared to 
52 € per ton in the Baseline scenario. 
This reflects that cheaper abatement 
measures are put into play at the supp-
ly side in this scenario.  By combining 
demand and supply side measures it 
will be possible to achieve stronger 
CO
2
 targets.
Denmark, Estonia and Norway over-
comply with respect to the RE tar-
get, and hence there are no costs of 
renewable energy. For the remaining 
countries the costs of compliance are 
between 20 and 40 €/MWh. Denmark 
and Norway increase their net elec-
tricity export relative to the Baseline 
scenario, while Swedish net export de-
creases with approximately the same 
amount. 
The general trends observed in the re-
distribution resulting from the electri-
city market are that consumers are the 
winners and producers are the losers, 
and the amounts redistributed this way 
are substantially larger than the values 
obtained between this scenario and the 
Baseline scenario. This is in contrast 
to the Regional renewable energy tar-
get scenario, where the generator side 
was shown to be the winner. More-
over, benefits resulting from the elec-
tricity market are seen in all countries. 
However, the net social welfare chan-
ge in this scenario, relative to the Ba-
seline scenario, cannot be assessed 
without knowing the costs of imple-
menting the consumption reduction 
(and such assessment was not attemp-
ted here), nor can be distribution on 
the different actors without specifying 
the implementation costs and their 
distribution on the actors. 
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Ambitious targets, but with differentiated means and 
consequences
The Nordic and Baltic regions to-
gether contain large renewable energy 
sources, including substantial amounts 
of unexploited hydro, wind and bio-
mass, and hence ambitious targets for 
reducing CO
2
 and increasing the share 
of renewable energy can be met with 
local resources. 
The consequences of approaching 
such targets will depend heavily on 
the relative weights on the different 
environmental goals, as well as on the 
details of their implementation. In par-
ticular, the goals with respect to CO
2
 
and renewable energy have adverse 
effects on the electricity price. Also 
the distribution of winners and losers 
among the countries and the actors 
within countries is heavily subject to 
policy goal and policy implementa-
tion. 
For further information:
Hans Ravn, RAM-løse edb
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13. District heating in the Nordic region 
The choice of energy resources de-
pends on local availability and energy 
infrastructure. Hence, the differences 
shown in Figure 13.1 are expected. 
Biomass and/or municipal waste are 
major renewable energy resources 
in all Nordic countries. According to 
our model results, the future fuel mix 
depends heavily on future energy po-
licy. A primary focus on energy effi-
ciency gives a high penetration of heat 
pumps, while a focus on renewable 
energy increases the utilization of bio-
mass at the expense of fossil fuels and 
peat, as shown in our model results. 
However, irrespective of policy, the 
diversification of the fuel mix is also 
ensured in the long term. 
District heating is a valuable part of the Nordic energy system, with a total 
supply of 130 TWh/year. In the coming years, the district heating business will 
face challenges due to increased competition from other energy efficient tech-
nologies like heat pumps, combined with potentially increasing fuel costs. On 
the other hand, storing thermal energy is more feasible than storing electricity, 
thus district heating may provide valuable flexibility to the electricity system. 
Diversified fuel mix also in future district heating systems
Figure 13.1: Energy carriers 
in district heat production
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District heating policies in the Nordic countries
Sweden: A new district 
heating law came into for-
ce in 2008. The law aims 
at strengthening the district heating 
customer’s situation, e.g., through 
increasing the transparency of the di-
strict heating business.  There have 
been discussions about general third 
party access (TPA) to the district hea-
ting system. The idea was, however, 
rejected by a governmental investiga-
tion in 2005. During 2010 TPA will be 
studied in depth by a special investi-
gator assigned by the Swedish govern-
ment.
Denmark: Danish en-
ergy policy has a strong 
focus on energy efficiency 
and increased utilization of 
renewable energy resources.  Through 
energy planning, the municipalities 
have assigned some areas to district 
heating and others to natural gas distri-
bution. The municipalities may choose 
to make access to collective energy 
distribution systems (natural gas or 
district heating) mandatory. A major 
challenge now arising for the muni-
cipalities is drawing the line between 
district heating areas and areas for lo-
cal heat production like heat pumps. 
Because of the strong focus on CO
2
 
emissions, natural gas areas may now 
be converted to district heating, thus 
further increasing district heating’s 
market share.  
Finland:  District heating 
has a very stable pricing 
policy in Finland. Since 
1999, the price of most 
fuels has risen more steeply than the 
price of district heating. Some reasons 
for this are the diversified use of fuels, 
the increased use of peat and waste 
wood and the widespread use of coal, 
although the price of coal has risen 
steeply since the summer of 2007. 
However, the main reason for the 
success of district heating in Finland 
is that 75 % of all heat is produced 
in combined heat and power (CHP) 
plants having high total efficiencies. 
Norway: District heating 
is growing extensively in 
Norway, but from a small 
base. The official target of 
at least 4 TWh of new renewable heat 
before the end of 2010 has been met, 
and several market participants com-
pete to establish new district heating 
systems. A concession for district hea-
ting is mandatory for plants with more 
than 10 MW maximum heat loads. 
Municipalities may decide on man-
datory connection of new buildings 
to the district heating system, provi-
ded that there is a concession for the 
district heating system. According to 
the Energy Law, the price of district 
heating may not be above the cost of 
electric heating. The Ministry of Pet-
roleum and Energy is now deliberating 
on the future regulation of the district 
heating business in Norway.
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Energy efficiency and heat pumps reducing customer heat 
demand
Business development tends to follow 
an S-shaped curve. In a district heating 
context, the volume of energy sold is 
related to the penetration rate. When 
(if) a level where all customers have 
district heating is reached, the volume 
is bound to be at the same level or 
decline due to both energy efficiency 
and substitution to local solutions (e.g. 
heat pumps). On the other hand, as 
long as the building stock increases, 
new potential customers enter the 
market.
The European Union (EU) has am-
bitious targets for energy efficiency 
improvements by 2020, and this will 
probably affect the demand for heat. 
As building codes get stricter, with 
consumption level targets reaching 
those of low energy houses or even 
passive energy houses, the overall heat 
demand in new houses and areas will 
be significantly lower. Customers are 
hardly likely to choose a heating solu-
tion that has a high fixed yearly cost 
and a lower energy cost when they 
need less energy. If the fixed prices are 
low and the energy price higher, some 
of the customers will probably want to 
install a heat pump as a complemen-
tary technology to district heating, and 
use the heat pump as base load and 
district heat as peak load. This is not 
a good situation for the district hea-
ting companies, as they would have to 
keep the installed capacity high while 
selling less heat.  This indicates the 
importance of balancing the district 
heating price models in relation to cli-
mate policies.
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Figure 13.2:  Actual development of district heating in the Nordic Countries, and future scenarios
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Policy affects primarily the fuel mix, to a lesser degree  
volume
The EU 20/20/20 goals have a pro-
found impact on the development of 
the use and production of district hea-
ting in the Nordic countries. This has 
been analysed within the NEP project 
through model calculations for each 
of the four countries. Three scenarios 
have been calculated:
1. Today’s policy instruments – the re-
ference case
2. Adding the EU’s target for increased 
use of renewable energy
3. Adding the EU’s target for impro-
ved energy efficiency as well
The district heating results have been 
derived from the more comprehen-
sive scenario calculations presented 
in Chapter 4 — “The EU’s renewable 
target alone will reduce the Nordic 
emissions of CO
2
 by 20 %”.
Present policy instruments used in the 
Nordic countries, including a price of 
CO
2
 emission allowances of 25 €/t, 
lead to a development of district hea-
ting production according to Figure 
13.3. The total use of district heating 
increases marginally. The use of coal 
decreases, while waste incineration 
and the use of natural gas increases. 
Biofuels maintain a dominating role 
in the district heating production for 
another 25 years. The use of peat in-
creases in Finland.
In the EU renewable energy directive, 
there are quantified goals for the share 
of renewable energy in each country. 
A condition that imposes this total 
amount of renewable energy on the 
common Nordic energy system has 
been inserted in the model. This influ-
ences the development of the Nordic 
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Figure 13.3: Nordic district heating production with no new goals from the EU
energy systems, e.g. the district hea-
ting production, see Figure 13.4. The 
EU target leads to a marginally larger 
district heating production than in the 
case with today’s policy instruments. 
The most obvious difference is the 
large increase in the use of biofuels, at 
the expense of coal and peat.
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When we — on top of today’s policy 
instruments and the EU’s 20 % goal 
for increased use of renewable ener-
gy —  also add the EU’s energy effi-
ciency goal, the use of district heating 
remains almost constant. This is a sig-
nificantly lower level of district heat 
production than in the two previous 
scenarios. One exception is Norway 
where the efficiency target increases 
the use of district heating slightly. Bio-
fuels retain their dominating role. Na-
tural gas expands less than in the other 
scenarios. The energy efficiency target 
also acts as a promoter of heat pumps, 
which results in a larger district hea-
ting production by heat pumps, espe-
cially in Sweden and Norway. 
District heating provides valuable flexibility to renewable 
electricity
Increased investment in stochastic re-
newable energy production like wind 
power and small-scale run-of-river 
hydro power plants, also increases the 
demand for a system that is able to 
balance a fluctuating and unpredicta-
ble power production. Large scale hy-
dropower plants with a reservoir offer 
such balancing power. In parts of the 
Nordic system, like Denmark, other 
measures have been used to cope with 
the increased volatility in the power 
system.  One of these measures is to 
use excess electricity in district hea-
ting systems. 
In periods with very high power pro-
duction, and/or very low demand, the 
prices could be zero or even negative. 
Such situations already occur in the 
Nordic electricity market. Utilization 
of low price electricity, even in short 
periods, could be of interest both in di-
strict heating systems and for process 
heat. Conditions for very low prices 
typically occur when the wind po-
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Figure 13.5: Nordic district heating production with EU renewable goal + EU energy efficiency goal
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wer plants produce at maximum load 
during low demand periods. 
Electric energy is very expensive to 
store, while thermal energy is both 
cheaper to store and relies on mature 
technology. Some district heating sys-
tems have accumulators installed al-
ready, as they offer the possibility to 
store excess heat from base load pro-
duction and use it during peak load pe-
riods. This load shifting strategy could 
be further utilized with electric boilers 
converting cheap electricity to thermal 
energy, storing it in accumulators and 
replacing expensive use of fossil fuel 
as peak load. 
In addition to electric boilers, heat 
pumps can also be used when availa-
ble. If electricity has a low price of-
ten enough, even investments in elec-
tric boilers, accumulators and/or heat 
pumps might become viable.
For further information:
Monica Havskjold, Xrgia, Göran Koreneff, 
VTT and Hans Ravn, RAM-løse edb
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The district heating challenge 
– how to remain competitive and contribute to a  
sustainable development if/when energy demand  
starts to decline
District heating is an energy carrier that has been growing steadily for decades 
in the Nordic countries. The use of district heating is still increasing, but there 
are signs that this is happening at a slower pace. Eventually this could lead to 
the stagnation or even the reduction of district heating use.
A number of factors will influence the use of district heating in the future, in-
cluding:
• Increased energy efficiency in buildings (decreases demand)
• Conversion to other heating alternatives (decreases demand)
• Warmer climate due to increased greenhouse effect (decreases demand)
• District heating to new customers, both through conversion of existing
   buildings and for new buildings (increases demand)
• Heating demand due to more efficient household appliances (increases
   demand)
• New markets for district heating (increases demand)
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The situation for 
district heating 
imposes a num-
ber of challenges. 
We touch upon 
some of these in 
this text.
Some analyses 
indicate that the 
heating demand 
in the Swedish 
housing and ser-
vice sectors may 
decrease conside-
rably as a consequence of increased energy efficiency efforts by existing district 
heating customers. Energy savings is not a new phenomenon. While heating de-
mand has gradually decreased, new customers have enabled the district heating 
sector to continue growing. From the figure it is clear that district heating deli-
veries to new customers moderate the decline of district heating, which would 
be even more drastic without this effect.
However, other analyses are less pessimistic and foresee continued growth. It 
may be wise though to be prepared for a situation with declining demand. Nor-
way may be an exception in this respect due to a large growth potential.
At present, more ambitious energy policies are being imple-
mented, like the EU target for 20% reduction in primary 
energy use compared with projected levels, to be ac-
hieved by 2020 by improving energy efficiency. 
Together with national policies in the Nord-
ic countries this is expected to intensify en-
ergy savings efforts. 
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Increased competition from increasingly efficient heat pumps 
may also decrease total district heating demand in the Nordic 
countries
It is very unusual for 
existing district heating 
customers to convert 
from district heating to 
other heating alternati-
ves. This is partly due 
to regulation issues, but 
it may also indicate that 
customers are either 
satisfied with district 
heating or that there is 
a lack of competitive 
alternatives. 
However, competition from ever more efficient heat pumps has become more 
and more intense. For example, there is a growing trend for Swedish customers 
to switch part of their heating consumption from district heating to heat pumps. 
There are also examples of this in Finland. These customers often remain as di-
strict heating customers, but consume considerably less. At present this happens 
on a very limited scale, but the underlying economic incentives are obvious. Ba-
sed on data from the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate we have calculated 
that a new heat pump is economically favourable compared to existing district 
heating in almost half of the Swedish municipalities where district heating is 
available. Competition is obviously most critical in municipalities in which the 
price of district heating is the highest. It is reasonable to expect that competition 
from heat pumps will reduce demand for district heating in the Nordic countries.
As a consequence of the partial conversion from district heating to heat pumps, 
the remaining demand for district heating often shows an unfavourable load 
curve. The figure on the next page shows daily district heating demand for one 
customer before (2006) and after (2008) a partial conversion to heat pumps. 
Small energy demand in combination with unchanged capacity demand often 
leads to a situation in which a district heating company’s income decreases more 
than its costs do. This is a consequence of the typical structure of the district 
heating tariff. The advantages of a district heating tariff that reflects true cost 
structure is discussed further below.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Future heating demand was estimated with the help of climate scenarios in 
an analysis of the consequences for Swedish society of increased greenhouse 
gas effects (”Sverige inför klimatförändringarna - hot och möjligheter”, SOU 
2007:60). The results vary between different parts of the country, but on average, 
heating demand could be expected to decrease by approximately 0.3 % per year. 
Since Sweden is situated in the middle of the Nordic region, it is reasonable to 
assume that all Nordic countries could be facing a similar development.
District heating can grow through expansion to new  
customers, but the potential is limited
District heating can be seen as a mature business in three of the Nordic countries 
- Denmark, Finland and Sweden. This means that its growth potential is limited. 
Most buildings in energy dense areas are already connected to district heating. 
Conversion of existing buildings to district heating provides only limited po-
tential for expansion. In Norway, market penetration of district heating is much 
lower as Norway has traditionally relied on electrical heating. This means that 
the potential for conversion to district heating is large. Nevertheless, there are 
obstacles to overcome, like the fact that many buildings lack the internal heat 
distribution system necessary to make district heating feasible.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
District heating is also a competitive alternative for new buildings. However, 
volumes are limited in the short term, both due to the rate of construction of new 
buildings and to the often very small specific heating demand in new buildings. 
Passive houses, energy neutral buildings and low energy buildings are concepts 
that are often discussed, and increasingly put into practice.
New markets for district heating provide opportunities but 
expectations are limited
As the growth of district heating in its traditional markets starts slowing down 
it is natural to intensify the efforts to identify and exploit new markets. Some 
examples are:
• Heating of ground (e.g. streets and sidewalks)
• Absorption cooling
• Appliances in households (e.g. washing machine and dish washer)
• Laundries in multi family houses (e.g. washing machine and drying)
• Greenhouse heating
• Refining of fuels (e.g. drying)
• Combined processes (e.g. transportation fuel, electricity and industrial waste
   heat)
Discussions with Swedish district heating representatives indicate that although 
these new markets are viewed as interesting and it is important to try to develop 
them, expectations for future district heating demand from these markets are 
low. It is reasonable to assume that the situation is similar in the other Nordic 
countries.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Climate and energy policies influence district heating demand 
and production, both positive and negative
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The EU 20/20/20 goals will have a profound impact on the development of 
Nordic district heating business. This has been analysed within the NEP project 
through model calculations for each of the four countries. Three scenarios have 
been calculated:
• Today’s policy instruments – the reference case
• Adding the EU target for increased use of renewable energy (the first figure   
  below)
• Adding the EU target for improved energy efficiency to all of the above (the 
  second figure below)
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How to utilize five strategic heat source advantages 
In order to be competitive in the heating market, district heating must rely on 
inexpensive energy sources. This is important since district heating includes a 
heat distribution system whose costs must be justified by the low cost of heat 
production. Fortunately the district heating concept provides opportunities for 
such low cost energy production. Five strategic advantages can be identified 
from an energy production point of view:
Current policy instruments in use in the Nordic countries, including an EU-ETS 
price of  €25/t CO
2
, lead to a marginal increase in the total use of district heating 
in the coming years. The use of coal decreases, while waste incineration and 
the use of natural gas increases. Bio fuels maintain a dominant role in district 
heating production for another 25 years. The use of peat increases in Finland.
The addition of the increased use of renewable energy target leads to a margi-
nally larger district heating production than in the previous case. This indicates 
that district heating is an effective way to utilize renewable energy. The most 
obvious difference regarding the production mix is a large increase in the use of 
biofuels at the expense of coal and peat.
When we on top of current policy instruments and the EU 20 % target for in-
creased use of renewable energy also add the EU’s energy efficiency target (-20 
% energy use), the use of district heating remains almost constant, i.e. clearly 
lower than in the two previous scenarios. Biofuels retain their dominant role, 
but at a smaller volume. The use of natural gas grows less than in the other two 
scenarios. 
These calculations highlight the possibility that increased energy efficiency may 
result in stagnating - or even decreasing - total deliveries of district heating. This 
will also affect the basis for future combined heat and power (CHP) production, 
since the possibility of utilizing the related heat is lower. This becomes even 
more obvious if more industrial waste heat and heat from waste incineration 
(with a more limited electricity to heat ratio) are introduced.
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• Combined heat and power (CHP) production is a powerful measure for 
improving energy efficiency in energy conversion. By not using separate 
plants for electricity and heat production, considerable efficiency impro-
vements can be achieved. Economies of scale are an important issue for 
CHP and district heating is in line with this.
• Waste incineration is a competitive measure from a waste management 
perspective if efforts are made to minimize landfill. Energy recovery is, 
in addition to volume reduction, an important part of waste incineration. 
Electricity production efficiency is limited due to boiler material restric-
tion related to the nature of the fuel. This means that heat production, 
and the necessary heat demand, is a prerequisite for effective energy 
recovery.
• Industrial waste heat is often available as a by-product in connection 
with energy intensive industry. Industrial waste heat is typically low tem-
perature and therefore lacks useful applications. District heating howe-
ver, makes it possible to utilize this otherwise wasted heat for heating 
purposes.
• Geothermal energy is a very large energy source in a global perspective. 
It is often available at relatively low temperatures, which means that di-
strict heating is often a prerequisite for the utilization of this heat source.
• ”Difficult fuels” could be seen as a label for fuels that require large ef-
forts for handling, combustion, flue gas cleaning, etc. Examples could 
be wood residues, peat, coal and heavy fuel oil. The advantage of such 
fuels is, of course, the low cost. However, given the high fixed costs 
associated with combustion, the energy conversion plant must have a 
certain scale, which district heating can facilitate. 
Combining two or more strategic advantages is obviously better. For example, 
a combined plant that uses what could be labelled as difficult fuels in a process 
for production of transportation biofuels, and where waste process heat is reco-
vered and electricity is produced through CHP, combines three of the strategic 
advantages mentioned above. 
A production mix in which these strategic advantages are utilized as much as 
possible creates a strong foundation for a competitive district heating concept.
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Both total price and the design of the district heating tariff is 
important for competitiveness
Nordic district heating tariffs typically include a large variable component, the 
energy fee. The energy fee is related to energy use and typically makes up 70 
to 90 % of the total district heating price. In all four countries large differences 
could be observed between different companies, with the share of the energy fee 
ranging from 50 % to 100 %.
Marginal costs are often used as a basis for price-setting, as they give informa-
tion on what the cost is for producing what customers are about to use or not use. 
Marginal costs vary from hour to hour and these variations can be large due to 
different heat production costs for different alternatives. For practical reasons, 
hourly resolution cannot be applied in the district heating tariff. Average mar-
ginal costs over, for example, three seasons may be a reasonable compromise.
Marginal costs for district heating production can vary widely in different di-
strict heating systems due to differences in the production mix. However, this 
study shows that on average, marginal costs in Sweden are 20 % lower than the 
energy fee (including energy related capacity fees). This means that the district 
heating tariff generally does not completely follow the cost structure in this re-
spect. From this point of view, it would be an improvement if the price of capa-
city was a larger share of the tariff and had a more direct relationship to actual 
capacity demand.  
Analyses of Swedish district heating production show that there are also large 
differences in average marginal costs between seasons. Since typical district 
heating tariffs do not reflect seasonal variations through differentiated energy 
fees, a recommendation would be to increase seasonal differentiation in order to 
achieve a tariff that better reflects the cost structure.
At this point it is important to be aware of the typical differences in the structure 
of district heating production in the Nordic countries. Finland and Denmark have 
a large share of CHP (mainly based on coal, natural gas, biomass or peat) while 
in Sweden district heating is primarily based on waste incineration, a relatively 
small share of CHP (based on wood fuels), heat pumps and heating plants (based 
on wood fuels). These different structures typically lead to different variations 
in average seasonal marginal costs for district heating production. Variations are 
smaller in Finland and in Denmark than in Sweden. 
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We have, in this study, discussed the district heating tariff from a cost reflecting 
point of view. The district heating tariff is, however, constructed with more goals 
than to be “cost-correct”. A further goal is that the tariff is simple to understand. 
Customers often also prefer that a large share of the district heating tariff is vari-
able and reflective of how much energy they consume, as they want to be able to 
influence costs through their behaviour. Further, a general political ambition to 
stimulate energy savings is often present, which tends to favour a large variable 
share. At the same time, district heating companies prefer a price that does not 
vary too much between years, is easy to predict and relates to the cost structure 
of competing heating alternatives. Therefore, we realize that there may be quite 
rational reasons for choosing a pricing structure that may not entirely reflect 
the cost structure. Nevertheless, we have chosen to discuss this issue as we feel 
that it is important to bring attention to this matter in order to make an informed 
decision on the design of the district heating tariff structure. 
What could then be the consequences of applying a district heating tariff that 
does not correctly reflect true variable costs? Below we discuss a case in which 
the energy fee makes up a significantly larger share of the total price than the 
variable costs’ (average marginal cost) share justifies. This leads to - or risks 
leading to - a number of phenomena.  Below we list some of these:
• Energy savings risk reducing the volume of district heating deliveries, so the 
energy fee will have to be gradually raised in order to cover also part of the 
fixed costs that remains intact.
• Partial conversion to heat pumps to reduce the use of district heating could 
appear to be more competitive than it really is. (This reduces district heating 
energy deliveries, while the demand for delivery capacity remains.)
• Greater energy saving than what would be economically optimal.
This, of course, goes both ways. If the energy related part of the district heating 
price is too low from a “cost-correctiveness” point of view the opposite pheno-
mena would occur. That would be equally negative.
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District heating provides additional value for the customers
The competitiveness of district heating is not only determined by the compa-
rison between the price of district heating and the price of alternative heating 
options. District heating can present other advantages, such as:
• Often favourable from an environmental and climate change perspective
• Inherent flexibility regarding production mix
• Carefree for the user
• Creates additional space
These aspects are of course important to take into consideration when district 
heating is compared with its alternatives. 
A recurring argument against district heating is that customers are locked to 
one company and that it is more or less impossible to switch to other forms of 
heating. This is often used as an argument for the regulation of district heating. 
However, it can be argued that real alternatives are in fact available. Conversion 
from district heating to heat pumps is one such alternative. Furthermore, the 
customer-company relationship can be viewed as being a mutual dependence. 
It is not only the customer that is dependent on one supplier; the district heating 
company is also dependent on its customers. Since the district heating system is 
fundamentally coupled to one location the district heating company must present 
a competitive offer in order not to lose its customers.
District heating in Norway facing other challenges
The district heating sector in Norway is booming, and thus dis-
tincts itself from the other Nordic countries. This is mainly 
due to public policy, as funding from Enova has been made 
available for both green-field plants and development of 
existing plants. 
During the last 1-2 years, companies have com-
peted to get hold of the most valuable conces-
sions. NVE (the Norwegian Energy and Water 
Directorate) has granted a lot of new conces-
sions in areas not yet supplied with district 
heating. A concession is a necessity to get 
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the financial support from Enova, and also for the municipality to make connec-
tion to district heating mandatory for new buildings.
However booming, even in Norway two important challenges have arisen for the 
district heating companies. First, heat pumps represent a commercially highly 
attractive alternative to district heating, especially if the customer also has a 
cooling demand. 
Second, the export boom of municipal and industrial waste to Sweden imposes 
a demand surplus for low value energy sources. 
 
To cope with the first challenge, some district heating companies are offering 
district cooling, installing heat pumps themselves for combined production of 
district heating and cooling. Also existing district heating customers consider 
installing their own heat pumps. All this resulting in the same problems as des-
cribed for Sweden where district heating may end up as peak load supply. 
Competition for fuel is a common situation for the district heating companies. 
Nevertheless, the current situation with “aggressive pricing” of municipal and 
industrial waste for incineration, challenges the very existence of some compa-
nies. A lot of new incineration capacity is being built both in Norway and Swe-
den in recent years. At the same time the financial melt-down in 2008-2009 tigh-
tened the supply of waste for incineration. While Swedish incineration plants are 
able to sell 100 % of their heat production, the Norwegian incineration plants 
face small district heating systems still under development. Thus, the more com-
petitive Swedish incineration plants can reduce their gate fee for waste, leaving 
Norwegian plants with too little low cost fuel for their heat production com-
mitments. 
An important lesson from this situation is to increase the focus on the fuel supp-
ly. It should be stressed that momentary prices in a continuously developing 
common waste market should not be taken for granted. Other technologies that 
exploit resources that either are easily transported or may have different areas 
of application, could face similar problems in the future. Hence, more resources 
should be invested in risk management as further investments in biomass based 
plants may face an increased risk. A strategy for diversification may be to invest 
in heat-pumps, where 2/3 of the heat is produced from temperature differences 
in ambient air or other forms of “free” energy. 
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As the Norwegian district heating systems are still under extensive develop-
ment, they may apply investment strategies to design plants more adaptable to 
future challenges than the case is for the fully developed district heating systems 
in the other Nordic countries. 
Regulation of district heating – present situation and trends
Two countries, Denmark and Norway, have regulation in place that makes it 
possible to force customers to connect to district heating. Customers must in 
that case pay for the forced connection but they are not forced to buy heat. If 
they choose to buy heat after being forcefully connected, regulated tariffs apply. 
Regulated tariffs do not apply for customers that voluntarily request to be con-
nected to the district heating system. 
In Finland and in Sweden, customers are free to choose between the different 
heating alternatives and there is no formal price regulation. Finnish district hea-
ting tariffs must, however, be based on costs.
In three of these countries district heating is widely diffused and is the dominant 
heating alternative. Among these countries there are examples of both 
• forced connection together with price regulation and 
• free choice of heating alternative. 
As a result, the Nordic countries do not provide a clear indication as to how dif-
ferent regulating regimes influence the penetration of district heating.
In Sweden, there is an increased focus on regulation resulting from the general 
perception that district heating prices have risen rapidly and that potential waste 
heat suppliers feel shut out from the heating market. The Swedish Competition 
Authority claims that introducing price regulation to district heating is an im-
portant step in order to improve competition and create better functioning mar-
kets. They also recommend that third party access (TPA) to the district heating 
distribution system should be considered. TPA is also favoured by a number of 
industries and energy companies that feel that they are not given the opportunity 
to supply heat to existing district heating systems. During 2010, TPA will be 
studied in depth by a special investigator assigned by the Swedish government. 
At this stage it is uncertain how TPA would influence the future competitiveness 
of district heating. It is however fair to assume that mandatory TPA would have 
a profound impact on the district heating business.
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14. District heating price model
In this section we discuss the tariff 
structure of district heating in relation 
to the cost structure, and the possible 
implications of this relationship in an 
energy supply perspective. One ex-
ample could be that the energy related 
(variable) portion of the total price is 
disproportionately large compared to 
the cost of producing and distributing 
the heat, which includes large fixed or 
capacity related costs. This may result 
in incorrect price signals to customers, 
who could therefore make suboptimal 
choices, e.g. regarding energy savings 
or partial conversion to heat pumps.
Already at this stage it is important to 
stress the fact that a switch from di-
strict heating to e.g. heat pumps could 
in certain cases be a correct and op-
timal choice. In this study we have, 
however, chosen to focus on the risk 
for suboptimal choices due to an in-
appropriately designed district heating 
tariff.
District heating tariffs in the Nordic countries typically include a variable com-
ponent that is linked to energy consumption and often makes up 75 to 90 % of 
the total price. The corresponding average marginal cost for the district heating 
production is typically lower than the variable income, in Sweden typically 20 % 
lower. This means that the district heating tariff generally does not completely 
reflect cost structure. Furthermore, average marginal costs typically vary sig-
nificantly depending on season. If the ambition is to have a tariff that reflects 
the cost structure in this respect, larger price differences between seasons are 
desirable. If the district heating tariff lacks in “cost-correctness” there is a risk 
that the customers are encouraged to behave in a way that leads to sub-opti-
mizations. 
 – important for future competitiveness
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District heating tariff – a very large part related to energy 
use, only a small part related to capacity
Swedish district heating tariffs typical-
ly include a large variable component, 
the energy fee. A study of the district 
heating tariff for 15 Swedish district 
heating companies shows that on aver-
age, the energy fee corresponds to 66 
% of the total price. However, the ca-
pacity part of the tariff is often directly 
coupled to energy use and not to de-
manded capacity. The capacity part of 
the tariff could therefore be seen as a 
variable income related to energy, and 
the real energy-related fee is thus pro-
bably closer to 90 %. (nb: the survey 
refers to the situation in 2006. In the 
past few years some district heating 
companies have changed to “genuine” 
capacity fees.)
The tariff structure is similar in the 
other Nordic countries. In Finland, the 
energy fee makes up approximately 
85 % of the total district heating price, 
while in Denmark it typically amounts 
to around 70 %. In Norway the energy 
fee is typically in the range of 75 %. 
In all countries, large differences can 
be observed between different compa-
nies, with an energy fee ranging from 
50 % to 100 % of the total price. 
District heating marginal production costs – often large 
variations between seasons
The average variable production costs 
are considerably lower than the energy 
fee, typically less than half. (When we 
discuss cost they include policy in-
struments, e.g. taxes.) However, for 
the purpose of designing cost-correct 
tariffs, the short term marginal cost is 
a more relevant valuation of variable 
costs than the average variable cost. 
Marginal costs are often used as a ba-
sis for price-setting as they give infor-
mation on what the cost is for produ-
cing what customers are about to use 
or not use. Marginal costs are conside-
rably higher than average costs as they 
reflect the cost for the most expensive 
production alternative that is used to 
satisfy the demand. 
The marginal costs of district heating 
vary from hour to hour. These varia-
tions can be large due to different heat 
production costs for different alter-
natives. For practical reasons, hourly 
resolution cannot be applied in the di-
strict heating tariff. A reasonable com-
promise could be average marginal 
costs over for example three seasons.
The marginal costs of district heating 
production vary significantly in dif-
ferent district heating systems due to 
differences in the production mix. Ho-
wever, this study shows that on avera-
ge, marginal costs in Sweden are 20 % 
lower than the energy fee (including 
energy related capacity fees). This 
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means that the district heating tariff 
generally does not completely follow 
the cost structure in this respect. From 
this point of view it would be an im-
provement if the price of capacity was 
a larger share of the tariff and with a 
more direct relationship to actual ca-
pacity demand.  
Figure 14.1: Cost (incl. taxes) of the Swedish average marginal district hea-
ting production month by month for the year 2006
The large variations in both variable 
price (energy fee) and variable cost 
(marginal cost of production) between 
different district heating systems in-
dicate that, although overall the tariff 
appears to be fairly close to “cost-
correct”, there are many systems with 
tariffs that do not reflect the true cost 
structure. This may go both ways, i.e. 
there may be systems in which the va-
riable fee makes up too large a share 
of the total price as well as systems 
in which the share is too small. There 
is no such thing as a uniform national 
district heating production. The na-
tional picture is a consequence of a 
large number of local district heating 
systems, each with its own characte-
ristics.
At this point it is important to bring to 
light some typical differences in the 
structure of district heating production 
in the Nordic countries. Finland and 
Denmark have a large share of CHP 
(mainly based on coal, natural gas, 
biomass or peat) while district heating 
in Sweden is primarily based on waste 
incineration, a relatively small share 
of CHP (based on wood fuels), heat 
pumps and heating plants (based on 
wood fuels). These different structures 
typically lead to different variations in 
average seasonal marginal costs for 
district heating production. Variations 
are smaller in Finland and in Denmark 
than in Sweden. Note, however, that 
further aspects particularly related to 
the interplay between the electricity 
and heat supply aspects are not treated 
in this text.
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Risks if the tariff does not match the cost structure
We have, in this study, discussed the 
district heating tariff from a cost re-
flecting point of view. The district 
heating tariff is, however, constructed 
with more goals than just to be “cost-
correct”. A further goal is that the tariff 
should be simple to understand. Custo-
mers often also prefer a large part of 
the tariff to be variable and reflective 
of how much energy they consume, as 
they want to be able to influence costs 
through their behaviour. Further, a ge-
neral political ambition to stimulate 
energy savings is often present, which 
tends to favour a large variable share. 
At the same time, district heating com-
panies prefer a price that does not vary 
too much between years, is easy to pre-
dict and relates to the cost structure of 
competing heating alternatives. There-
fore, we realize that there may be quite 
rational reasons for choosing a pricing 
structure that may not entirely reflect 
the cost structure. Nevertheless, we 
have chosen to discuss this issue as we 
feel that it is important to bring atten-
tion to this matter in order to make an 
informed decision on the design of the 
district heating tariff structure. 
The study thus indicates that on a na-
tional average, the size of the energy 
fee is higher than the corresponding 
average marginal costs and, as shown 
in Figure 14.1, that average marginal 
costs typically vary significantly bet-
ween seasons. The average marginal 
cost for district heating production 
could be five times higher during win-
ter than during the summer. Neverthe-
less, many Swedish district heating 
companies apply the same price th-
roughout the year and companies that 
do apply different pricing during the 
different seasons have only small price 
differences. If the ambition is to have 
a tariff that reflects the true cost struc-
ture of district heating production, lar-
ger price differences between seasons 
should be encouraged. As discussed 
above, seasonal differences could ty-
pically be smaller in the other Nordic 
countries, but the principle is similar.
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What could then be the consequences 
of applying a district heating tariff that 
does not correctly reflect true variab-
le costs? Below we discuss a case in 
which the energy fee makes up a sig-
nificantly larger share of the total price 
than the variable costs’ (average mar-
ginal cost) share justifies. This leads to 
- or risks leading to - a number of phe-
nomena.  Below we list some of these:
• Energy savings risk reducing the 
volume of district heating delive-
ries, so the energy fee will have to 
be gradually raised in order to cover 
costs.
• Partial conversion to heat pumps 
to reduce the use of district heating 
could appear to be more competitive 
than it really is. (Reduces district 
heating energy deliveries, while ca-
pacity demand remains.)
• Greater energy saving than what 
would be economically optimal.
This, of course, goes both ways. If the 
energy related part of the district hea-
ting price is too low from a “cost-cor-
rectness” point of view the opposite 
phenomena would occur. That would 
be equally negative.
Future competitiveness of district heating – a principle 
discussion for Sweden as an example
The competitiveness of district hea-
ting can be explained by a number 
of factors, for example  cogeneration 
providing a high total efficiency, the 
possibility to utilize cheap but com-
plex fuels with low variable costs, and 
a flexible production that facilitates ra-
pid adaptation to changing fuel costs.
Although district heating is regarded 
as an environmentally friendly hea-
ting source, other solutions are com-
peting for the same market. In all the 
Nordic countries, the main entrants 
seem to be heat pumps and local 
biomass-fired production (i.e. pel-
let stoves and boilers). Solar heating 
is also attracting more interest. En-
ergy efficiency is high on the political 
agenda. Long-term, this may lead to a 
reduced demand for heat which may 
hurt the district heating business. In 
many respects district heating is still 
a competitive heating alternative, but 
competition from other alternatives is 
toughening. At least in Sweden, heat 
pumps and to some extent pellets boi-
lers are the most competitive alterna-
tives.
District heating legislation in the diffe-
rent Nordic countries is not consistent. 
For example, in Norway and Denmark 
connection to the district heating sys-
tem is mandatory in certain specified 
areas, whereas customers in Finland 
and Sweden are always free to remain 
unconnected. There are also other dif-
ferences in legislation. In the discus-
sion below we concentrate on Sweden, 
which means that the competition bet-
ween different energy carriers and en-
ergy conversion alternatives is mainly 
decided by market forces and there is 
no regulation of the heating market in 
this field. 
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We have analyzed competition to di-
strict heating from other heating al-
ternatives in Sweden. We have identi-
fied four main scenarios for a specific 
building, seen from a district heating 
perspective:
1. Existing district heating; conver-
sion of the total heating demand to 
another energy carrier and another 
energy conversion alternative
2. Existing district heating; conver-
sion of a fraction of the heating 
demand to another energy carrier 
and another energy conversion al-
ternative
3. Presently heated by another en-
ergy carrier and another energy 
conversion alternative; conversion 
to district heating
4. New building; all alternatives star-
ting from scratch, district heating 
is one of the options.
In scenarios 1, 3 and 4, competition 
between district heating and other 
heating alternatives is mainly decided 
by the total cost for heating, current 
and future. Although it is unusual to 
convert from district heating to other 
alternatives, there are examples in 
Sweden of district heating customers 
that, disappointed with the cost of di-
strict heating, have taken the drastic 
step of switching to alternative heating 
sources like ground heat pumps. Sur-
veys have also shown that heat pumps 
could successfully compete with di-
strict heating from an economic point 
of view in several Swedish municipa-
lities. If heat pumps are competitive, 
there is of course in principle no ob-
jection against choosing them at the 
expense of district heating.
On the other hand, district heating 
is still a competitive alternative to 
convert to, especially from oil-fired 
boilers or electric boilers, so district 
heating may continue to gain market 
share. However, the most attractive 
areas (= the most energy dense areas) 
are typically already connected to di-
strict heating. The areas considered for 
district heating are therefore increa-
singly less energy dense, which means 
that potential additional markets get 
smaller all the time. 
It is important that tariffs match the cost structure 
– conversion of a fraction of district heating to heat pump as 
an example
Partial conversion from district hea-
ting to heat pumps, scenario 2 above, 
is becoming increasingly common in 
Sweden. There are indications that 
this may lead to an annual drop in 
demand of more than 0.3 %. Further, 
these customers may exhibit a very 
unfavourable profile from the district 
heating company’s point of view. An 
example of this is shown in the follo-
wing figure.
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Figure 14.2: District heating delivery for a specific customer without, and with, a partial heat 
pump switch
The profitability of making a partial 
conversion to heat pumps is influenced 
not only by the total overall price of 
district heating, but also by the tariff 
structure. The larger the energy fee, 
the more favourable the heat pump 
alternative will become. The reason is 
that a considerable share of the district 
heating company’s costs are fixed or 
related to capacity. If the remaining 
district heating deliveries largely con-
sist of short-lasting heating peaks, the 
costs of the district heating company 
will remain high while the income will 
be relatively small.
A district heating tariff that reflects 
the true cost structure therefore pro-
vides two important advantages: 
1.It will be less attractive to convert 
parts of the heating to e.g. exhaust 
air heat pumps or solar heating (for 
other types of heat pumps the con-
sequences are more ambiguous, at 
least in relation to the seasonal dif-
ferentiation of the energy fee).
2. If the partial conversion to heat 
pumps still happens, the company’s 
costs and income will decrease pro-
portionally. Otherwise there is a risk 
that the income decreases more ra-
pidly than the costs.
However, if the heat pump proves to 
be competitive also in the presence 
of a district heating tariff that reflects 
the true cost structure of district hea-
ting production, the partial conversion 
to heat pumps is a correct and logical 
choice.
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15. Proactive strategies for environmental 
sustainability of municipal companies
How come some companies work 
strongly focused on mitigating their 
environmental impact while others 
don’t go further than meeting comp-
liance requirements? All companies 
face a similar institutional environme-
nt, are subject to the same regulations 
and operate on a common market. 
Hence, the driving forces for such stra-
tegic proactivity have to be searched 
for within the company. The first part 
of this chapter presents a framework 
consisting of different strategic areas 
that energy companies should engage 
in to work in a proactive and compre-
hensive way with the environmental 
challenge. Subsequently, the empiri-
cal findings of the study are presented 
using the framework to mirror selected 
activities of the case companies that 
lead to better sustainability of their bu-
siness. Furthermore, key mechanisms 
There is a need for companies in the stationary energy system to take a strate-
gic approach to sustainable development and intensify their efforts to integrate 
sustainable practices into their business. This chapter sets out how municipal 
energy companies mitigate their impact on the environment by working sys-
tematically with the sustainability challenge in several dimensions. Companies 
with a proactive strategy for environmental sustainability follow a sustainable 
vision for their business that includes reducing their carbon emissions, impro-
ving the environmental qualities of their products and investing in clean tech-
nologies. Besides mapping what such proactive strategies for environmental 
sustainability involve by conducting case studies of municipal energy companies 
with a strong environmental focus, key mechanism facilitating such strategies 
have been investigated to show pathways for sustainable development for com-
panies in the stationary energy system. The study illustrates that, by applying a 
strategic perspective to the environment, municipal energy companies can de-
velop new business opportunities and contribute greatly to sustainable develop-
ment within their sphere of activitiess.
- pathways of sustainable development in the stationary 
  energy system
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that enable the studied companies to 
effectively embed sustainable prac-
tices in the companies’ management 
and energy system are highlighted. Fi-
nally, conclusions are drawn.
Four strategic areas ensure a coherent strategy for  
environmental sustainability
Strategy can generally be viewed as 
“a pattern of important decisions that 
guides the organization in its relation-
ships with its environment, affects the 
internal structure and processes of the 
organization, and centrally affects the 
organization’s performance” (Ham-
brick, 1980:567). To be able to study 
what a proactive strategy for environ-
mental sustainability involves, it has 
been broken up into four dimensions 
that represent important areas for 
companies to focus on in order to mi-
tigate their impact on the environment. 
Emission Reduction draws attention 
to minimizing the emissions resulting 
from different corporate activities 
and opts at increasing the efficiency 
of operations. Under the Product 
Stewardship strategy, the company 
searches for opportunities to enhance 
the environmental qualities of its ex-
isting products or develop new sustai-
nable products in line with customers’ 
needs. Clean Technology sheds light 
on the investments in renewable or 
bridging technologies that companies 
engage in to bring about more radical 
changes to their production system. 
Lastly, a sustainability vision brings 
attention to how companies create 
a shared roadmap for sustainability 
within the firm and with its stakehol-
ders that reconciles value creation for 
the company with wider goals for a 
sustainable society. 
Emission
Reduction
Product
Stewardship
Clean
Technology
Sustainability
Vision
Minimize direct 
impact on 
environment; 
increase efficiency
Enhance 
environmental 
qualities of 
products
Create a shared 
roadmap for 
sustainable
development
Invest in 
renewable or 
bridging 
technologies
sustainability
Source: Adapted from Hart (1995) and Hart and Milstein (2003)
time
Figure 15.1: Strategic areas of proactive strategies for environmental sustainablility
179
Highlights of case study findings illustrating proactive strategies 
for environmental sustainability:
Technical and organizational integration lead to emission  
reductions
The companies studied distinguished 
themselves by a strong capability to 
integrate sustainable business practi-
ces into their energy systems and ma-
nagement processes. On the technical 
side, fuel switching opportunities have 
been used extensively, for instance by 
replacing fossil fuel oils with bio-oil. 
The cooperation with other actors has 
also contributed to improving the en-
vironmental sustainability of the pro-
duction mix and reducing emissions. 
An interesting example is the outsour-
cing of district heat production to lo-
cal farms that can utilize their waste 
products in a beneficial way while 
contributing to greener production. 
The utilization of waste heat as well as 
connecting to neighboring district hea-
ting systems are other measures that 
ensure efficient resource use. When 
it comes to management systems, the 
integration of environmental concerns 
into the organizations was made sure 
by including environmental perfor-
mance measures in the performance 
management tool Balanced Scorecard 
on which the incentive system is ba-
sed. One company has taken the chal-
lenge further and made a commitment 
to become climate-neutral, setting 
a clear signal to its stakeholders in 
which direction the company will be 
developing. Central to the capability 
to reduce the impact on the environ-
ment is a well-established and com-
petent environmental organization. 
Moreover, a timely adoption of the 
ISO 14001 norms for environmental 
management appears to be a decisive 
factor for achieving a high environme-
ntal standard. Efficient environmental 
management is a socially complex 
process under which competence gra-
dually accumulates leading to the con-
tinuous improvement of routines and 
incremental emission reductions.
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Innovations in product stewardship aim at enhancing envi-
ronmental qualities of existing products or expanding into 
new business lines
Innovations at a strategic and opera-
tional level are crucial to secure the 
company’s ability to stay competitive. 
It is also important in order to improve 
the environmental sustainability of a 
company’s products and processes. To 
direct the innovation process, a timely 
identification of opportunities and th-
reats from the environment is vital. A 
continuous dialogue with customers 
is essential to keep the product port-
folio tuned with opportunities opening 
up for energy companies. Examples 
are new products within energy ser-
vices and the development of climate-
neutral district heating. One company 
preempted competitors by offering en-
vironmentally certified district heat, a 
result from the close cooperation with 
an environmental organization. Natu-
rally, such achievements are motiva-
ting for employees and good publicity. 
To conclude, strengthening energy 
services, which usually is a young line 
of business, gives companies a new 
platform for expansion, whereas im-
proving the environmental quality of 
district heating reinforces the viability 
of this traditionally important business 
area. Moreover, with the introduction 
of remote meter reading, new possibi-
lities arise to work with demand-side-
management in the consumer market, 
raising customers’ awareness on their 
energy consumption and creating in-
centives to save energy. Companies 
with a strong local embeddedness also 
have better possibilities to market new 
products in their niche. An innovative 
approach observed was to offer ‘lo-
cally produced renewable electricity’ 
from a newly built combined heat and 
power plant to the local community. 
Finally, biogas ventures create nume-
rous opportunities for sustainable fuel 
use and constitute a rapidly expanding 
new line of business at one of the case 
companies.
Clean technology implementation through strategic cooperation
Clean technology investments are 
crucial to reposition the firm and de-
velop the sustainable competencies 
needed to prosper in a carbon-restrai-
ned economy. At the case companies, 
cooperation proved to be an important 
means for business expansion and the 
dissemination of clean technologies. 
Strategic cooperation can extend the 
available competences and produc-
tion resources of energy companies, 
leading to better economies of scale 
and financing possibilities for clean 
technology investments. Energy com-
panies can also be valuable coopera-
tion partners in smaller ventures, for 
example for biogas or rapeseed oil pro-
duction where they can bring in their 
experience and resources. Furthermo-
re, finding new forms of cooperation 
can give positive results. For example, 
wind farm expansion was favored by 
an innovative business model that 
builds on the co-operation with land 
owners and nearby residents. This se-
ems to lessen the NIMBY effect that 
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often stops up renewable investments. 
Close ties with the owners also fa-
vor the possibilities for investing in 
clean technologies. If the municipality 
is willing to stand as a guarantor for 
loans, the disadvantages of scale that 
smaller energy companies face when 
planning for new production capa-
city can be weighed up. Communica-
tion seems to be essential to a smooth 
implementation of new investments 
projects, be it with owners, the local 
community or other affected parties. 
Emphasizing the significance of such 
clean technology investments and cre-
ating a dialogue with stakeholders can 
build acceptance for the project and 
speed up the implementation process.
Sustainability vision creates a shared roadmap for the future 
development of the company
Communicating a vision for com-
pany development along sustainable 
lines to employees and stakeholders 
of the company is a central aspect of 
creating acceptance and commitment 
for the corporate strategy for environ-
mental sustainability. Internally, such 
commitment facilitates implementing 
environmental goals. Supported by 
environmental training, employees 
feel empowered to take responsibi-
lity for the environment in their work 
tasks, which often results in bottom-up 
initiatives for environmental improve-
ments. Communicating a sustainabi-
lity vision to customers and financiers 
can strengthen the relationship which 
in turn increases the opportunities to 
further develop the organization in a 
sustainable direction. At a corporate 
governance level, a shared understan-
ding by both managers and owners as 
to where the company is heading is es-
sential. At the studied companies there 
is clearly a consensus between owners 
and the board of directors that envi-
ronmental sustainability is important 
for business success. Furthermore, the 
owners focus on long-term sustainable 
returns and see the company as a me-
ans to produce social welfare at a local 
level. Clearly, the municipal energy 
company is the municipality’s stron-
gest tool to improve the local envi-
ronment. This shows for examples in 
common goals such as the expansion 
of district heating and the promotion 
of fuel gas and biogas in transporta-
tion. A sustainability vision that is 
shared between the company and its 
owners can foster rapid changes.
Five key mechanisms foster the transition to environmental 
sustainability 
From the empirical study five key 
mechanisms have been identified 
that facilitate the implementation of a 
proactive strategy for environmental 
sustainability in the case companies. 
Organizational integration relates 
to structures and processes that pro-
mote the integration of sustainability 
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Conclusions – pathways for sustainable business and 
environmental development 
Embracing the above mechanisms, 
proactive municipal energy compa-
nies are well-positioned to develop 
energy solutions that facilitate the 
transition to a sustainable society. By 
taking a strategic approach to sustai-
nability the companies can build im-
portant resources and competencies 
allowing them to exploit new business 
opportunities. At the same time, their 
embeddedness in the local context al-
lows the companies to contribute to a 
sound development of the local eco-
nomy and environment. 
Communication
& learning
Local
embeddednes
s
Co-operation
Innovation
Organizational
Integration
PROACTIVE
STRATEGY
FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY Figure 15.2: Key mechanisms 
fostering a proactive strategy for 
environmental sustainability
principles into both the technical and 
management systems of the compa-
nies. Communication and learning 
lead to a better understanding of the 
challenges ahead. By keeping a dia-
logue with stakeholders and engaging 
in a continuous learning process the 
companies can foster the required 
changes. Furthermore, innovations 
were vital to enhance the sustainabi-
lity of products and processes. Emis-
sion reductions allow for incremental 
changes while adopting or developing 
clean technologies facilitate radical 
changes towards sustainable produc-
tion systems. An important means for 
the realization of sustainable solutions 
was also the co-operation with ac-
tors that control resources of interest 
to energy companies engaging in a 
proactive strategy for environmental 
sustainability. Lastly, local embed-
dedness reflects that municipal energy 
companies can concentrate value crea-
tion from the energy system at the lo-
cal level by embedding their activities 
in the local context. 
For further information:
Gabriela Schaad and Anders Sandoff, 
School of Business, Gothenburg University
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16. Leading indicators in successful 
facilitation schemes for Clean Tech 
companies
– the case of increasing growth and export volumes in 
the biomass combustion manufacturing industry
In the Nordic countries of Sweden, Denmark and Finland the extensive use of 
biomass for heat- and power production is one of the main explanations for the 
relatively low emissions of GHG in the Nordic region. The availability of biomass 
in parallel with stiff tax regimes on CO
2
 emissions has made this one of the main 
technologies within the combustion industry e.g. district heating and industrial 
heating industries. Local manufacturers have answered to this demand and de-
veloped equipment to handle the special needs of renewable solid fuel combus-
tion. There is now a great interest in turning so called “Clean Tech” industries 
within the biomass field into a growth sector with increased export revenues 
and employment as a much sought-after consequence. A lot of resources are 
committed by government, industries and investors to fulfil this ambition. This 
chapter takes an actor perspective in analysing the conditions for growth and 
export orientation and outline important success factors for the design of ac-
tor oriented facilitation schemes. The analysis shows that in order to increase 
growth and export volumes in small Clean Tech companies characterized by an 
extensive operating history, facilitation schemes must be able to foster the fol-
lowing three core capabilities:
•  creating competitive advantage based on customer value, 
•  developing foreign sales capabilities and 
•  increasing value from stakeholder collaboration.
In essence, combustion is the main 
source of green house gas emissions 
and eighty percent of all emissions 
within the EU emanates from produc-
tion of power and heat. An increase in 
the use of biomass has potential to sig-
nificantly reduce CO
2
 emissions within 
the EU.  EEA estimates that nearly half 
Introduction
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of the target of 20 percent of renewa-
ble energy could be met by biomass in 
the year 2020 (EEA, 2008).  In terms 
of power and heat production, biomass 
has the potential to meet 18 percent of 
the European demand for heat and 12 
percent of electricity demand in 2030 
as compared to 3 percent and 6 percent 
respectively in 2008. 
The increased demand for energy 
produced from biomass in the Nordic 
region is also illustrated by analy-
ses made within the NEP project. As 
shown in the figure below, the present 
Nordic use of biomass for energy pur-
poses is large and it can be expected to 
grow considerably during the coming 
10 years.
Figure 16.1: The 
calculated use of 
renewable en-
ergy in the Nordic 
countries by the 
year 2023 in three 
different NEP sce-
narios, compared 
to the present use
Several studies indicate that the bio-
mass combustion sector can become a 
booming international market for the 
next 20 years (Berndes, Hoogwijk and 
van den Broek, 2003). The biomass 
combustion sector is one of the sectors 
in the Swedish Clean Tech industry1 
that has been identified as especially 
promising by Swedish authorities and 
is also receiving international recogni-
tion.2  A plethora of facilitation activi-
ties, consisting of different measures 
such as economic endorsement, deve-
lopment programs, cluster formations, 
triple helix co-operations and explicit 
export initiatives are undertaken in or-
der to realise this potential. However 
there have been growing concerns that 
progress is not heading in the right di-
rection and actions are now called for 
improving existing facilitation sche-
mes in order to break this development 
path3.  
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1  Although Clean Tech segment have a rather wide scope it generally includes producers of “clean technology” faci-
litating input substitution increasing the use of renewable materials and energy sources that reduce the use of natural 
resources, and cut or eliminate emissions and wastes.” (p 2. In Makower and Pernick, 2001).
2  See “A compilation of bioenergy in Sweden — Medium size plants and biofuel markets”, 2009, Swentec for an 
overview and IEA Bioenerg
3  See for example the Swedish government decision Dir. 2008:31 to establish a Swedish Environmental Technology 
Council responsible for preparing an action plan for government work in facilitating Swedish Clean Tech companies.  
The action plan was finalized in Dec. 2009 containing 82 suggestions on how to improve this facilitation (Swentec,  
2009).
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In this chapter we take the position of 
the corporation at interest and investi-
gate impediments for growth and ex-
port orientation and how these impact 
the design of actor oriented facilitation 
schemes. This is done by analysing the 
results of a study investigating inno-
vation, export and stakeholder col-
laboration activities among Swedish 
manufacturers of biomass combustion 
plants. The empirical data has been 
collected during 2008 and 2009 by 
means of ’site visits’ (Young och Sel-
to, 1991) where personal interviews 
have been conducted with leading 
representatives in the companies and 
related organizations.
The Industry and its relation to growth and export facilitation 
schemes
The Swedish biomass combustion 
manufacturing industry has seve-
ral important attributes that makes 
it particularly suitable for attaining 
knowledge about the prerequisites for 
growth in the clean tech sector. Besi-
des the fact that the industry offers a 
significant global CO
2
 emission reduc-
tion potential and an established home 
market, which makes it relevant in 
absolute terms, it also has interesting 
industry characteristics. 
It contains six manufacturers of so cal-
led turnkey solutions for dry and moist 
biomass in the range of 10 to 50 MW
t
.4 
All of these manufacturers are able to 
engage in business deals as a main 
contractor. They also share a long busi-
ness history and extensive experience 
of product development, export acti-
vities and stakeholder collaboration. 
These companies have similar product 
portfolios, size (between 16 and 60 
employees and turnover between 66 
and 300 MSEK in 2008) and growth-
patterns. The customers are mainly 
from the energy sector, pulp and pa-
per, sawmills, service sector and indu-
stry. In essence these organizations are 
small, well established technology-
driven clean tech companies that re-
present a broad set of experiences rele-
vant for an important set of small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME:s).5 It 
is significant to emphasize that this is a 
business context that stands apart from 
the typical clean tech company com-
monly referred to in media reporting; 
very small, innovation-driven start-up 
companies with difficulties finding 
venture capital. On the other hand, an 
extensive operating history associated 
with considerable institutional sticki-
ness due to local embeddedness (Gra-
novetter, 1985) will have a decisive 
impact on how growth and export ac-
tivities can be induced in an effective 
way. When trying to facilitate growth 
and export in the clean tech sector by 
designing support initiatives and pu-
blic policies it is important to acknow-
4 The companies included in the study are: Hotab AB, Järnforsen Energi System AB, KMW Energi AB, Petrokraft AB, 
Saxlund International AB, och TPS Termiska Processer AB
5 See EU Commission recommendation 2003/361/EC regarding the definition of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises.
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ledge these differences. With insights 
from the analysis of the biomass com-
bustion industry the suitability of ex-
isting growth and export facilitation 
schemes can be evaluated. In order to 
better understand the unique characte-
ristics of this industry the next sections 
will give brief accounts on innovation 
and product development, export acti-
vities and stakeholder collaboration.
Impediments for growth and increased export orientation
There are some characteristics of these 
companies that seem to be especially 
important to understand in order to be 
able to design coping strategies to re-
duce or overcome these impediments. 
First, demanding customers shift the 
focus in the company towards tech-
nological solutions and away from 
customer value; product development 
and innovation is to large parts charac-
terized by incremental technical refi-
nement rather than developing stan-
dardized business concepts addressing 
core customer needs. Small compa-
nies in rather mature industries have 
difficulties changing established po-
wer relations, defining the sale process 
and content of negotiation. Although 
this is mostly true for the Nordic mar-
kets with a high penetration rate and 
where the production technique is well 
known and established, the dependen-
ce of these markets make it hard to im-
plement a more radical reframing of 
the business proposal, more suitable 
for high volume sales. 
Second, the relatively complex pro-
duct requires the companies to have 
high standards regarding abilities to 
manage intricate procurement proces-
ses, capabilities for onsite construc-
tion management and subsequent ope-
rating training. In markets where the 
concept of biomass combustion is new 
or unknown, there is also a great de-
mand for educating the customers and 
helping to establish necessary supply 
chains. These high qualifications is a 
significant impediment for growth sin-
ce an important condition for growth 
is the ability to recruit new employees. 
Given the size of these companies, 
the complexity of the products and 
the technological orientation of the 
corporate culture, it is a challenge to 
find new employees that can induce 
new ideas and ways of working and 
at the same time blend in with the ex-
isting corporate culture. Morevoer, an 
increase in export volumes for these 
relatively small companies will need 
local representation of some sort (e.g. 
partner/subsidies or agents/retailers 
with long term exclusive agreements). 
The difficulties involved establishing 
these international sales organizations 
are considerable in these companies.
Third, the option to facilitate business 
development and growth by stakehol-
der collaboration is framed by prior 
experiences from such activities. In 
many instances these experiences have 
been negative from the company’s 
point of view. Small organizations 
have limited capacity to engage in 
these long range and time consuming 
activities with rather uncertain and so-
187
metimes vaguely defined value to the 
company. In too many cases these col-
laborative activities have not resulted 
in tangible positive effects such as in-
creased sales or export capacity. There 
is even a considerable reluctance to 
engage in these activities in the future. 
Leading indicators for successful growth and export facilita-
tion schemes for small companies with an extensive opera-
ting history   
The results from the Swedish biomass 
combustion manufacturers support the 
belief that existing clean tech facili-
tation schemes do not trigger a satis-
factory increase in growth and export 
volumes in companies with a long 
operating history. Although these re-
sults are in line with more general con-
cerns regarding the efficiency of exis-
ting facilitation schemes, the results 
in the above presentation indicate that 
these impediments are of fundamen-
tally different nature, and needs to be 
addressed extensively in order to faci-
litate desired development. The large 
complexity of these areas; i.e. proper 
actions are contingent on industry-, 
company- and product/customer seg-
ment-specific circumstances, indicate 
that they need to be treated as speci-
fic and separate capability areas rather 
than bundles of more general problem 
area. The different nature and sheer 
complexity of these impediments imp-
lies that successful coping strategies 
must be able to develop these capabi-
lities in the facilitated companies. So 
it is necessary that in order to increase 
growth and export volumes in small 
Clean Tech companies characterized 
by an extensive operating history, faci-
litation schemes must be able to foster 
the following three core capabilities in 
these companies:
• creating competitive advantage ba-
sed on customer value, 
• developing foreign sales capabilities 
and 
• increasing value from stakeholder 
collaboration.
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In the design of the facilitation sche-
mes, the questions of in what form the-
se capabilities should be exercised and 
by whom are of course delicate. Even 
more so is the question of what mecha-
nisms should be in place to guide the 
build up and continuous development 
of competences to foster the develop-
ment of firm specific capabilities. Suf-
fice to say that it seems appropriate to 
divide responsibilities and concentrate 
facilitator competences into three dif-
ferent specialised competence areas. 
Below we give a brief account of 
tentative corner stones of these com-
petence areas. The first one would be 
responsible for stimulating change by 
having special competence regarding 
business model development, mana-
gement reorientation and corporate 
change processes. The second one, be-
ing responsible for building export ca-
pabilities, should have more hands on 
capabilities being instrumental in hel-
ping companies increase their export 
volumes. Important competences in-
clude knowledge of export activities, 
and biomass industry characteristics 
of different markets. Finally the third 
of these specialised competence areas 
should have the main responsibility 
for facilitating companies in stakehol-
der collaborations, develop their skills 
in increasing value from these activi-
ties and also evaluating the appropria-
teness of different initiatives/programs 
and schemes. Together, these compe-
tences manifest leading indicators 
proceeding growth and export volume 
increases.
A necessary prerequisite for the suc-
cess of these responsibility areas is 
to have dedicated funds at their dis-
posal. However, even with sufficient 
funds and adequate competence at 
hand, top-managers in these compa-
nies can’t be assumed to generally be 
willing to change drastically. Building 
competence and capabilities are long 
term commitments that can’t rest on 
the traditional good-willing intention 
of just being helpful. Instead it must 
be guided by carrot and stick mecha-
nisms encouraging companies to de-
vote considerable resources of their 
own and deepen their commitment to 
change.  
The need for a conceptual framework for designing 
facilitation schemes 
In the limited scope of this chapter it is 
of course not possible to cover all re-
levant aspects of actor oriented Clean 
Tech facilitation schemes. Here we 
have focused on small well established 
Clean Tech companies with extensive 
business experience. The suggested 
division in three distinct responsibility 
areas must also be analysed in relation 
to the needs and situations of the ty-
pical Clean Tech start-up companies. 
Clearly more research is needed in 
order to better understand these dif-
ferences.
In this chapter we suggest a concep-
tual framework for a better understan-
ding of the task at hand. The value of 
such an understanding becomes even 
more evident when we consider the 
189
enormous challenge of making Clean 
Tech a sector that significantly drives 
economic development. It is safe to 
conclude that successful facilitation 
schemes addressing organizational 
change will most certainly need co-
ordinated actions of an extraordinary 
magnitude stretched out over long 
periods of time, binding substantial 
amounts of economic resources. In ad-
dition to this there are a great number 
of facilitators, all with vested special 
interests which needs to be “dissol-
ved” in order reduce the institutional 
stickiness that characterize the current 
situation. A conceptual framework for 
addressing these issues will most cer-
tainly be a necessary starting point for 
a structured discussion about the de-
sign of future facilitation schemes and 
provide a firmer base for future action. 
For further information:
Anders Sandoff, School of Business, 
Gothenburg University
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17. International climate policy partici-
pation critical for Nordic industry 
competitiveness 
Industries in the Nordic Countries are 
among the most energy-intensive in 
the world due to the large shares of 
paper, metal and chemical industries 
in the total production. In Sweden 
these sectors account for 25% of the 
total electricity consumption, and in 
Finland and Norway up to more than 
35%. In Finland and Sweden, paper 
and pulp industries are clearly the lar-
gest energy users, whereas in Norway, 
metal and mineral industries consume 
half of the total electricity used in ma-
nufacturing sectors.  
The perspectives for the competitive-
ness of these industries – market envi-
ronment, production costs, revenues, 
and differences between sectors and 
countries – are discussed against the 
background provided by GTAP mo-
del simulation results for the reference 
and global scenarios. The “Reference 
scenario” includes present 20% reduc-
tion target and ETS I and II. The “Glo-
bal policy” scenario imposes an ad-
ditional 10% reduction for EU, and a 
commitment of other Annex I countri-
es to limit their emissions with compa-
The impact of emissions reduction policies varies by country and by industry. In 
Sweden, the total impact of climate policies on industries is quite modest, as the 
services sector is not greatly affected by the decline in output of other sectors. A 
much clearer impact is seen in Finland, where a larger share of the services sec-
tor is composed of industries that use significant amounts of fossil fuels (namely 
transports and construction). Norway is characterised by a large share of oil and 
gas production; energy commodities, which are also closely linked to services. 
Many industries important to Nordic countries face increasing costs under all 
the scenarios in the period 2004-2020, whilst the world market price of these 
commodities remains virtually unchanged. This implies that whilst the produc-
tion may become more expensive, the income earned at world market does not 
increase in the same proportion. Therefore, especially export-oriented energy-
intensive industries are, on one hand, becoming less advantaged compared to 
the foreign (often Chinese or Indian) competitors and, on the other hand, pro-
vide less profitable use of available production factors compared to other do-
mestic industries. However, such a development is largely offset by an overall 
growth in industrial output, which stays around 3% per annum in all scenarios
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rable speed. The scenario simulations 
assume full emissions trading within 
sectors using fossil fuels and between 
participating countries. More detailed 
descriptions and assumptions for the 
scenarios are presented in Chapter 19.
Challenges from changing market environment, 
opportunities from cleaner energy
The loss of comparative advantage of 
energy-intensive industries in Nordic 
countries is a long-term trend present 
in all scenario simulations, and con-
firmed by real life observations such 
as the recent closures of production 
plants. Though the economic reces-
sion undoubtedly has accelerated the 
decline, there are more fundamental, 
long-term changes in the global com-
petitive environment and local Nordic 
primary factor markets that are affec-
ting energy-intensive industries. 
On the other hand, facing the tighten-
ing regimes for green house gas emis-
sions reduction, the Nordic countries 
have an advantage in the potential for 
clean energy production, which may 
imply lower energy price increases 
due to climate policies than in the rest 
of the world. The geographic and na-
tural conditions in the Nordic countri-
es give opportunities for energy pro-
duction using land, coasts, forests and 
hydro power, and there is also unused 
potential for further wind and solar 
power. This potential is not fully in-
corporated in the global economy si-
mulations, but it is explored further 
in Chapter 20 “Climate challenge – a 
stimulant for a new Nordic business.”
Climate policies make final user energy prices rise and 
producer prices decline 
In the GTAP model simulations, a con-
siderable increase in the global energy 
consumption is observed. There is a 
generally increasing trend in oil and 
gas prices, whereas coal price is decre-
asing. As expected, the pre-tax world 
market price is highest when there are 
no climate policies, because the CO
2 
price increases the final price paid by 
industries and consumers, hence lo-
wers the demand, which in turn causes 
the supply prices to also decrease. 
The world prices for all energy com-
modities decline significantly with 
stricter emissions policies. The higher 
the reduction targets, the lower are 
primary energy prices before taxes. 
When moving from European policy 
commitments in the Reference scena-
rio to a Global policy with ambitious 
targets for EU, the relative impact on 
oil price is more severe than on other 
energy commodity prices. World aver-
age electricity prices develop the op-
posite way, as the CO
2
 price is inclu-
ded in the primary energy prices paid 
by electricity producers.
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Nordic energy-intensive industries face increasing costs but 
stagnant revenue
At the local Nordic markets, the prices 
of energy-intensive industry products 
increase significantly under all the 
scenarios over the simulation period 
2004-2020 and beyond. At the same 
time, the world market price of these 
commodities remains virtually un-
changed, except for refined coal and 
petroleum products that experience 
a world-wide price rise as discussed 
above. Not only are new competitors 
from Asia and South America benefit-
ting from being closer to the fastest 
growing demand in the developing 
world and lower costs for the most im-
portant production factors, but the pri-
ces for labour in the Nordic countries 
are also growing faster than in the 
traditional industrialised competitor 
countries.
In the period from 2004 to 2020, the 
price of labour is simulated to grow 
15% more in Finland, 10% more in 
Sweden and 7% more in Norway and 
Denmark compared to rest of the Wes-
tern Europe and Northern America. 
The higher increase in labour prices 
is supply-driven, as the labour force 
growth relative to population growth 
is low in Nordic countries. This, in 
turn, is mainly due to less profuse im-
migration compared to other Western 
countries. This is clearly demonstrated 
in Figure 17.1, showing the develop-
ment of local price, reflecting produc-
tion costs, for paper and pulp sector in 
Finland and Sweden relative to world 
market price. The reasons for different 
European and global prices for Fin-
land and Sweden are discussed below.
Thus, for the energy intensive indu-
stry, the production becomes more 
expensive in the Nordic countri-
es, whilst the income earned at 
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Figure 17.1:  Prices 
for pulp and paper. 
Development of lo-
cal prices in Finland 
as Sweden relative 
to world market 
price under “Refe-
rence” and “Global 
policy” scenarios.
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world market does not increase in 
the same proportion. As the energy-
intensive industries are typically ex-
port-oriented, they are becoming less 
advantaged compared to the foreign 
competitors. Both the demand and 
production of these sectors is moving 
towards the growing economies in 
Asia, where the primary factor prices 
remain, despite rapid growth, at relati-
vely modest levels compared to Wes-
tern countries in general. In addition, 
compared to those domestic industries 
that are able to produce higher value 
added, the use of available production 
factors becomes less profitable in the 
energy-intensive industries. 
In absolute terms, however, the ener-
gy-intensive industries remain at cur-
rent levels or grow modestly, since the 
loss in relative competiveness is offset 
by overall growth of industrial output, 
which stays around 3% per annum in 
all scenarios. Moreover, the observed 
decline in output levels is also to an 
extent compensated by higher prices: 
the value of the output is not decrea-
sing as fast as the quantity, implying 
that the production within sectors is 
also moving towards products that 
have better sales prices.
Losers and winners of different climate policy scenarios
In Sweden, the overall results are si-
milar in both simulations. The EU 
emissions reduction policies trigger 
only minor decrease in overall in-
dustry output growth in comparison 
to an experimental scenario with no 
emissions reduction policies at all, 
whereas the inclusion of other Annex 
1 countries in climate policies results 
in a considerable increase in Swedish 
total manufacturing industries output. 
This suggests that the Swedish energy 
sector is able to switch to less emis-
sions generating production with rela-
tively low extra costs, which gives an 
additional comparative advantage to 
energy-intensive industries.
In Finland, the impacts of emissions 
reduction policies are clearly more 
visible. A closer look at industry-
specific results indicates that the main 
difference between simulations comes 
from the paper and pulp sector, where 
the supply price grows with climate 
polices clearly more than in Sweden 
for example, as was shown in Figure 
17.1 above. The similar pattern is also 
visible in the rest of the heavy indu-
stry.
A large part of the climate policy im-
pacts on industries comes through the 
electricity price, which is discussed in 
Chapter 9. The GTAP model simula-
tions give an analogous picture with 
the other NEP models that focus on 
electricity demand and price develop-
ment in Nordic countries: the electri-
city price in the “Global policy” sce-
nario is lower than in the “Reference 
case” scenario, and subsequently the 
aggregate Nordic energy demand in 
2020 is 5% higher. The model calcula-
tion deals with national electricity pri-
ces. In reality there is more or less a 
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Figure 17.2: Output growth in manufacturing industries, Finland and Sweden. The bars show the 
average annual growth rates between 2004 and 2020 for manufacturing industries in Reference 
and Global policy simulations.
common Nordic electricity price. This 
may lead to slightly exaggerated dif-
ferences in industry development in 
the different Nordic countries in the 
model results. 
Figure 17.2 presents the average an-
nual output growths under different 
scenarios in Finland and Sweden for 
four manufacturing industry groups. 
Comparing these results to the real life 
observations, it should be noted that 
the model does not provide for curren-
cy exchange rate regimes. Though the 
long-term impact from the inclusion 
of such policy is likely to be small, it 
might make the difference even more 
favourable to Sweden on the short run.
Differences explained by characteristics of industries
The impact of climate policies appears 
severe to the paper and pulp sector in 
Finland, but does not occur in the same 
way in Sweden, as illustrated in Figure 
17.3. The Finnish paper and pulp in-
dustry is hit hard when the burden of 
emissions reduction is in EU alone, 
and in contrast has the biggest relative 
gain from a global policy, as there is 
a similar climate policy costs for the 
non-European competitors. There are 
two prominent explanations to this: 
the different composition of the aggre-
gated sector ”paper and pulp”, and the 
price of wood. 
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Figure 17.3: Paper and pulp production. Development of supply at the world market and in Finland, 
Sweden and rest of the EU15 under “Reference” and “Global policy” scenarios.
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Within the pulp and paper sector, the 
share of pulp, out of the total produc-
tion, is much higher in Finland than in 
Sweden. Further, paper production in 
Finland uses relatively more mechani-
cal pulp than the industry in Sweden. 
Whilst higher share of mechanical 
pulp implies lower wood consump-
tion, it also increases energy consump-
tion. This is reflected as a larger share 
of energy in the pulp sector’s cost 
structure in Finland than in Sweden. 
Energy price is, obviously, one of the 
factors most affected by emissions re-
duction policies.
The Finnish industries also face grea-
ter increases in wood price than their 
Swedish counterparts. The reason for 
this is a high degree of dependence on 
imports for supply of wood in Finland, 
which means that the wood price is 
affected by increased transport costs 
due to carbon taxes. This can be seen 
clearly in the high share of transports 
in the total cost structure of the Fin-
nish paper and pulp sector. 
On a global scale, we can see the ge-
neral trend where the production shifts 
away from traditional paper producing 
countries, and most importantly from 
Europe. Whilst the total output is in-
creasing in all regions, the share of 
Nordic and also German production of 
total world trade is clearly decreasing. 
Related to this, Chapter 18 addresses 
in more detail several structural chan-
ges in Nordic and world forest indu-
stries, including the paper and pulp 
sector in China, Indonesia and Brazil, 
and differences between types of final 
products and raw materials used.  As 
the Europe’s loss of market share is 
biggest in the policy scenarios without 
participation of other countries in the 
climate policy, the industry develop-
ment is likely to be accompanied with 
carbon leakage. This issue is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 19. 
Metal and minerals industries show 
quantitatively similar results as the 
paper and pulp sector. In 2020, the 
Swedish and Danish metal and mine-
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Unlike other Nordic countries, Norway is not only characteri-
sed by energy-intensive industries but is also a large producer 
of fossil fuels. This makes a big difference to the simulation 
results, and complexity is added from the fact that Norway’s 
own power production is not fossil fuel based. If there were 
no climate policies at all, the strong increase in global en-
ergy demand would make the simulation results show high 
growth figures for the Norwegian petroleum sector and de-
cline of other industries, as the policy measures to restrict 
such development are not incorporated in the model.  The 
oil price changes in different scenarios, greatly influencing 
the prices of production factors in Norway, and thus costs in 
all energy-intensive industries. Therefore the differences bet-
ween different policy simulations are particularly noticeable 
in comparison to the other Nordic countries. 
The results have two main directions. First, a development 
similar to Sweden can be observed with regard to energy-
intensive industries, as Norwegian electricity production 
has the advantage of using very little CO
2
 emitting fuels. Se-
cond, Norway’s petroleum sector follows the developments 
of world oil price. Hence, despite the fast increasing pri-
mary factor prices mentioned earlier, as the pre-tax oil price 
growth is slower with tightened climate policies, it becomes 
more profitable to use the production factors to other sec-
tors than petroleum. Industries that compete for the same 
resources with the primary energy producing sectors will be-
nefit from increased supply and lower prices. The Norwegian 
energy-intensive industry has a double advantage of having 
relatively clean energy available, and increased production 
factor supply (and lower prices) with climate policies. At sec-
tor level, the mineral industries behave quite similar to the 
other Nordic countries, but the impacts on metal industries 
are clearly more sensitive to the policy regimes
OIL MAKES NORWAY DIFFERENT
rals sector output in the Global Policy 
scenario is 7% higher than in the Eu-
ropean Policy scenario, and in Finland 
the difference is 12%. Within the ag-
gregated sector, iron and steel industry 
in all countries is clearly more sensiti-
ve to climate policy regime than other 
industries, and between the countries, 
Finnish industries are more sensitive 
than their Swedish and Danish coun-
terparts.
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Overall welfare losses are small but clearly influenced by 
policy
As discussed in Chapter 19, the emis-
sion reduction policies affect macro-
economic performance in developed 
countries relatively little even with 
high reductions in CO
2
 emissions. Ho-
wever, how the distribution of welfare 
losses are divided between countries 
is greatly influenced by how much of 
the industrialised world is covered by 
the climate policy regime. The gross 
domestic product in 2020 in Nordic 
countries would be about 3% higher 
with the Global policy than in the re-
ference case.  
Figure 17.4 shows the difference in 
real GDP levels compared to the Refe-
rence scenario in the Nordic countries. 
It shows that, in accordance with the 
results for energy-intensive industries, 
Finland is the most sensitive to the 
policy regime whereas the influen-
ces on Swedish economy are smaller. 
Further, in the long run, the impacts of 
the Global policy are less straight for-
ward due to the permanent changes in 
global demand for different industrial 
products. 
Figure 17.4: GDP in Nordic countries. 
The figures show the difference in real 
GDP levels in the ”Global Policy” sce-
nario compared to the ”Reference” 
scenario.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Industrial development and future 
export for Nordic industry  
– opportunities and challenges
International interest for Nordic environme-
ntal technology has been growing immen-
sely over the past few years. Sub-segments 
such as water treatment, waste manage-
ment, renewable energy and energy ef-
ficiency are on top of the international 
agenda. The demand for e.g. bio-energy 
solutions for the production of heat, electri-
city and transport fuels is growing all over 
the world. Driving forces are environmental 
concerns, climate focus and urbanization.
In the NEP project we have investigated the possibilities for the Nordic countries 
to meet these global challenges. There is a chance that Nordic industry could 
get a boost from climate and energy policies. The picture is, however, mixed and 
there will be both winner and losers. Global climate policies would be considera-
bly more favourable for Nordic industry than regional EU policies.
Macro economic changes
The growth in world population and economy drives the demand of scarce com-
modities that are difficult to substitute, such as primary energy, as well as ge-
nerally all primary production factors. This growth drives international energy 
prices and shift traditional industries to regions with lower price for labour and 
resources. In the Western world in general, and in the Nordic countries in parti-
cular, the share of manufacturing industries decreases in favour of services and 
industries with high degree of processing.  Attempts to limit the green house gas 
emissions with climate policy regimes can be compromised by carbon leakage 
if the participation in the regime is not global. Further, the cost of the reductions 
can be decreased if more countries are included in emissions trading.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Can energy also in the future support the global  
competitiveness of Nordic industry?
Industries in the Nordic Countries are among the most energy-intensive in the 
world due to the large shares of paper, metal and chemical industries in the total 
production. In Finland and Sweden, paper and pulp industries are clearly the 
largest energy users, whereas in Norway, metal and mineral industries consume 
half of the total electricity used in manufacturing sectors.  
The loss of comparative advantage of energy-intensive industries in Nordic 
countries is a long-term trend. Though the economic recession has undoubtedly 
accelerated the decline, there are more fundamental, long-term changes in the 
global competitive environment and local Nordic primary factor markets affec-
ting energy-intensive industries. This is discussed further in Chapter 18.
On the other hand, facing the tighten-
ing regimes for green house gas emis-
sions reduction, the Nordic countries 
have an advantage in clean energy 
production, which may imply lower 
energy price increases due to climate 
policies than in the rest of the world. 
The geographic and natural condi-
tions in the Nordic countries give 
opportunities for energy production 
using land, coasts, forests and hydro 
power, and there is also unused poten-
tial for further wind and solar power. 
Another example is the forest indu-
stry. Climate policies stimulate the 
forest industry to develop new high-
value products such as new biomate-
rials, liquid bio-fuels, and electricity 
from renewables. This could balance 
reduced competitiveness for pulp and 
paper.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
Given the right conditions, the biomass combustion sector is an example of a 
branch that can become a booming market for the coming 20 years. The biomass 
combustion sector is one of the sectors in the Swedish Clean Tech industry that has 
been identified as especially promising by Swedish authorities and is also receiving 
international recognition. The results have so far not lived up to expectations so-
mething that support the belief that existing Clean Tech facilitation schemes do 
not trigger a satisfactory increase in growth and export volumes in companies with 
a long operating history. This is a business context that stands apart from the ty-
pical Clean Tech companies commonly referred to in media reporting; very small, 
innovation-driven start-up companies with difficulties finding venture capital. 
The results from our work indicate that in order to increase low to moderate 
growth and export volumes in small Clean Tech companies characterized by an ex-
tensive operating history, these companies must increase their physical presence 
in these markets. 
The relatively complex product demands high standards regarding abilities to ma-
nage intricate procurement processes, capabilities for onsite construction mana-
gement and subsequent operating training. In markets where the concept of bio-
mass combustion is new or unknown there is also a great demand for educating 
the customers and offering help to establish a business model for the customers 
regarding necessary supply chains. The difficulties involved establishing these in-
ternational sales organizations are prominent in these companies.
The need to get involved in these markets through stakeholder collaboration is 
framed by prior experiences. In many instances these experiences have been ne-
gative from the company’s point of view. Small organizations have limited capacity 
to engage in these long ranging and time consuming activities with rather uncer-
tain and sometimes also vague value to the company. 
Case study: Time consuming physical presence in local 
markets is often necessary
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18. The Nordic forest industry
A production decline  
The paper and pulp industry has been the backbone of the Nordic industry for a 
long time. However, in recent years the industry has faced economic difficulties 
and is no longer growing. The industry has a large impact on the Nordic energy 
markets both as a large consumer of electricity and as a producer of electricity 
and heat. The forest industry is of course also a huge consumer of wood and a 
producer of leftover materials that can be used as biofuels. Understanding the 
factors that will influence the future development of this industry is paramount 
in understanding the future for the Nordic energy markets. This perspective is 
mainly based on the NEP report “Wood markets and the situation of the forest 
industry in the Nordic countries”.
Preliminary statistics show a rather 
dramatic decline for the Nordic paper 
and pulp industry in 2009. The Finnish 
industry has been particularly hit. The 
Swedish industry has done better, being 
able to benefit from a weak currency.
Structural threats observed long before the financial crisis 
The Nordic forest industry has histori-
cally profited from a relative closeness 
to both customers and raw materials. 
Other advantages include relatively 
low electricity prices and a high pro-
portion of raw materials based on long 
wood fibres.
However, a number of negative fac-
tors are now affecting the Nordic fo-
rest industry. 
• Demand for paper products in deve-
loping countries has been growing at 
BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE 
NORDIC FOREST INDUSTRY 
Turnover: 50 billion EUR (2007) 
Net exports: approximately 35 billion EUR
Electricity consumption: 60 TWh (2007)
Electricity generation: 18 TWh (2007) 
- a temporary dip or the beginning of a structurally 
driven decline?
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a high rate of about 10 % per year. 
Nevertheless, this increase in de-
mand has been met by an even larger 
growth in the production capacity of 
pulp from fast growing eucalyptus 
and rainforest wood. China imports 
fibre, but its paper production has 
increased significantly and China is 
now a net exporter of paper. 
• Demand for newsprint has already 
fallen in the United States, and is 
now falling in Europe as well. 
• A continuing modification of euca-
lyptus trees towards longer wood 
fibres will result in a larger supply 
of newspaper quality fibre and there-
fore increased competitive pressures 
on the Nordic forestry industry. Even 
Russia is expected to increase pro-
duction of newsprint-quality pulp. 
Price increases and the ability to pay for electricity and wood 
Parallel to the structural changes affec-
ting the Forest industry, we have seen 
a rapid increase in both electricity pri-
ces and prices for wood in the Nordic 
region. One reason for the rise in elec-
tricity prices is the introduction of a 
price on carbon in Europe, something 
not affecting non-European competi-
tors. The increase in wood prices can 
partly be explained by the rapid in-
crease in demand for biofuels, partly 
driven by strong support schemes in 
Sweden. This is one of the reasons the 
Forest industry in Finland was against 
joining the Swedish electricity certifi-
cate system even though the industry 
would have received certificates for 
the electricity produced from leftover 
products from their production pro-
cesses. Export tariffs on wood from 
Russia are also driving up the price of 
wood, especially in Finland.
In an attempt to illustrate how the pro-
fitability of the industry depends on 
the price of raw materials and on the 
price of electricity, we have looked at 
historical profit margins in the indu-
stry and at the production technology 
used. We then calculated the electricity 
price and the wood price at the point in 
which the various parts of the industry 
reach break-even. These breakeven 
points were then plotted in a diagram. 
We call the resulting curve “the ability 
to pay curve” (ATP).  In figure one this 
is calculated for the Swedish forest in-
dustry for wood and for the Nordic fo-
rest industry for electricity.  
205
Figure 18.1: Ability to pay (ATP) for wood in the Swedish forest industry and the ability to pay for 
electricity in the Nordic forest industry. 
Looking at the ATP for wood from 
right to left we see “pulp”, “other pa-
per”, “saw mills”, “newsprint”, and at 
the top “other print paper”. We have 
included two lines in the figure that il-
lustrate the present price level in cen-
tral Sweden for pulpwood and timber. 
Looking at the ATP for electricity we 
see from right to left “newsprint Nor-
way” “newsprint Sweden and Fin-
land”, “mechanical pulp”, “corrugated 
card board”, “chemical pulp”, “other 
paper” and “other print paper”.
In our scenarios, electricity prices 
range from 40 to 50 EUR/MWh, but 
one should be careful to draw too 
strong conclusions based on the exact 
levels.
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Newsprint has a low ATP for electri-
city, but a high ATP for wood. This is 
natural since this production uses a lot 
of electricity but much less wood than 
paper based on chemical pulp. The si-
tuation is similar for mechanical pulp. 
“Other print paper” has a high ATP for 
both wood and electricity. The ATP for 
wood is low for pulp, especially che-
mical pulp. The ATP for electricity is 
also rather low for chemical pulp, not 
because high electricity use but on an 
overall low profitability for this part of 
the industry. 
To corroborate our results we have 
conducted interviews with represen-
tatives from the forest industry, and 
these interviews confirm the rough 
picture painted here.
Does this mean that significant parts 
of the Nordic forest industry will be 
forced to close down, and that large 
amounts of wood will be diverted to 
other areas such as energy? We know 
that the industry is currently facing 
problems. This is quite obvious from 
company statements and the closure 
of plants. However, important adjust-
ment measures from the industry are 
to be expected.
Closing mills will lead to a reduced 
demand for wood from the industry. 
One would therefore expect to see 
a downward pressure on the price of 
wood in the region. Some wood will 
be consumed by the energy sector, but 
that demand is limited, at least in the 
short run. In theory, large volumes of 
wood could be exported, provided the 
world market price of wood is suffi-
ciently high. In that case, low wood 
prices will give the Nordic forest in-
dustry a comparative advantage over 
competitors in importing countries. 
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World market for biomass, competition from the energy 
sector and the role of China 
The interaction between the forest 
industry and the energy sector has in-
creased because of the strong drive for 
carbon-free, domestic energy. The fo-
rest industry competes with the energy 
sector for raw materials, but is also 
the major supplier of biofuels. To un-
derstand how the competitiveness of 
the Nordic forest industry will develop 
in the future, one must also consider 
the following facts:
• One advantage for the Nordic fo-
rest industry is that production of 
pulp and paper is usually integra-
ted, which allows for more ener-
gy-efficient production. Nordic 
pulp and paper facilities are also 
relatively new and efficient.
• Developing new eucalyptus plan-
tations and production facilities 
that use eucalyptus wood usually 
takes a very long time. In addition 
to the actual production plants, 
new infrastructure such as roads 
and harbours will be needed. 
• International climate policies may 
also reduce the supply of wood 
from rainforests. This could drive 
up the price of wood in develo-
ping countries and reduce their 
competitive edge in the market for 
forest products.  Restrictions on 
new eucalyptus plantations, due 
to water problems for example, 
could also result in higher wood 
prices in developing countries. 
• The possibility of a “China-effect” 
in the future cannot be ruled out 
if Chinese demand for fibre can-
not be met by supply. This might 
also lead to higher paper prices, 
but these price increases would be 
limited as long as China is a net 
exporter of paper.
• The electricity price in the Nordic 
region is important for the com-
petitiveness of the Nordic pulp 
and paper industry. Results from 
the NEP model group indicate 
that electricity prices in the Nord 
Pool region may be rather low in 
the next few decades. Had the mo-
dels considered the structural pro-
blems faced by the forest industry, 
the electricity prices would have 
been even lower (see Chapter 8 
and 9). 
• The forest industry is developing 
new high-value products such as 
new biomaterials, liquid biofuels, 
and so on. Successful develop-
ment of these products could lead 
to a renaissance for the Nordic fo-
rest industry.
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Today China imports almost half of the fibre it uses. One 
quarter is waste paper imports that come mainly from 
the US. Reduced demand for newsprint in the US could 
reduce the amount of waste 
paper that China can import 
from the US. This shortfall 
would then have to be replaced 
by other source of fibre.
Indonesia is the main expor-
ter of pulp to China. Brazil is 
also a big exporter, in spite of 
long transport distances.  A big 
share of the Indonesian pulp 
production comes from rain-
forests. Deforestation in rain-
forests in Indonesia and Brazil 
account for 25% of the world’s 
total greenhouse gas emissions. If pulp exports from Indonesia to China are redu-
ced as a consequence of climate change policies, China may again find it difficult 
to satisfy its demand 
for fibre. 
These are two ex-
amples of supply-
side problems that 
could generate a 
“China effect” on 
pulp. A strong in-
crease in Chinese 
consumption of pulp 
and paper would 
have a similar effect.
CHINA’s SUPPLY OF FIBRE THREATENED?
Figure 18.2: The fibre sources for paper production 
in China 2004. Source: China Paper Almanac 2004
Figure 18.3: China’s import of chemical pulp from 2002-
2004 and an estimate for 2005. 
Source: Global trade atlas, China import data
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19. Broader participation required for 
successful emissions reduction as 
global energy demand increases
The results from simulation with the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model focus on the period until year 
2020. However, long-term projections 
for the macro variables have been ob-
tained up to 2050 to enable the inte-
gration with the Nordic Times model, 
which by nature requires a very long 
time horizon. 
Two of the GTAP model scenarios 
presented here correspond to the NEP 
modelling group policy scenarios pre-
sented in the Chapter 8, with minor 
differences. The “Reference” scenario 
incorporates EU’s present 20% reduc-
tion target and ETS I and II, and the 
“Global policy” scenario simulation 
features an additional 10% reduction 
for EU and a commitment of other 
Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries to 
limit their emissions with comparable 
speed. The “2°C policy” scenario rela-
tes to the results presented in Chapter 
20, and includes the emissions reduc-
tion requirements generated by the 
Nordic Times model to meet the 2°C 
target. The model simulations assume 
The growth in world population and economy drives the demand of scarce com-
modities that are difficult to substitute, such as primary energy, as well as ge-
nerally all primary production factors. This leads to increased world market oil 
price and shifting of traditional industries to regions with lower price for labour 
and resources. In the Western world in general, and in the Nordic countries in 
particular, the share of manufacturing industries decreases in favour of services 
and industries with high degree of processing. Emissions reduction policies tend 
to accelerate this development. Growing economies also trigger an increase in 
energy use and green house gas emissions. An attempt to limit these emissions 
with climate policy regimes can be compromised by carbon leakage if the par-
ticipation in the regime is not global. Further, the cost of the reductions can be 
decreased if more countries are included in emissions trading.
Reference and policy scenarios
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full emissions trading within sectors 
using fossil fuels and between parti-
cipating countries. This produces an 
economically optimal shadow price 
for CO
2 
emissions. In reality, the in-
dustry coverage of the trading is more 
limited, and only parts of the allocated 
caps are subject to trading. In other 
NEP model group simulations, diffe-
rent assumptions about the emissions 
reduction regimes are used, as discus-
sed further below.
Implications for the Nordic industries 
in the “Reference” and “Global po-
licy” scenarios are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 17.
Macroeconomic development
Assumptions about the growth of va-
rious macroeconomic driver variables 
are a starting point for the scenario 
work and given as an exogenous in-
put to the simulations. The long-term 
projections on labour, population, and 
productivity or real GDP growth are 
incorporated in the scenarios, and the 
same figures are also used for scena-
rios presented in Chapter 20.
The projected annual average world 
population growth in period 2005-
2050 is 0.77% and the total population 
reaches 9.2 billion by the end of the 
projection period. However, alterna-
tive population scenarios range from 
8 to 11 billion. An increased share of 
working age population is observed 
until 2020, after which it starts to de-
crease. 
The total factor productivity growth 
estimates vary between 1% in some 
Western countries and up to 5% in fas-
test-growing Asian economies. This 
results in total annual GDP growth 
rates of up to 9-10% in countries like 
China and India. By the year 2050, the 
extreme growth figures are projected 
to come closer to those in developed 
economies. It is important to be aware 
of these assumptions, since the have a 
significant impact on the final results. 
Table 19.1 summarises the population, 
labour force and real GDP growth ra-
tes used in the baseline simulations for 
Nordic countries and other country 
groups. These are “normal”, average 
rates in a equilibrium growth path, and 
for example the impact of the present 
economic recession are not included 
in the baseline projections.
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Global development characterised by increased demand for 
energy and food
Table 19.1: Macro drivers. Average annual growth rate assumptions 2004-2020 used in the 
simulations
Population Labour force Real GDP
Denmark 0.4% 0.1% 2.7%
Finland 0.4% 0.1% 3.0%
Norway 0.9% 1.1% 3.2%
Sweden 0.7% 0.7% 3.3%
Western Europe 0.6% 0.7% 2.7%
Eastern Europe (incl. former 
SU)
-0.2% … -0.1% -0.3% … 0.1% 5.1% … 5.6%
Other developed countries 0.0% … 1.3% -0.3% … 1.3% 3.3% … 4.0%
China 0.7% 0.6% 9.5%
Other developing countries 1.5% … 2.8% 2.2% … 3.4% 5.0% … 8.8%
The growth in macro drivers, and po-
pulation in particular, triggers some 
fundamental changes in the world 
commodity markets. The products that 
are scarce and difficult to substitute 
become more expensive relative to 
other goods. This is particularly true 
for food and primary energy: whilst 
their share of the global value of in-
dustry output is gradually declining, 
their prices compared to other goods 
increase fast. 
In rapidly industrialising regions, 
above all in China, energy takes an in-
creasing share of total industry output 
value until 2020. Globally, however, 
in almost all regions the services and 
manufacturing with high value added 
are increasing their share. The Nordic 
countries follow the same general pat-
tern, and the share of traditionally en-
ergy-intensive industries is declining 
in favour of services 
and less energy-in-
tensive production, 
though the out-
put in all sectors 
is still growing 
steadily. 
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The weight of Asia in the global economy is increasing, and the development in Asia has 
a significant impact on the whole world. In addition to the overall growth, one striking 
characteristic is the growth of skilled labour especially in China, which has triggered an 
economic growth reaching 10% annually. A similar, though less dramatic pattern, applies to 
the developing South-East Asia. In the long run, relatively small differences in assumptions 
will cumulatively result in significantly different outcomes. To study these implications, we 
look at the results of an alternative scenario where the GDP growth rate in all developing 
Asia is cut by one percentage point, which corresponds to about 13% lower GDP growth for 
this region. All other assumptions are as in the “Reference” scenario.
 
Globally, each 10% reduction in developing Asia GDP growth results in a growth decrease 
of 2% for world GDP, 3% for investments, 3% for international trade and 5% for the price of 
primary factors. The CO
2
 emissions grow 6% less than in the “Reference” scenario.
The differences in Asian growth assumptions have varying impact on global industry output 
results, but it is generally higher for the manufacturing sectors than impact on GDP. The 
output differences are particularly large in iron and steel sector (–4%), whereas paper and 
pulp industry impact is in the same range with the GDP, other heavy industries falling in 
between. In the Nordic countries, the falling global demand for industry products is offset 
by the lower supply form Asian countries: Nordic industries are in fact able to increase their 
global market shares, and the impact of Asian lower growth remains small.
ASIAN ECONOMIES INFLUENCE THE GLOBAL  
DEVELOPMENT INCREASINGLY
World economies grow, emissions grow and leak
As all components of economic 
growth are growing, a positive GDP 
growth is also observed in all scena-
rios. However, on the global level, in 
absence of climate policies, energy 
use and thereby CO
2
 emissions growth 
relative to GDP growth is high. This 
is shown in the policy scenarios com-
paring the countries that participate in 
the climate policy to those that are out-
side the regimes. Figure 19.1 shows 
how much the CO
2
 emissions in dif-
ferent scenarios and regions grow as 
a percentage of the GDP growth. In 
developing countries, the emissions 
growth rates are more than 70% of the 
GDP growth rates in scenarios where 
they have no climate policy commit-
ments. In non-participating developed 
countries the ratio is even higher. In-
stead, the emissions growth is only a 
bit over 50 percent of the GDP growth 
in all regions participating in climate 
policy under any regime. As the GDP 
growth differences between different 
scenarios are very small whilst the ra-
tio of emissions to GDP growth drops 
significantly when emissions reduc-
tions are imposed, the impact of cli-
mate policy on the overall economic 
performance is small.
The simulations also show evidence 
on carbon leakage. In the developing 
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countries, fast economic growth is ac-
companied with increased emissions, 
as discussed above. In the reference 
scenario, developing countries ac-
count for 77% of total world CO
2 
 emis-
sions growth in the period 2004-2020. 
However, emissions are growing fast 
not only in the developing countries 
but also in those Annex I countries not 
committed to international climate po-
licy. Figure 19.2 shows regional and 
world emissions in “Reference” and 
“Global policy” scenarios compared 
to a hypothetical scenario with no cli-
mate policies at all. In the “Reference” 
scenario, 70% of the reductions in the 
EU are offset by emissions growth 
in other regions. One fourth of this 
leakage is attributable to other rich 
countries, about 60% to the develo-
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2
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ping countries and the rest to former 
Soviet Union countries. In the “Global 
policy” scenario (with a commitment 
for all developed countries), EU emis-
sions actually increase, as permits are 
bought from other countries, especi-
ally USA, where reduction costs are 
considerably lower. At the same time, 
the leakage to developing countries 
grows in absolute terms, but relatively 
speaking the total leakage is only half 
of the reduction in Annex I countries.
Whilst the overall energy demand 
grows steadily in all climate policy 
scenarios, there are significant diffe-
rences between different forms of en-
ergy. Generally, electricity use is gro-
wing faster than fossil fuels, especially 
coal and natural gas use. It can be seen 
in Figure 19.3 that the difference be-
comes particularly prominent with 
ambitious emission targets in the “2°C 
policy” scenario. This result is in line 
with the electrification of the energy 
system suggested in Chapter 20, and 
also interesting in light of the implica-
tions to the Nordic electricity market 
presented in Chapters 8-9. 
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Figure 19.3:  World energy use. Global demand 
for fossil fuel based primary energy and 
electricity under different scenarios, %-dif-
ference to the base year 2004.
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In chapter 20 it is shown that EU’s CO
2 
 
emission reduction target for 2020 
could be achieved with an allowance 
price of 20-30 €/t CO
2 
 at global emis-
sions trading market. The emissions 
prices generated by GTAP model for 
the “2°C policy” are somewhat higher, 
about 40 €/t CO
2 
 in 2020, since they 
do not take into account the energy 
efficiency or other technology impro-
vements, and instead of marginal cost 
of technology, they represent the total 
economic cost of a policy. Figure 19.4 
shows the development of the emis-
sion permit price under different sce-
nario simulations as an index of simu-
lated 2008 price (4-5 €/t CO
2 
). 
In the “2°C policy”, the price in-
creases steadily as the target gets more 
ambitious. Although the overall emis-
sions reduction target is highest in the 
“2°C policy” scenario, the CO
2 
 price 
increases more in the “Reference” sce-
nario, especially in longer term. The 
“Global policy” scenario shows a drop 
in the permit price at the point where 
all Annex I countries join the trading 
scheme, after which it increases at ap-
proximately the same rate as in “2°C 
policy” scenario. 
Other similar scenarios have been cal-
culated in the NEP model groupx . The 
results from those scenarios show both 
similarities and differences with the 
GTAP scenarios. The differences can 
largely be explained by the different 
modelling approach and assumptions 
about CO
2 
 price formation. The model 
group’s other scenarios only include 
the Nordic region, and the global de-
velopment is therefore only included 
as system boundary assumptions (e.g. 
different assumptions on climate-
change mitigation goals in regions 
Lower emissions with less cost by including more countries 
in climate policies
x) see the NEP report ”Insights from NEP policy scenario simulations”
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outside the EU), whereas in the GTAP 
simulations, unrestricted trading of 
emission permits between regions 
guarantees the lowest CO
2 
 price at any 
time as the reductions always take pla-
ce where they are least costly. Another 
example of the modelling differences 
is that the technical bottom-up mo-
dels assume that carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) will be commercially 
available 20 years from now, thereby 
establishing a ”backstop technology” 
that leads to an upper limit for the CO
2 
 
price. Such technological develop-
ment is not endogenously described in 
the GTAP model.
In the “Global policy” scenario, the 
emissions reduction target for the 
world is lower than in the “2°C po-
licy” scenario, but for the EU, target is 
much stricter than in the “Reference” 
scenario. Thus, a climate policy re-
gime that covers more industrialised 
countries implies lower CO
2 
 prices for 
European industries compared to pre-
sent, even if this involves more reduc-
tions for the EU. 
For further information:
Janne Niemi and Juha Honkatukia, VATT
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20. Global climate challenge 
– a stimulant for a new Nordic business
The EU has agreed to adopt the necessary domestic measures to ensure that 
global average temperature increases do not exceed pre-industrial levels by 
more than 2°C. This target was also agreed in Copenhagen Accord at the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in 2009.  Tackling climate change to a safe 
level would require from 50 to 80% reductions in global greenhouse gas emis-
sions compared to the present level by 2050, which would need a total change 
of the existing energy systems and could stimulate a new industrial revolution. 
Nordic countries have long traditions in developing and using low carbon tech-
nologies, like renewable energy technologies and CHP, as well as energy efficient 
solutions in residential and industrial sectors. Tackling climate change would 
create huge markets for clean energy technologies, and Nordic industry could 
take a great advantage on this. On the other hand, the cost efficient mitiga-
tion path indicates that electrification of the energy system could partly solve 
the climate problem. Nordic countries also have good possibilities to increase 
their “zero or even negative emission energy production” by 2050 and export 
renewable fuels or electricity to the neighbouring areas. Nordic business around 
clean energy could be developed both by technology transfer and energy export 
creating new possibilities for the Nordic welfare.
Long term development of Nordic, 
European and global energy systems 
have been studied to evaluate the cost 
effective transition towards low car-
bon energy systems. The energy and 
emission scenarios presented below 
take into account the whole energy 
system from fuel procurement and en-
ergy production to energy end use in 
different sectors as well as all the Kyo-
to greenhouse gas emissions and their 
reduction measures. The aim of these 
studies was to give a widened view of 
the impacts of long term climate poli-
cies on future energy systems as well 
as to evaluate demands of clean ener-
gy technologies on the global markets. 
Two energy system models have been 
used: the Global TIAM model created 
under the IEA/ETSAP collaboration 
and Nordic TIMES model further de-
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veloped by VTT. The scenarios studied 
include Baseline scenario and global 
policy scenario with deep emission 
reductions. The Baseline assumptions 
for GDP development are described in 
the Chapter 19.  In the global policy 
scenario the impact of the 2 °C target 
on greenhouse gas emissions have 
been simulated assuming global emis-
sions trading and global consensus to 
tackle climate change. The so called 
2°C Market simulation case represents 
global minimum in costs (or global 
maximum in consumer welfare) to 
tackle climate change. The Nordic sce-
narios include also simulation results 
with different CO
2
 allowance price le-
vels. In these “EU policy” simulations 
it is assumed that only EU has climate 
targets after the Kyoto period, which 
is achieved by emissions trading.
2°C degree target would require zero CO2 emission 
levels and radical decrease of all the greenhouse gases ...
The Figure 20.1 shows the global CO
2 
emissions in the Baseline and global 
policy scenario with 2 °C mitigation 
target up to 2100. The scenario results 
illustrate the required emission re-
duction level and emission reduction 
path in the shorter term. The largest 
share of emission reductions would 
be realized by conventional techno-
logy change, i.e. by increased use of 
renewables, nuclear and other low 
carbon fuels, and especially by impro-
vement of energy efficiencies through 
the whole energy chain. Large share 
of emission reductions could be reali-
zed by investing in carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) integrated to fossil fuel 
fired energy plants as well as to indu-
strial processes. Even bio-CCS with 
“negative” net emissions seems an att-
ractive option, i.e. CCS equipped with 
co-firing of fossil fuels and biomass or 
CCS integrated to a pulp industry. It 
should be noted that in these scenarios 
it is assumed that deforestation has 
been stopped and natural sinks have 
been increased by forestation. The op-
posite trend would make climate chan-
ge mitigation even more challenging.
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Figure 20.2 shows the development of 
greenhouse-gas emissions in Western 
Europe (i.e. EU-15, Iceland, Malta, 
Norway and Switzerland) by 2050 for 
the CO
2
 price level of 50 EUR/t with 
regional climate policies. The results 
also indicate that EU’s CO
2
 emission 
reduction target for 2020 could be ac-
hieved without any other further mea-
sures than CO
2
 price if the allowance 
price exceeds 20-30 €/t CO
2
 in 2020.
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Figure 20.2: Greenhouse-gas emissions in Western Europe. The assumed CO
2
 price 
increases linearly from 20 €/t in 2020 to the indicated price level of 50 €/t in 2040. 
Sector “Other CO
2  
“  includes emissions from transport and residential sectors.
Figure 20.1: Global CO
2
 emissions in the Baseline and 2 °C mitigation scenarios.
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Figure 20.3 shows the corresponding 
development of greenhouse-gases 
but includes different CO
2
-price le-
vels. The results show that by 2050 
the EU’s energy system could be CO
2
 
emission free with the highest emis-
sion price scenario assumed. In that 
simulation case the greenhouse gas 
emissions were reduced about 75% 
by 2050. The figure also indicate that 
radical reduction of non-CO
2
 green-
house gases as well as CO
2
 emissions 
from other than stationary energy sec-
tor would be very expensive or even 
impossible. Much of those emissions 
originate from land use changes and 
agriculture, and reduction of those 
emissions would require changes of 
communities, human behaviour and 
strong policies. The slow renewal rate 
of buildings and infrastructures also 
restrain emission reductions.
Electrification of the energy system could be one solution 
for the climate challenge
Scenarios on future electricity pro-
duction indicate that transforming the 
energy system from utilizing combus-
tible fuels towards using electricity 
would be a cost efficient measure in 
climate change mitigation. However, 
this would require that electricity pro-
duction is based on low carbon alter-
natives, i.e. renewables, nuclear and/
or fossil fuels with CCS. The Figure 
20.4 shows the total net electricity 
supply in the Nordic area and Western 
Europe in the Baseline and EU policy 
scenarios. 
Figure 20.3: Greenhouse gas emissions in the Western Europe with different CO
2
 price scena-
rios. The assumed CO
2
 price increases linearly from 20 €/t in 2020 to the indicated price levels 
in 2040. Sector “Other CO
2  
“includes  emissions form transport and residential sectors.
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Figure 20.4:  Total net electricity supply in the Western Europe (above) and the Nordic area (below). 
The assumed CO
2
 price increases linearly from 20 €/t in 2020 to the indicated price levels in 2040. 
Sector “Other generation” is mainly other renewables than hydro and wind power.
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It is clearly seen that in the longer 
term electricity production increases 
with increasing CO
2
 price indicating 
electrification of the energy system. In 
2020 the energy system is still largely 
based on existing generation mix and 
with increased CO
2
 price investments 
in energy saving would dominate. Ho-
wever, it should be noted that in these 
scenarios the EU’s targets for renewa-
bles has not been taken into account 
and therefore the share of renewables 
in 2020 could be even higher than pre-
sented. Another important result from 
the simulations is that Nordic countri-
es would become net electricity expor-
ters while Western Europe would im-
port much of its electricity. The same 
conclusion has been drawn from the 
scenario calculations with the other 
Nordic models used in NEP project. 
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Climate change mitigation and increase in energy demand 
in the developing countries would create huge markets for 
clean energy 
Global simulations indicate rapid in-
crease in energy demand in the develo-
ping countries both in the Baseline and 
global policy scenarios. The primary 
energy consumption in developing 
Asia alone could comprise about 30% 
of the world’s primary energy in 2050. 
The EU statistics indicate that the 
market areas of Danish, Finnish and 
Swedish energy technology exports 
differ greatly due to different energy 
technology expertises. All the Nordic 
countries have strong expertise on re-
newables, especially on biomass and 
biowastes (Finland, Sweden, and Den-
mark), wind (Denmark and Finland) 
and hydro power technologies (Nor-
way, Sweden, and Finland). Norway 
has also developed and demonstrated 
CCS technologies, which is also beco-
ming more important in Finnish R&D. 
Figure 20.5 shows the capital expen-
ditures needed for selected technology 
groups in power and heat generation 
in the global policy scenario with the 
2°C mitigation target. It is clearly seen 
that in the longer term the largest share 
of investments would be in the non-
OECD countries. For wind power, lar-
ger share of investments takes place in 
the OECD-countries, especially in the 
shorter term. It should ne noted, howe-
ver, that capital expenditures for both 
nuclear power and hydro power would 
be very significant between 2020 and 
2050. Both of these investments are 
usually regulated by national policies, 
which could prohibit these invest-
ments in the future, when the picture 
would be significantly changed.
Figure 20.5: Annual capital expenditures on new power and heat generation capa-
city in 2020-2050, 2 °C Market scenario.
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For further information:
Tiina Koljonen and Antti Lehtilä, VTT
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21. Perspectives on security of supply  
issues in the Nordic countries 
To get a feeling for what energy ex-
perts feel about SoS we constructed 
a questionnaire where respondents 
provided information on their opini-
ons about various aspects of SoS in 
the energy sector in their own country 
and in the Nordic region as a whole. 
We asked energy experts, including 
participants in the research group and 
financiers of this project to participate. 
Security of supply (SoS) is one of three cornerstones of European energy policy. 
The EU Council of Ministers expediently approved the EU Renewables Directive 
after a proposal by the EU Commission. The reason for this quick acceptance of 
the Directive was a concern for energy SoS in the EU, possibly aggravated by SoS 
problems resulting from Russia shutting off all gas supplies to Europe through 
the Ukraine a few months earlier. In spite of all this, we have found that it is very 
difficult to discuss these issues in a Nordic context.
Mixed views on what the SoS issues are for the Nordic region
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Table 21.1: Summary of answers from the SoS questionnaire. Responses are gra-
ded on a four grade scale were low numbers signal SoS problems (red dots).  
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From the table we can see that six are-
as out of 45 are regarded as problema-
tic. We can also see that the red spots 
are spread over the table – there is not 
one single category that is regarded as 
especially problematic.
SoS is a geopolitical issue, not a technical or economical 
issue
Coal resources are spread relatively 
evenly over the world. This is not the 
case with oil.  Approximately 70 % of 
global oil production takes place in 
only seven countries. Natural gas is 
even more concentrated - approxima-
tely 50 % of currently known global 
natural gas reserves are located in only 
three countries. 
Throughout history, many different 
strategies have been implemented to 
secure the delivery of energy resour-
ces. Many European countries had 
colonies until the middle of the 20th 
century. There were many reasons for 
the establishment of colonies, but one 
reason was the desire to secure the de-
livery of critical goods. US foreign po-
licy has consistently sought to secure 
deliveries of oil and other key fuels, as 
well as to obtain low prices for impor-
ted goods. China, with an expanding 
industry in need of raw materials and 
other inputs, has recently tried to se-
cure deliveries of energy and other 
goods by signing treaties with other 
countries, or by buying access to vari-
ous resources in other countries.
A common feature of these attempts 
to secure key supplies is a political 
game where buyers, or “takers”, play 
a very tough game – sometimes even 
resorting to war – to secure delivery 
of critical goods at low prices. Con-
versely, oil and natural gas exporting 
countries try to counteract the influ-
ence of importing nations in the West 
and Far East. The OPEC oil cartel that 
tries to maximize the price of oil is an 
example. Another example is Russia, 
which tries to use its natural resources 
in a geopolitical perspective.
These issues are important to world 
leaders, but countries often resort to 
secretive measures that often would 
not stand up to public scrutiny. Among 
the oil importing nations the major 
player is probably the US, but China is 
also very active, and several EU mem-
bers are also good at securing supplies 
using more or less shady methods. 
Economics cannot be used to study 
these issues. The NEP project is strong 
on economics, but in-depth knowled-
ge of international politics would pro-
bably be more valuable when studying 
SoS issues. For this reason, we should 
not expect too much from the NEP 
project when it comes to solutions to 
SoS problems.
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Standard indicators give contradictory results 
Import dependency 
When calculating the share of imports 
in the Nordic region’s total electricity 
consumption we have considered nu-
clear fuel, coal and electricity imports. 
We have left out oil and gas imports 
as the the Nordic region as a whole 
is a net exporter of oil and gas, even 
though Sweden and Finland by them-
selves are net importers. The results 
from the MARKAL and PoMo models 
running a number of different scena-
rios are presented below.
Figure 21.1:  Import share, excluding oil and gas
Compared to 2006 (which is modelled 
as a normal year regarding tempera-
ture and precipitation), dependency 
on imports is lower in both 2020 and 
2030, for both models and for all sce-
narios. This decline can be explained 
by three factors: lower use of coal 
condensing power plants, electricity 
imports turning into exports, and an 
increase in domestic renewable energy 
sources. This means that the European 
Union’s climate change and renewa-
ble energy policies appears to result 
in reduced import dependency for the 
Nordic region.
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Energy source diversity 
The Herfindahl index is commonly 
used to measure diversity of supply. It 
is obtained by squaring the share (per-
cent) of each type of supply source 
and then summing the resulting num-
bers. The principle is that the more 
energy alternatives there are, and the 
more equal they are in size, the better. 
Diversity is high where the Herfindahl 
value is low. A low value is a sign of 
low dependence on a few energy sour-
ces.  
Once again, we have used the MAR-
KAL and PoMo models to calculate 
how the Herfindahl index is expected 
to develop in the future. As we can see 
from Figure 21.2, MARKAL data in-
dicates that the Herfindahl index will 
be higher in both 2020 and 2030 than 
in 2006, pointing to an increased de-
pendency on imports. PoMo gives a 
slightly lower index for 2030, but hig-
her for 2020. 
This means that if we are to go by 
the Herfindahl index, the European 
Union’s climate change and renewa-
ble policies appears not to contribute 
to strengthening security of supply. 
The reason for this is that instead of 
retaining a dependency of coal, oil and 
gas – which is positive for this index 
– the dependence on biofuels, hydro-
power and nuclear power, which was 
large to start with, increases. This re-
sults in a high Herfindahl value. The 
introduction of new wind power is po-
sitive, but it does not compensate for 
the negative effects. 
Figure 21.2: Energy source diversity, the Herfindahl index
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In continental Europe, security of 
supply issues tend to focus on the 
strong and increasing dependency on 
imported natural gas from Russia. As 
discussed in Chapter 23, even though 
the use of natural gas in the Nordic 
region is limited, a severe delivery 
disturbance or a rapid price increase in 
continental Europe will also influence 
the Nordic region through interlinked 
electricity markets and other mutual 
economic dependencies. 
From a Nordic perspective, the 
region’s strong and increasing depen-
dency on nuclear power and biofuels 
should be high on the agenda, next to 
traditional SoS issues such as the de-
pendence of modern societies on firm 
deliveries of electricity and heat. His-
torically, we have seen severe 
disturbances to nuclear power 
production. Due to common 
constructions features in many 
reactors, even minor safety is-
sues can cause long produc-
tion stops in a large share of 
the installed capacity, causing 
capacity shortage in the re-
gion.
The strong focus on renewa-
ble energy in the Nordic regi-
on and in the EU has lead to a 
rapid shift from fossil fuels to 
biofuels in district heating and 
in combined heat and power 
(CHP) generation. Most often 
these plants cannot use any other fuel. 
Sudden delivery disturbances or price 
shocks can be problematic especially 
for district heating.  This development 
can be explained by strong support 
systems for renewable energy and 
high CO
2
 taxes/prices, which make 
investors reluctant to invest in plants 
that can burn other types of fuel in ad-
dition to bioenergy. We illustrate this 
in the figures on next page.
In the figures, we have increased the 
price of bioenergy by 50%  compared 
to a base case scenario. The three bars 
in the upper left part show a rather 
large impact on the demand for bio-
energy. In this case we have simulated 
a situation in which investors predict 
these new price levels when they in-
The situation in the Nordic region differs from that in the rest 
of Europe
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Fig 22:3
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Figure 21.3:  Difference in fuel use if biomass-prices increase significantly from 2016 and onwards. 
Excluding the renewable Directive.Fig 22:4
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Figure 21.4:  Difference in fuel use if biomass-prices increase significantly from 2016 and onwards. 
Including the renewable Directive.
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vest. The three top right bars illustrate 
a situation in which they do not anti-
cipate higher prices when they invest. 
In this case, the possibilities to make 
short-run adjustments to their fuel mix 
are of course more limited. When in-
cluding policies aimed at fulfilling the 
renewable directive we see that the 
sector’s flexibility is reduced. Instead 
the renewable directive leads to a sys-
tem change, where district heating is 
substituted by electricity – from bio-
fuels to wind (wind power is the main 
component of “Other renewable” in 
the figures).
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22. Is nuclear power a threat to 
security of supply?
Nuclear power is together, with hydro-
power, a dominant contributor to base 
load generation in the Nordic area. In 
a normal year, the 10 reactors in Swe-
den and the four in Finland produce 
around 90 TWh out of a total demand 
of around 380 TWh. Hydropower 
produces around 200 TWh and the 
remaining 100 TWh come from ther-
mal power and a small share of wind 
power. This figure is based on model 
runs for 2006 with normal hydro in-
flow.
Is nuclear power a threat to security of supply? The answer to this question may 
be yes. A heavy dependence on nuclear power for base load could be a threat to 
security of supply in the Nordic region and the potential problems will increase 
with more wind power in the system. Historically nuclear power has been a 
rather reliable source of electricity, but because of the extremely high standards 
of safety that the industry must follow, even minor faults can lead to the closure 
of reactors. Our analysis indicates that the Nordic power system is rather robust 
in terms of energy, and that even major nuclear power disturbances could be 
handled reasonably well. The problem will mainly be a capacity problem, secu-
ring the system during peak load periods.
Figure 22.1: Generation mix in 
the Nordic region 2006 - a “nor-
mal” year.
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232 
In the near future, the share of nuclear 
power is expected to increase. At pre-
sent there are fairly large ongoing or 
planned investments in the Swedish 
plants designed to extend their life 
span and to increase their capacity. 
These investments may add up to 10 
TWh of annual output. In Finland a 
fifth reactor currently under construc-
tion will add another 13 TWh in a few 
years. Further, three consortiums have 
applied to the Finnish Council of State 
for permission to build a sixth and 
possibly even a seventh and eighth 
reactor.
However, nuclear power is still a sen-
sitive political issue in Sweden. The 
industry has been living with a poli-
tically mandated phase-out program 
for a long time. Following a parlia-
mentary decision, one of the two reac-
tors at Barsebäck was closed down in 
1999 followed by the second reactor 
in 2005. For the remaining ten reactors 
no firm decisions have been taken in 
terms of actual dates when the reactors 
should be closed, but the political will 
to eventually close all plants has never 
been in doubt. Recently, the political 
climate has changed and the present 
government is in favour of allowing 
new reactors to be built, replacing ex-
isting reactors when these reach the 
end of their economic life span.  Ho-
wever, this parliamentary majority is 
very slim. 
Two examples of major disturbances in nuclear generation
In 1992 and 1993, five out of twelve 
Swedish reactors were out of opera-
tion for several months. The reason 
for this was the discovery of a con-
struction mistake in one of the safety 
systems. Since all five rectors hade the 
same basic design, the Swedish safety 
authority decided to temporarily shut 
down all reactors until the problem 
was solved. This is an example of how 
a failure in one reactor can create a 
severe reduction of generation capa-
city. At the time of these incidents, the 
Swedish electricity market was still 
heavily regulated through the State 
Power Board, and the consequences 
for consumers were negligible. 
The next incident occurred this winter 
(2009/2010). Up to four of the reactors 
had serious problems during the win-
ter, which during three specific days, 
contributed to prices escalating to, or 
above, 1000 EUR/MWh.  
For two of the reactors, Ringhals 1 and 
Ringhals 2, there have been numerous 
delays in the planned restart after large 
upgrades. The official explanation for 
the delays from the reactors’ owner is 
that the complexity of the projects had 
been underestimated. There have also 
been some security issues at Ringahals 
that had to be solved before the reac-
tors could restart.  The two reactors 
Oskarshamn 3 and Forsmark 2 have 
been running on reduced capacity 
during the three price peaks, also fol-
lowing major upgrade projects. In to-
tal, nuclear production in Sweden was 
reduced by between 3,5 to 4,4 GW 
during the winter months, creating 
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price spikes on the spot market. Nor-
mal winter capacity in the fourteen nu-
clear reactors in Sweden and Finland 
is about 12 GW.  
Figure 22.2: Hourly prices on NordPool Elspot the winter 2009/2010 in Sweden.
  
To summarise, nuclear capacity in 
Sweden in the winter 2009/2010 was 
reduced for two main reasons:
• Many reactors are undergoing pro-
grams to increase capacity, extend 
reactor lifetime, and increase secu-
rity. These upgrades have proven to 
be more complicated than predicted. 
Planned restarts has been delayed a 
number of times this winter.
• The safety authority has been very 
critical of some of the companies. 
One of the reactors at Ringhals has 
been put under special surveillance.  
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The winter of 2009/2010 was also very 
cold in the Nordic region. Because of 
the large number of electrically heated 
houses this led to high power demand. 
Still, demand in Sweden during the 
price spike the 8th of January was still 
not exceptionally high, about 10%, or 
2,5 GW, below the all-time high.
During the 8th of January when prices 
spiked at 1000 EUR/MWh, resour-
ces from the special capacity reserve 
in Sweden and Finland were used at 
NordPool (140 MW was accepted at 
Elspot). At the same time Svenska 
Kraftnät, the Swedish TSO, used the 
special capacity reserve to stabilize 
the grid. 1080 MW of generation from 
the reserve* was activated to allow 
for exports of hydropower from the 
northern part of Sweden to the south 
without violating security limits.
The Nordic electricity system is resilient to reduced nuclear 
generation in terms of energy, but not in terms of capacity
The Nordic electricity system is resi-
lient to reduced nuclear generation in 
terms of energy, but not in terms of 
capacity.
We have in the NEP project used 
two of our electricity market models 
(PoMo and EMM) to simulate the ef-
fects of a severe production decline in 
nuclear generation. The assumption is 
that nine of the fourteen reactors are 
out of operation for one year. 
In Figure 22.3 we have summarised 
the consequences in terms of energy. 
From the model runs we see that the 
reduction in nuclear power is compen-
sated by increased imports, increased 
hydro generation, increased genera-
tion in condensing power plants, and 
a small increase in CHP. We also get a 
decrease in demand of 4-5 TWh in the 
electricity intensive industry because 
of high prices. 
In the figure we have illustrated two 
cases: one in which the market actors 
believe that the nuclear plants will 
be back in operation within one year 
(“planned restart”), and one in which 
they do not know when the plants will 
be restarted (“uncertain restart”). The 
difference in results between the two 
cases is the use of water in the reser-
voirs. With planned restart, the hydro-
power companies are less interested in 
saving water for later, and are instead 
willing to produce more electricity 
while the nuclear plants are closed.
 
*) In the Swedish capacity reserve 1166 MW generation and 633 MW of demand reductions is contracted.
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Figure 22.3:  Estimated replacement energy using the PoMo model. Scenario with 9 nuclear reac-
tors out of operation for one year.
Looking at the prices predicted by 
PoMo, we see that most of the time, 
prices are higher than normal, but not 
dramatically higher. The problems oc-
cur during periods of cold weather and 
high demand. This is illustrated by the 
peak prices during the winter weeks. 
    
Figure 22.4:  Estimated prices using the PoMo model. Scenario with 9 nuclear reactors 
out of operation for one year.
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We get similar results for average pri-
ce increases using the EMM-model, 
but in that model we do not get the 
high winter peaks. One reason for that 
is that the PoMo model and the EMM 
model treat bottlenecks in imports and 
exports differently.   
Note that PoMo and EMM are mo-
dels for market price calculations and 
not grid models. Transmission system 
congestions inside the market area are 
not taken into account well enough to 
simulate capacity limitations in the 
grid.  These models are good in de-
scribing the challenge of over a year 
replacing the loss of more than 60 
TWh of nuclear generation, but these 
models are not designed to capture 
short term capacity issues. In reality, 
temporary bottlenecks in the grid will 
cause situations much more severe 
than illustrated here. This is something 
we learned this last winter. 
What these model runs illustrate is that 
the Nordic electricity system is rather 
resilient to reduced nuclear generation 
in terms of energy, but from expe-
riences in real life we know that lack 
of base load generation during winter 
weeks will cause capacity problems, at 
least in parts of the Nordic market.  
With more wind power in the Nordic market, the capacity 
issue will have to be highlighted further
In all of the scenarios for the deve-
lopment of the Nordic market used in 
the NEP project we see an increase in 
the use of wind power and a decline 
in fossil fuel based condensing power. 
We also know that even if wind po-
wer plants will most likely be spread 
geographically over the entire Nordic 
region, there will be periods with high 
demand and unusually low wind gene-
ration. This will increase the risk for 
capacity shortage in the region. 
In Figure 22.5 we have illustrated this 
by looking at wind data and simulated 
the total production from wind power 
during a winter week. The assump-
tions are that we have 34 500 MW 
of wind power installed in Sweden, 
Norway and Finland. This amount of 
wind power will approximately co-
ver 20 percent of the annual demand 
in these three countries. The different 
lines in the figure show the estimated 
hourly production for different years. 
The variations are almost three times 
the Swedish nuclear capacity.
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Figure 22.5:  Estimated wind power production from installed capacity of 34 500 MW in Sweden, 
Norway and Finland. Source: The Sweco Wind Model, WiMo.
Is nuclear power a threat to security of supply?
The answer to this question may be yes. 
A heavy dependence on nuclear power 
for base load could be a threat to secu-
rity of supply in the Nordic region and 
the potential problems will increase 
with more wind power in the system. 
Historically nuclear power has been a 
reliable source of electricity, but be-
cause of the extremely high standards 
of safety that the industry must follow, 
even minor faults can lead to the clo-
sure of reactors. Our analysis indicates 
that the Nordic power system is rather 
robust in terms of energy, and that 
even major nuclear power disturban-
ces could be handled reasonably well. 
The problem will mainly be a capacity 
problem, securing the system during 
peak load periods.
One focus here is of course to manage 
the nuclear plants in a way that does 
not jeopardize the security and thus 
the production. Part of the solution is 
also to work hard to introduce more 
demand flexibility into the market, 
and to invest in more transmission ca-
pacity. To promote a more diversified 
mix of base load generation is another 
option.
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23. Potential effects on the Nordic 
region of a gas shortage in Europe 
The European Union is becoming 
more and more dependent on impor-
ted natural gas. This is a result of two 
trends; the demand for natural gas is 
increasing while production within 
the union is decreasing. Production 
is decreasing mainly in the gas fields 
in Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
Figure 23.1 shows the forecast for the 
EU-27 from IEAs World Energy Out-
look 2009.
- increased demand of gas in EU and decreased  
production gives increased dependence of imports
Figure 23.1: Demand, production and imports of natural gas for EU-27 accor-
ding to IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2009.
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If we would include Norway (not an 
EU member) in the picture the situa-
tion would improve, but the share of 
imports would still increase over time.
There are a number of concerns in re-
spect to this increased import depen-
dency:
• Natural gas reserves are located in a 
few countries. An increased import 
dependency in a commodity of such 
dignity will be an issue high on the 
agenda for any government. 
• Recent conflicts between Russia and 
Ukraine has led to severe reductions 
of Russian gas shipped via Ukraine, 
and in January 2009 the shortages 
persisted for several weeks. 
• Long periods of gas delivery inter-
ruptions will cause disturbances in 
many sectors of the society in many 
central European countries. 
• The power prices in UK, Germany, 
the Netherlands and France are 
highly correlated with the costs of 
gas. High gas prises will very soon 
spill over to high electricity prices to 
the consumers.
• The price of CO
2
 within the EU ETS 
system is correlated to the price dif-
ference between gas and coal. High 
gas prices will drive the CO
2
 price. 
This will hurt the industry in Europe 
both trough higher CO
2
 costs and th-
rough higher electricity prices.
Prices for electricity gas and CO2 are all linked together 
Looking at the prices of gas, coal and 
CO
2
 in the different commodity mar-
kets in Europe one can clearly se how 
these markets interact. 
We start out with the formation of the 
CO
2
 price. One common hypothesis 
is that the CO
2
 price must be high 
enough for the natural gas fired po-
wer plants to be competitive compare 
to coal fired power plants. The reason 
behind this hypothesis is that substitu-
tion between coal and gas is one of the 
cheapest mean for the industry in Eu-
rope to reduce CO
2
 emissions to com-
ply with the emission targets.
In Figure 23.2 we have compared the 
running cost of producing electricity 
in gas fired CCGT plants with the run-
ning cost of producing electricity in 
coal fired condensing plants. In the gas 
plant we have assumed an efficiency 
of 50 % and in the coal fired plant an 
efficency of 40 %. In reality the effi-
ciency rate varies quite a lot between 
different plants. What we see is that 
when we include the CO
2
 cost the 
production costs are pretty much the 
same. This implies that the most effi-
cient CCGT plants most likely will be 
running as base load most of the year, 
while the inefficient plants will mainly 
be used as reserve capacity. This is of 
course in line with the intension of the 
carbon market. 
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Figure 23.2: Running cost of gas fired and coal fired power plants including the CO
2
 cost.
One problem with this hypothesis is 
that the price of natural gas also is 
set based on demand and supply on 
the European market. One could ar-
gue that the gas price is set so that gas 
can compete with coal given the CO
2
 
price. We have sort of a “hen and egg 
dilemma” what comes first the CO
2
 
price or the natural gas price? 
One could also argue that since the po-
wer companies up to now got most of 
the emission rights they need for the 
electricity production for free, they 
would not include them in the run-
ning cost calculations. Both theoreti-
cal reasoning and statistical analysis 
have showered that this is not the case. 
Even if a company gets the emission 
right for free these rights have an alter-
native value and if not used for electri-
city generation they can be sold. 
The next question is how the gas price 
influences the European electricity 
price. From the figure below we can 
see that there is a strong correlation 
between of peak electricity price and 
the running cost of CCGT with a 50 
percent efficiency rate. (Since the run-
ning cost of coal and gas fired plants 
are pretty much the same we would 
get a similar picture if we substituted 
CCGT with coal condensing power in 
Figure 23.3). It is interesting to note 
that the peaking gas price in the end 
of 2005 and beginning of 2006 did not 
result in peaking electricity off peak 
prices. It did though lift the peak pri-
ces to rather extreme levels. In both 
Germany and France the prices were 
in line with or a bit higher than the 
running cost of CCGT. In the Nether-
lands the peak prices were a lot higher. 
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Figure 23.3: Running cost of a gas fired CCGT power plant with 50 percent efficiency rate 
and the off peak prices on the spot markets in Germany, the Netherlands and France.
The European electricity peak pri-
ces are normally substantial higher 
than the of peak price of fuels, and 
can mainly be explained by the run-
ning cost of gas power plants and start 
costs. 
It is also interesting to see how well 
the prices on different European mar-
kets follow each other. Another obser-
vation is that in spite of the fact that 
most of the gas in Europe is bought on 
long term contracts, it is the gas spot 
market price that is used when elec-
tricity is bid into the electricity spot 
markets.
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Gas shortage together with a dry year will drive electricity 
prices in the Nordic area
During normal circumstances the 
Nordic countries have lower prices 
than central Europe. A typical import 
/export scenario is that the Nordic 
countries export power during day 
time and import during night. This 
means that we often have the same 
or slightly higher off peak price com-
pared to central Europe, but a lo-
wer peak price. During wet years we 
have enough resources to export even 
during off peak periods and thus in-
creasing the price differences further.
The larges effect will be seen during 
a dry year situation. Depending an the 
severness of the draught we could be 
depending on more or less maximum 
import most of the time. If we have a 
European gas shortage situation at the 
same time as there is a drought in the 
Nordic countries the electricity prices 
could reach price levels never seen be-
fore.
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Figure 23.4: Price difference between Nordpool system price and EEX in Germany. The 
hydrological situation in the Nordic countries compare to an average situation.
How the price difference between 
the Nordic countries and central 
Europe are effected by the hydro si-
tuation is illustrated in Figure 23.4. 
We see from the blue curve in fi-
gure 23.4 that the hydrological si-
tuation in the Nordic countries has 
deteriorated from a surplus situa-
tion in 2008 to a rather large deficit 
during the spring of 2010. At the 
same time we see that the price dif-
ference between the German spot 
market and Nordpool Elspot have 
gone from a situation with lower 
Nordic prices (negative price diffe-
rence) to a situation were we have a 
lot higher prices than Germany.
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
The challenge to use energy systems model-
ling in a “wise and appropriate” manner in  
large multidisciplinary research projects 
Lessons learned during the course of the NEP project
The insights that are presented here summarize the lessons that have been lear-
ned from using energy systems modelling during the course of the NEP project. 
This project is characterized by a number of distinguished features: a compre-
hensive multidisciplinary research project involving a multitude of complex re-
search questions and using, and coordinating, a wide variety of different models 
from different countries and different scientific disciplines. The many research 
questions have defined and governed the modelling process of the project, which 
is essential. Model-related limitations may not affect, or govern, the choice of 
research questions. Furthermore, model analyses have frequently during the 
NEP project been complemented and scrutinized by other scientific disciplines 
from e.g. social and management sciences using methods such as deep inter-
views, questionnaires and statistical analyses. Thus, the findings presented here 
are based on this specific project context.
Every model is biased by traditions and preconceived opinions stemming from 
the model developer, the model user that constantly updates and develops the 
model and, finally, the model client for whom the model results are intended 
and who delivers feed back to model input as well as out-
put. This fact also became very apparent during the cour-
se of the modelling process of the NEP project. However, 
a huge effort was done in order to liberate the models and 
model results from such influence. This does not necessarily 
mean re-coding or reorganizing the models or by changing 
a lot of input, but rather an awareness of the fact that model 
results differ and to expose the different fundamentals and 
assumptions of the models. Thereby, model results may be 
explained on a higher level than otherwise. The often quite 
interval in results may be used as an indicator of the relevant 
and actual uncertainties that are present in certain important 
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OPPORTUNITES AND CHALLENGES
assumptions. Thus, the end result of such a modelling analysis is significantly 
more balanced, and thus more representative, than if only a single model ap-
proach would have been used. On the other hand, there are also differences in 
model assumptions based on traditions and opinions that in fact should be pos-
sible to harmonize once they have been identified and exposed. In some cases, 
there actually may exist “a single truth” or at least, agreed compromise. It is 
indeed an important, and cumbersome, challenge to balance assumptions which 
may be synchronized between different model approaches with assumptions that 
are better left in an unchanged state. 
1. Use models to increase understanding of causes and effects!
Using energy- and climate-policy modelling is an efficient and feasible way of 
dealing, in a consistent way, with complex systems. The use of models provides 
new insights. Furthermore, gathering around a model or several models is a pro-
cess that works as an objective platform, a “clearing house”, where issues can 
be analyzed and discussed among participants with different interests on equal 
grounds. 
2. Involve stakeholders and clients at an early stage
Model inputs and results should be validated and verified by other project par-
ticipants and by external expertise during the entire project. This ensures a high 
degree of credibility to the modelling work. 
3. Consider an interdisciplinary approach, and...
Many issues related to energy and climate policy analysis are truly interdisci-
plinary in their nature. Therefore, research within the field should reflect that 
fact and should, if possible, use more than one scientific discipline or method. 
Thus, model results and insights become supported by not just one but several 
scientific disciplines. 
...organize model users with complementary model 
approaches
The NEP project has used an approach which has proven 
both efficient and successful, namely to involve several 
model approaches developed independently of each other. 
Using several models means that the issues in focus may 
be tackled from different angles, different scientific ap-
proaches and disciplines can be used simultaneously, and 
the risk of bias due to a “common background” is reduced. 
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However, working closely with several models representing different methodo-
logies rarely is a walk in the park. The models must be coordinated and one of 
the main challenges involves input data.
4. It is not possible to harmonize all input assumptions
A large number of assumptions have to be made before model simulations are 
carried out. Even though the input assumptions have been harmonized to an 
extensive degree in all NEP models, it has not been possible to reach full harmo-
nization. The reason is that the models are designed differently. Some of these 
differences make it impractical to fully harmonize model input without compro-
mising the functionality of the models, and some of these differences turn out to 
significantly affect important model results. 
5. Important results are similar in different models
The extensive model analyses of the NEP project have shown that several and 
important results are similar when comparing model outputs. This indicates ro-
bustness of the results. 
6. Some results may vary substantially between the models… 
For other model results, variations between the models have been rather signi-
ficant. 
… but we can explain why ...
Differences in model configurations and coverage yield different results, but 
also increase the understanding of the crucial drivers for developments in e.g. 
power market balances, wholesale prices and CO
2
 emissions from the Nordic 
power market. 
Model output should actually, to a certain extent, differ between different mo-
dels since they are designed differently and for different purposes, they rely on 
different philosophies, and they cover different systems (both in terms of geo-
graphy, time horizon and part of the energy system/macro economy). Further-
more, some of the output is simply not fully comparable. 
…and the differences in model output give an added value to the ana-
lysis!
It is the differences in model output that actually give an added value to the 
analysis since the differences reflect the uncertainties in the system in focus. If 
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the output is relatively similar among all models, this is, on 
the other hand, a strong indication that such specific results 
are robust.
7. Use each model where it is best suited. 
The models can be used to address the same (or similar) is-
sues. Thereby, results that are robust (many models show very 
similar results) may be separated from model results that are signifi-
cantly more uncertain (model results vary largely among the models). Such 
model comparisons are also very efficient for increasing the understanding and 
for validating the models. However, it must also be recognized that certain mo-
dels simply are not properly designed for analyzing all the issues that are dealt 
with.
8. Linking the models: Use output from model A as input to model B
The intention of the NEP project has not been to develop nor use a super model 
which includes as much of the issues to be analyzed as possible. Instead, the 
NEP project has used several separate models. However, these have to be coor-
dinated in terms of input (refer to the discussion above) and in terms of benefit 
from each other, i.e. linking input and output between models. While performing 
the linking, let there be a “human touch” in between models. 
9a. Recognize the “cultural” differences of the models and the modellers
The modeller makes his or her own considerations. Therefore, each model is in a 
sense biased. Furthermore, there exist “cultural” differences in the view on how 
to use models and apply different methods. Some of these cultural differences 
stem from the fact that modellers may have different educational background. 
During the NEP project also “cultural” differences with respect to e.g. the prin-
cipals and practices of energy markets, policy measures etc. were identified. One 
such example is the view on the relation between the two commodities, electri-
city and district heating, from combined heat and power schemes which differs 
somewhat between the Nordic countries. 
9b. Recognize the “national” differences of the models and the modellers
As for “cultural” differences, “national” differences may involve e.g. how to 
consider and describe e.g. energy markets, policy instruments and taxation. “Na-
tional” differences also relate to the view on e.g. future available options for the 
development of the energy system. This is strongly influenced by the “energy 
history” of a certain country. Models originating from countries where a certain 
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fuel or technology to the existing date has played an important role tend to look 
generously on the prospects for that fuel or technology also in the future. And 
not only in the country of origin but also in other countries also described by the 
model. 
 
10. Recognize human errors
There is always a risk of errors or bugs within a model, especially if it is a com-
plex and comprehensive model. Such errors may be minimized by performing a 
vast amount of model runs and carefully analyzing results and let them be scru-
tinized by other experts. Furthermore, as in the case of the NEP project, working 
with several models, harmonizing input data and compare outputs also reduces 
the risk of using a model with a non-discovered error.
Success factors recognized and identified by the NEP 
project
Based on the experiences of the modelling work during the NEP project, we here 
summarize the findings that we encourage others to consider when using several 
energy-systems models in multi-disciplinary analyses. The list on next page is 
based on the “success factors” that we have identified during the course of the 
NEP project. Even though we do not claim to have identified all the success 
factors associated with working with several energy systems models at the same 
time, we firmly believe that the following items may come in very handy for 
those considering to work with energy systems modelling in an interdisciplinary 
way. This may involve projects where modellers as well as clients are respon-
sible for the modelling process and the model coordination.  
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Modelling process
Define research questions and let them govern the modelling activities. Model limitations shall not 
decide the contents of the research. 
Early involvement of stakeholders (feedback on input and output)
Initiate model runs as early as possible, prior to the finalization of input synchronization. Such early 
model activities are very important for starting the learning process and for achieving a general acqu-
aintance with the model package available to the project for modellers as well as clients. 
Identify an appropriate balance between the number of model runs (e.g. sensitivity analyses) and the 
effort put into the analysis of the model runs. Not all model runs need to be reported unless they gene-
rate additional knowledge. 
Establish a well-organized clearing-house where modellers and models are gathered with a shared 
and agreed view on the research questions and a shared model “language”. Keep these gatherings 
on a frequent basis
Ensure that model input and output becomes scrutinized also by other scientific methods such as deep 
interviews, questionnaires and statistical analyses.  
Model synchronization
Synchronize important input data – within reasonable limits
Use output from model A as input to model B where it is appropriate
Model validation
Models should be well validated (and documented)
Put effort in tracking down human errors (by e.g. comparing model outputs)
Differences in model approaches
Choose models with different methods aiming at a final overall interdisciplinary approach. Models 
should be complementary (and not too similar)…
..but recognize model overlaps and use it to highlight selected issues with more than one (in this case 
similar) model approach. This enables quality assurance for the models used and adds value to the 
analysis. 
Identify similarities in model output among the models – Robustness?
Identify differences in model output among the models used. Expose and explain the differences! 
Highlight differences explained by realistic assumptions rather than differences explained by model 
imperfections or shortcomings  
Identify system-boundary differences between the models
Identify differences in geographical scope – How is the “surrounding world” described 
Use each model for what it is aimed for … 
…but also identify areas or issues where a specific model is less useful 
Identify the “cultural” differences in the models (or in the use of models) when working with different 
approaches, e.g. differences in the way markets are described
Identify “national” differences between models from more than one country. This may be due to national 
differences in existing energy systems
20 success factors recognized and identified in NEP
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The following reports and synthesis sheets are published during the second 
phase of the NEP project and are found on the web site:  
www.nordicenergyperspectives.org.
40% CO
2
 reduction in the Nordic energy system; EU’s goals for renewables and ef-
ficiency have significant CO
2
 impact”
Areas in sustainable energy sector where companies in the Nordic countries will have 
both valuable experience and growth opportunities in the home-markets
Biomass market and potentials
Business development on the environmental sustainability agenda; the case of the 
Swedish clean-tech initiatives in biomass combustion industry
CO
2
 emissions from the transport sector in the Nordic countries
Cooperation with the GoReNEST project; incl. two joint workshops
Decreased import dependence with EU´s 20% goals - the import dependence de-
creases in the Nordic energy system as a consequence of increased use of renewable 
energy and decreased use of fossil fuels
Decreased import dependence with the EU 20% goals; results from the SoS work in 
the second phase of the NEP program - results from the MARKAL model
Electric vehicles in the Nordic countries – analyses and experiences from the NEP 
project
Expensive to reach all EU goals; the climate goal demands the least effort!
Global economy scenarios
Insights from the NEP policy scenario simulations
Reports and synthesis sheets
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KOMPAS – comparative analysis of 7 Nordic energy models (in Norwegian)
KOMPAS – improving the description of the demand side in the NEP models
Less DH when EU´s three 20% goals are applied
Millions of electric cars in the Nordic countries- impacts on the Nordic electricity 
system
Natural gas in the Nordic countries
Nordic electricity almost free from CO
2
-emissions already by the year 2020; all new 
capacity that will be built in the Nordic countries is renewable or nuclear.
Nordic industries in a global context
Nordic perspectives on the EU goals relating to CO
2s
, renewable energy and energy 
efficiency - results from the MARKAL model
Perspectives on renewable energy and energy with low CO
2
 emissions, with special 
focus on biomass
Prominent strategies for environmental sustainability in the stationary energy sector
RES deployment profoundly changes the market balance of the Nordics
Synthesis results: Conclusions from the research work in the second phase of the 
project
Technology options for a low CO
2
 energy system; export markets for Nordic know-
ledge and products
The complexity of climate change mechanisms
The development of District Heating in the Nordic countries - Impact of pricing struc-
tures
The future of the Nordic district heating
Widened view of energy efficiency and resource management, including preliminary 
results from the MARKAL model
Winners and losers among the renewable energy alternatives
Wood markets and the situation of the Forest industry in the Nordic countries
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Towards a 
Sustainable 
Nordic Energy System 
20 Perspectives on Nordic Energy  
10 Opportunities and Challenges
Nordic Energy Perspectives (NEP) is an interdisciplinary energy 
research project with the overall goal of demonstrating means for 
stronger and sustainable growth and development in the Nordic 
countries. The Nordic energy system is the point of departure, 
seen from a European and a global perspective. 
NEP analyses the national and international political goals, directi-
ves, and policy instruments within the energy area, as well as their 
influence on the Nordic energy markets and energy systems and 
the infrastructures and institutional structures.
Final report for the second phase of the Nordic Energy Perspectives project
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